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INTRODUCTION
On February 23rd, 2019, I logged on to Youtube to watch the introduction of humanitarian aid
into Venezuela, organized by the Venezuelan Opposition, Colombia, and the United States,
across one of the numerous bridges that connect Colombia and Venezuela. An endless mass of
citizens, led by dozens of workers in humanitarian vests, various reporters, and a few whitecollared politicians marched towards the Venezuelan side, its entry blocked by Venezuelan
soldiers with expressionless faces, behind plastic anti-riot shields. The marchers, draped in
yellow, blue, and red––the colors of both the Colombian and the Venezuelan flags-–sang the
Venezuelan national anthem in bursts. Tiny American flags were also visible in the crowd. When
the protesters reached the Venezuelan blockade, none of their pleas, poems, or prayers could
provoke a reaction from the soldiers. I quit the video and refreshed the live stream, hoping for
new results. Dozens of new videos depicting violence, chaos, and confusion flooded the sidebar
of my screen. In one video, Venezuelan army trucks rammed into civilians attempting to cross
into their country to support the entry of humanitarian aid. Another depicted frantic civilians
surrounding a semi-truck engulfed in flames, but the white-collared politicians and professional
cameras were gone; teenage boys in improvised facemasks and shirtless, nameless men pulled
cardboard boxes marked “USAID” out of the rubble and smoke. Onlookers filmed the drama on
their cellular phones, and––briefly––the world watched. Soon, new videos began to circulate on
the internet, filmed on the Venezuelan side. Young protesters, gathered to support the entry of
humanitarian aid into their country, disappeared under clouds of tear-gas, and shots rang from
Venezuelan security forces. From a window in an unknown border town, a few individuals
captured footage of a truck––allegedly carrying humanitarian aid––barreling down a dirt road,
pursued by Venezuelan army trucks. The soldiers cornered the aid truck, a flurry of shots could
be heard, and the onlookers exclaimed “they killed him, they killed him!” Prominent members of
the Venezuelan Opposition promptly reposted the video––as evidence of the regime’s brutality.
That night, Venezuelan presidential hopeful, Juan Guaidó, tweeted asking the international
community to consider “all options to achieve the liberation of the Motherland.” One minute
later, US Senator Marco Rubio added, “the grave crimes committed today by the Maduro regime
have opened the door to various potential multilateral actions not on the table just 24 hours ago.”
Thousands of online accounts began to post the hashtag #IntervencionMilitarYa
(#MilitaryInterventionNow). For a brief moment, many seemed convinced that army defections
in Venezuela would tilt the balance of power in the country against Maduro. In the days
following these events, much of the international news coverage reflected this anticipation––that
Maduro’s frequent accusations of assassination plots, a US-backed coup, even a military
invasion from Colombia, would materialize. Soon, some media outlets and social media
discussions began to indicate, rather, that the failed attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into
Venezuela was a reflection of Maduro’s grip on power––that the regime had emerged from this
period of instability stronger than before.
In the days and weeks that followed, I became aware of significant discrepancies in the
representations of these events within local and international media, as well as the digital,
transnational spheres of public opinion. Narratives denouncing US Air Force planes, carrying
humanitarian aid, as a thinly-veiled cover for regime change in Venezuela coexisted with
characterizations of humanitarian efforts as legitimate manifestations of international solidarity–
–or even a solution to hunger and poverty in Venezuela. Furthermore, I grew interested in the
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experience of these events by the residents of Colombo-Venezuelan border communities. Their
homes became the launching point for a months-long international humanitarian campaign, a
global spectacle that included even an all-day concert, “Venezuela Aid Live,” organized by
British billionaire Richard Branson to support the humanitarian effort, which drew hundreds of
thousands more––filling store shelves, hotel rooms, and restaurants unlike any moment in local
history. From halfway across the world, it was even more difficult to establish a clear picture of
the consequences these events––and their aftermath––had for border communities. Had they
welcomed the international attention, the foreign military planes and ambassadors, the politicians
from Caracas and Bogotá? Would these communities also be recipients of food and medical
supplies? Had the events and visitors presented new opportunities, or undue burdens? How had
they experienced the moment when the tiny town of Cúcuta was briefly on the covers of major
international newspapers? How did these communities feel afterwards, as the international news
pivoted quickly towards the next crisis, the next tragedy? The media offered no clear answers, no
complete narratives––only conflicting constructions of the same events.
My effort to understand these events and their context reflects an acute version of the dissonance
I often felt as a transnational subject of Venezuelan descent myself. All my life, my struggle to
understand dominant media constructions of events in Venezuela has been accentuated by my
physical distance to the country that was briefly my home––and filtered through the ideologies,
emotions, and nostalgia of immigrant parents who never wanted to leave. My undergraduate
studies of Latin American Literature and History provided new frameworks and reference-points
for understanding what were, indeed, increasingly fictional spaces and reconstructed memories.
These experiences led me to undertake this project, a discursive analysis of the dominant
coverage of the Colombo-Venezuelan border in the Colombian national press. With the support
of a Latin American Studies Research Award, and under the mentorship of Professor Nadia
Celis, during the summer of 2019 I conducted research in Colombia, primarily in Bogotá. By
looking at archival editions of El Espectador and El Tiempo, and scholarship on the history of
the Colombo-Venezuelan relations, I sought to examine the extent to which border crises gain
periodic attention in the Colombian press. In particular, I grew interested in the ways that
national press coverage might include, exclude, or reconfigure the priorities of border
communities. I tracked the changes and continuities in national press coverage of border
relations from the start of the Chávez presidency (April 2002-March 2013) to the year 2019, and
I scrutinized the extent to which dominant press coverage of the border may promote, or reflect,
the narratives of the Colombian state, the geopolitical interests of the United States, or economic
powers. Furthermore, I interrogated the conceptions of national identity articulated by media
narratives concerning border relations, and I sought to contrast these visions with the
perspectives and experiences presented by border communities.
Additionally, I interviewed local scholars and consulted local scholarship in media studies and
international relations, hoping to establish continuity between, evolution from, or the
transformation of their observed trends. Academic work in communications and media studies,
detailing the historical links between political and economic power and the Colombian media,
the concentration of media ownership, and the themes and trends in media representation,
confirmed my initial intuitions regarding the interplay between the Colombian media and
political and economic power. I became interested in the ways that media coverage engages in
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the cyclical production of crises, which are constructed in ways that divert public attention away
from “central” national issues towards the periphery––the border––constructing external
“enemies,” such as the Venezuelan state, rather than highlighting the fissures within Colombian
society. These interests led me to travel to the border city of Cúcuta, Colombia, where I held a
series of conversations with local government, industry leaders and members of the chamber of
commerce, labor union leaders, the editor of La Opinión, and citizens. My time in Cúcuta
suggested a profound discrepancy between the representation of the Colombo-Venezuelan border
within the national press vs. the lived experience of border communities, as well as the counterrepresentation of the border by the local press. Conversations with local sources at the border and
a review of relevant coverage indicated that the dominant representations of the border region in
major Colombian press outlets prioritized themes of violence, militarization, and conflict, while
local perspectives were often secondary to, or excluded from, the coverage. These experiences
informed my perceptions of the border––from the perspective of those most affected by ongoing
border crises––before the interrogation of dominant media representations through textual and
visual analysis.
Upon my return, I undertook a closer examination of the primary and secondary sources
collected in Colombia, looking in particular to the news sections of El Tiempo and El
Espectador, the major newspapers in Colombia, in addition to opinion pieces, editorials, and
photo galleries. Subsequently, a review of relevant theoretical background and an updated
methodology gave rise to the questions that drive the chapters that follow:
-

-

-

What narratives about the Colombo-Venezuelan border are constructed by the national
press? And how are these narratives legitimated as “true”?
How does the press construct and “imagine” communities, and who are, within these
imagined communities, the protagonists and antagonists, heroes, enemies, and friends,
offenders and defenders?
How do narrative techniques and rhetorical strategies, including syntaxis, paratextual
elements, imagery, repetition, dramatization, and emotions operate to suggest culpability,
construct victimhood, and justify state violence?
How does newspapers implicitly “construct” their audience?
How does the press coverage function to mobilize and construct notions of national
identity?
How do border subjects mobilize the discourse on Colombo-Venezuelan relations for
their own ends?
How do the “realities” constructed by the dominant press differ from those presented by
border communities?

The process of answering these questions began to reveal divergent editorial lines and dominant
narratives within each newspaper’s construction of the relation between the Colombian and
Venezuelan nations, states, and their people. Moreover, the combined conceptual background
relevant to this study helped reveal that El Tiempo and El Espectador construct different “truths”
through divergent constructions of similar events in a manner coherent with the ideological
affinities and conceptions of national identity held by their respective audiences and the editorial
leadership of each newspaper, constrained further by economic factors and pressures. The
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narratives and strategies used to promote each newspaper's vision of the Colombian nation,
through their coverage of binational tensions, became the primary focus of this thesis.
Antecedents and Historical Context
The history of the Venezuelan and Colombian nations and people is one of kinship and
interdependency, particularly in the border region. This historical bond has been invoked
recently by officials such as President Duque, who has described Venezuelan migrants to
Colombia as “brothers and sisters” with whom Colombia will always be “united by fraternity.”
Indeed, the rapid acceleration of Venezuelan migration to Colombia has not elicited an
exclusionary response from the Colombian state. Between 2018-2019 alone, Colombia accepted
nearly 1 million Venezuelan migrants––amounting to 1.7 million by December 2019 and
expected to reach 2.4 million by the end of 2020. 1 In 2017, the Colombian government began to
offer free healthcare and education to Venezuelan migrants; in 2019, the state granted citizenship
to all children of Venezuela refugees, a measure to last through 2021; in 2020, the state sought to
integrate Venezuelans into the formal economy by offering work permits to hundreds of
thousands of migrants who entered the country before November 29, 2019. 2
Conversely, the relationship between the Colombian and Venezuelan states has become
increasingly marked by distrust, growing militarization, and the threat of conflict. The recently
sharpening divide between the two countries may be traced to the intersection of the presidencies
of Álvaro Uribe (August 2002-August 2010) and Hugo Chávez (April 2002-March 2013).
During this period, the drug war became a pretext for Colombia to strengthen its relationship
with the United States, and Colombia became the closest ally of the United States against the
leftist government of Venezuela. Under the administration of Juan Manuel Santos (August 2010August 2018), Uribe’s successor, Colombia and Venezuela renewed diplomatic relations, which
had been frozen since July of that year. Although numerous incursions into Colombian territory
by the Venezuelan military, under Chavez’s successor Nicolás Maduro (April 2013-present),
renewed binational tensions, the Santos administration pursued peaceful negotiations with an
explicit rejection of militaristic rhetoric. Fears of military conflict at the border were renewed,
however, under the subsequent administration of President Iván Duque (beginning in 2018),
which strengthened Colombia’s relationship with the United States, advocated for regime change
in Venezuela, and cooperated with the Venezuelan Opposition to introduce humanitarian aid into
the country––largely of US origin––in violation of Venezuela’s national sovereignty. These
efforts fueled fears of military conflict or intervention in Venezuela. Subsequently, border
commerce strained under the suspension of diplomatic relations and border closures.
Moreover, the political and economic priorities of the interior have increasingly silenced those of
border communities, the ultimate victims of tensions between Colombia and Venezuela.
Nevertheless, the movement patterns of transnational individuals persist; these dynamics
Migracioncolombia.gov.co, Migración Colombia, February 2020, accessed May 11, 2020,
https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/noticias/251-febrero-2020/mas-de-un-millon-setecientos-setenta-y-un-milvenezolanos-estan-radicados-en-colombia-migracion-colombia.
2 Anatoly Kurmanaev and Jenny Carolina González, “Colombia Offers Citizenship to 24,000 Children of
Venezuelan Refugees,” New York Times, August 5, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/world/americas/colombia-citizenship-venezuelans.html.
1
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continue to contest growing nationalist sentiment on both sides of the border. The transnational
economies and dynamics upon which border communities depend, while compromised gravely
by the effects of binational tensions in Bogotá and Caracas, continue to adapt to these new
conditions. Hyperinflation, scarcity in foodstuffs, and shortages in medical supplies still draw
Venezuelans to border-towns such as Cúcuta, both through formal and––increasingly––informal
passages. Colombians continue to depend upon Venezuelan migrants as consumers and laborers.
Moreover, transnational familial and kinship networks link communities across both sides of the
border.
The Contemporary Colombian Media Landscape
Contemporary scholarship on the Colombian media demonstrates that the print media play an
increasingly active role in Colombia’s public diplomacy and foreign policy, often in alignment
with the priorities of the Colombian state. Furthermore, the political and economic structures of
the Colombian media are significant factors to the media tendencies observed in this study:
sensational journalism appealing to emergent nationalisms––and constructing their own
nationalistic discourses––the marginalization, misrepresentation, and mobilization of border
communities’ concerns, a demonstrated commitment in the discursive production and
reproduction of crises, and a redirection of popular attention towards external enemies.
In the 20th and 21st centuries, the relationship between the media and neoliberal interests has
increased around the globe. As a consequence of high production costs, the news has become
highly oligopolistic, which presents a fundamental challenge to the right to diverse and
independent communication. Particularly when media production models have become
increasingly dependent upon advertising revenue, media consumers must be homogenized and
information standardized in order to appeal to a more general audience and, in turn, increase
sales3,4 Moreover, the transition of media ownership from political to economic groups entails a
reformulation of “the news” from strictly social knowledge––ideology––into a commodity
directed by market factors; thus, the information presented in the current news media is not only
directed and constrained by socially accepted knowledge criteria, it must also be consistent with
profitability. Consequently, the mass media are no longer only producers of socially significant
information, rather, they engage in a productive activity that must satisfy consumer demands.5,6
This neoliberal reformulation of the mass media affirms María Teresa Herran’s thesis in her
political economy of the Colombian media, La industria de los medios de comunicación en
Colombia (1991):
mass media have been understood as tools to generate consensus...whose materialized
products contribute to the creation of the social contract necessary for the production of
the system. Nevertheless, and without questioning the latter proposition, such
Bagdikian, Ben. El monopolio de los medios de difusión. (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica), 22.
Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New
York: Pantheon Books, 2002), 15.
5 Teun A. Van Dijk. Discourse and Knowledge: A Sociocognitive Approach. (Cambridge;New York: Cambridge
University Press), 39.
6 David Felipe Jara Arevalo. “Neoliberalismo y su relación actual con los medios masivos de comunicación en
Colombia.” (Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana): 177.
3
4
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frameworks [dismiss] the consideration of information as a product in itself, of the mass
media as a productive process and the means of communications as an industry. 7
Yet, mass media must also satisfy social and political demands. In capitalist societies, mass
media function increasingly as hegemonic apparatuses, displacing education as the primary arena
of consensus and socialization for members of civil society and becoming the institutions
wherein individuals relate to reality. 8,9 Thus, the centralization of ownership over the mass media
by dominant economic groups is no coincidence; ownership over strategically important
apparatuses of social and political control, even if they are not the most viable mechanisms of
wealth production, presents a key avenue through which to legitimate prevailing political and
economic paradigms.10
In Colombia, the neoliberalization of the dominant national press is not only demonstrated
through the concentration of media ownership, but also aggravated by the explicit family ties of
media owners and directors to political and economic powers. Historically, the Colombian mass
media has existed in tension between the twin poles of deregulation and absolute state
intervention. Within the neoliberal era, media concentration in the hands of corporate and
political interests has contributed to the erosion of the “right to information” dictated in the 1991
Colombian constitution,
Every individual is guaranteed the freedom to express and diffuse his/her thoughts and
opinions, to transmit and receive information that is true and impartial, and to establish
mass communications media. The latter are free and have social responsibility. The right
to make corrections under conditions of equity is guaranteed. There shall be no
censorship.11
The Colombian press exhibits not only the economic pressures above mentioned, but is also
compromised by the links between editorial staff––and controlling family or economic groups––
to the country’s political leadership. These dynamics may help explain why Colombia is one of
the most dangerous countries for journalists. Dominant news coverage of the border must be
understood in the context of these internal pressures and dangers, compounded by local and
foreign economic and political interests.
El Tiempo, the most widely read newspaper in Colombia was founded in 1911 by Eduardo
Santos, and the Santos family remained main shareholders between 1913 to 2007. A history of
strong links between the Santos family and El Tiempo evidence the concentration of political
power, economic groups, and the dominant mass media characteristic to the Colombian context.
Enrique Santos Calderón served as director of El Tiempo from 1999-2009. Luis Fernando
Santos, his brother, was the president of Casa Editorial El Tiempo S.A from 1996-2010. During
María Teresa Herrán, La industria de los medios masivos de comunicación en Colombia (Bogotá: Fundación
Friedrich Ebert de Colombia, 1991), 32.
8 Javier Esteinou Madrid, Los medios de comunicación y la transformación de la sociedad civil (Ciudad de México:
Universidad Iberoamericana, 1985), 8-12.
9 Germán Rey and Javier Dario Restrepo, Desde las dos orillas (Bogotá: Ministerio de Comunicaciones, 1996), 31.
10 Jara Arevalo, 177.
11 “Colombia’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2015” Constituteproject.org, accessed May 12,
2020, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015.pdf?lang=en.
7
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this period, their brother, Juan Manuel Santos, served as Minister of Defense under President
Álvaro Uribe from 2006-2009. Later, Juan Manuel Santos became President of Colombia from
2010 to 2018. Francisco Santos Calderón, Juan Manuel Santos’ cousin served as Vice-President
under President Álvaro Uribe and would later join Uribe’s conservative “Centro Democrático”
party after Uribe and Santos became political rivals. In turn, Francisco Santos would become
ambassador to the United States under President Iván Duque, Uribe’s political protégé.
During the past two decades, however, the country’s leading newspaper has not only been
intertwined with political leadership, but also economic powers. In 2007, Luis Carlos Sarmiento
Angulo, a business mogul who is also the richest man in the country, became the primary
shareholder of El Tiempo. Ownership over El Tiempo’s parent company, Casa Editorial El
Tiempo S.A., became divided between Inversiones Vistahermosa S.A.S. (a company that
belongs to Grupo Aval of Luis Sarmiento Angulo), Inversegovia (which also belongs to the Aval
Group, and of which Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo owns 64.17% of shares), and Seguros de
Vida Alfa S.A. (also under controlling ownership by Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo).
Furthermore, strong links between El Tiempo and elite political families persist. Adriana María
Santos Calderón, sister of former Vice-President and current US ambassador Francisco Santos
Calderón and cousin of former President Juan Manuel Santos, is currently the sister-in-law of
Roberto Pombo, editor-in-chief of El Tiempo. Luz Angela Sarmiento, daughter of Luis Carlos
Sarmiento, is married to the current ambassador to the United Kingdom, Antonio José Ardila––
the son of Carlos Ardila Lülle, whose Organización Ardila Lülle (OAL) also owns the largest
radio network, RCN, and the television channel with the second-largest audience in the country,
Canal RCN.12
El Espectador, the oldest newspaper in Colombia, was founded in 1887 by the Colombian
journalist and politician, Fidel Cano Gutiérrez. Since its inception, the newspaper has been
defined by its opposition to officialist discourses, marked by the denouncement of powerful
financial groups and its commitment to highlighting marginalized voices. El Espectador has
weathered sanctions, censorship, and violent opposition by military dictatorships, democratically
elected presidents, and Colombian drug cartels. El Espectador has also faced retaliation in the
form of publicity boycotts by Colombian companies, pressured by financiers under investigation
for the illegal loans and financial irregularities.13 Journalists and editors at El Espectador have
faced death threats, kidnapping, and assassination for their criticism of national drug trafficking
cartels and investigative reporting highlighting human rights violations perpetrated by members
of the Colombian military, as well as right-wing paramilitary groups such as the AUC (United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), with alleged ties to President Álvaro Uribe Velez. 14
Political pressures have had continued financial impacts upon the El Espectador, which,
compounded by a national economic crisis, contributed to the newspaper’s near financial
FECOLPER and Reporters Without Borders, “Media Ownership Monitor Colombia,” accessed May 11, 2020,
https://colombia.mom-rsf.org/en/media/detail/outlet/el-tiempo/.
13 Andrés Osorio Guillott, “Las armas del periodismo: el Grupo Grancolombiano,” El Espectador, June 02, 2019,
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/cultura/las-armas-del-periodismo-el-grupo-grancolombiano-articulo-864013.
14 Reporters Without Borders, “Colombia - 2003 Annual Report,” accessed May 11, 2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20071030184409/http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=6191.
12
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collapse in 1997. That year, the founding Cano family lost its position as primary shareholders to
the Bavaria Industrial Group, owned by the wealthy Santo Domingo Family. Subsequently, the
Santo Domingo Group replaced all editorial leadership. El Espectador became a key asset to the
Santo Domingo Group, with majority stake in Bavaria Brewery, with a holding company,
Valorem S.A., that maintains significant direct and indirect ownership across media and
communications channels, including Colombia’s largest private television channel, Caracol
Television, and the main radio network, Blu Radio. 15
The acquisition of El Espectador by the most powerful economic group in the country, the Santo
Domingo Group, affirms the tendency of media concentration under neoliberal economic
structures. Furthermore, this transition illustrates the political consequences of concentrated
media ownership in the Colombian context. Indeed, bought under financial distress, the
newspaper held primarily social and political value. Subsequently, the newspaper’s editorial
leadership was directed to voice unconditional support to political candidates favorable to the
Santo Domingo Group. Notably, in 1998, the director of the newspaper was fired after his refusal
to voice support for a conservative presidential candidate. He was replaced by a close friend of
the Santo Domingo family.16 The concentration of media ownership not only presents barriers to
liberty of expression and freedom of information, but also has a direct impact upon the media’s
construction of events.
Methodology and Theoretical Framework
The discourse analysis portion of this study is limited in scope to the period of August 2018
through November 2019, tracing the development of the discourse on the Colombo-Venezuelan
border and migration from the start of the Duque presidency. During the period that concerns this
study, the Colombian government suspended diplomatic relations with Venezuela, worked
closely with the United States to facilitate the introduction of American humanitarian aid into
Venezuela, and closed the border with Venezuela––after the Maduro government had done so in
response to the humanitarian efforts––dramatically altering the lives of border communities.
Furthermore, this period is marked by the escalation of the Venezuelan Migration Crisis, as
millions of Venezuelan migrants entered Colombia, which placed further strains upon local
resources that accentuated tensions between Colombian citizens and the Colombian state.
The period under study presents a concrete moment through which to examine the confluence of
media and power in Colombia, which this analysis undertakes through an examination of
representative articles selected after the review of three key themes in the narrative of ColomboVenezuelan border relations established in El Espectador and El Tiempo: incursions by
Venezuelan forces at the border, Venezuelan migration to Colombia, and the humanitarian
efforts of February 22-23, 2019.
The analytical process began by the determination of the key “semantic blocks,” or themes,
relevant to the discourse on the Colombo-Venezuelan border, identified following an overview
Redacción El Tiempo, “Vendido El Espectador,” El Tiempo, November 13, 1997,
https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-695273.
16 Javier Dario Restrepo, “El Espectador de Colombia: agonía de un periódico,” Revista Latinoamericana de
Comunicación CHASQUI, no. 076 (2001), https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/160/16007604.pdf.
15
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of both El Tiempo and El Espectador’s coverage. Within each semantic block, a series of
representative articles were chosen for analysis, to determine their respective discursive patterns
and structures. When studying each article, I considered actors, spaces, grammatical structures,
contextual conditions, paratextual conditions, character of headlines and leads 17, implications
and presuppositions 18, use of metaphors, lexical expression19, and leading imagery.
The conceptual frame of this study is informed by Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a
multidisciplinary research approach that primarily studies how discursive structures of text and
talk within a given socio-political context function to “enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or
challenge relations of power and dominance in society.” CDA is anchored in the notion that
“power relations are discursive…[that] the link between text and society is mediated [and]
discourse is a form of social action” within discursive platforms such as conversations and news
reports. My approach is also informed by CDA’s commitment to performing analyses “in
solidarity and cooperation with dominated groups.” 20 This study seeks to examine the nature and
implications of the images, narratives, and constructed realities that characterize the Colombian
press’ representation of the border through the analysis of discourse. This theoretical background
informed my analysis of numerous articles presented in El Tiempo and El Espectador, all of
which relate to the diplomatic crises at the Colombo-Venezuelan border from 2008-2019 and
were compiled during my summer archival research or accessed within the online archives of
both publications.
At the theoretical level, this study dialogues with theories of nation, power and representation
that demonstrate how discourse and representation are key to the construction of not only
“imagined communities” but also the everyday expressions of citizenship by the individuals
interpellated by those discourses. Althusser’s concepts of ideology and ideological state
apparatuses, Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman’s propaganda model of the mass media,
Sara Ahmed’s political theories concerning emotions, representation, and the nation, and
Benedict Anderson’s reflections on the relations between print technology and nationalism,
among other texts, have offered useful background and guidance.
The framing, emphases, sourcing, and imagery that characterize much of the coverage of the
Colombo-Venezuelan border region within El Tiempo function to accentuate and legitimate the
exercise of state violence, construct exclusive notions of national identity, and justify violence
against “secondary” border residents and Venezuelan citizens. Moreover, the newspaper
functions under the implicit assumption of an ideal audience that excludes border communities
and their residents. Nonetheless, within El Tiempo’s coverage, border residents mobilize
dominant narratives for their own benefit––to articulate material needs and seek political
recognition. There is a tension between the narratives and forms of representation constructed
within El Tiempo and those constructed by El Espectador. El Espectador’s coverage of the
border emphasizes the victimhood of Colombian citizens––specifically, Colombian border
communities––at the hand of the Colombian state and de-emphasizes conflict at the border.
17 titles,
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http://www.discourses.org/OldArticles/Critical%20Discourse%20Analysis.pdf.
18 which

12

During the attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela in February of 2019, for
example, El Espectador’s coverage de-legitimates violent or military solutions to regime change
in Venezuela, reaffirming its characteristic appeals to national identity rooted in liberaldemocratic ideals, and the coverage also legitimates the perspectives and concerns of Colombian
border communities, whose perspectives are mobilized to facilitate criticism of the Colombian
state.
El Tiempo tends to provide a platform for state narratives through limited sourcing practices,
which depend upon sources from the Colombian state, such as President Duque, ambassadors,
diplomats, and military officials. Its coverage is also characterized by the repetition of charged
imagery and the emotionalization of coverage to invoke a conception of national identity rooted
in military strength, against which the Venezuelan state is characterized as a threat to national
sovereignty and security. These narratives reflect the newspaper’s alignment with the Colombian
Right Wing, affirmed by the character of its audience and editorial leadership. Moreover, El
Tiempo’s coverage legitimates violent or military solutions to regime change in Venezuela and
emphasizes the economic and military benefits of a strong US-Colombia partnership.
Conversely, El Espectador less consistently reflects state narratives, or at least adheres to more
diverse sourcing practices, highlighting the perspectives of academics and analysts from national
and international think-tanks and universities, members of truth commissions, representatives of
the Lima Group and the European Union, and members of the Colombian political opposition to
the Colombian government, sources which are cited less frequently in El Tiempo’s construction
of similar events. El Espectador also covers “Social issues / Labor / Poverty,” including many
stories about “violence against peasants/social leaders” in its coverage of the border, greater
coverage of “paramilitary” violence, in addition to guerrilla violence, which has a left-wing
association; El Espectador more consistently highlights both left and right-wing violence. Its
coverage includes more instances of violence by the Colombian military and security forces, who
are presented also as perpetrators of violence, rather than purely defensive forces. Moreover, El
Espectador constructs an alternative nationalist discourse based upon commitments to
multicultural inclusion and liberal-democratic ideals. Therefore, the newspaper frames the rise of
xenophobia by Colombian citizens as a moral crisis, rather than class conflict. Moreover, El
Espectador’s appeals to a national conception rooted in liberal-democratic ideals are
demonstrated by the newspaper’s calls for inclusion in its coverage of Venezuelan migration,
reflected ultimately by the scrutiny of US-Colombia relations and the rejection of violent or
military solutions to regime change in Venezuela,” characteristic to its coverage.
Chapter 1 analyzes key trends in the representation of military and sovereignty crises at the
Colombo-Venezuelan border by El Tiempo, during the period of August 2017-2019. The chapter
highlights the use of imagery to further national hostility, the transformation of vocabulary to
emphasize conflict, and the functions of paratextual elements such as tweets, videos, and web
links as spaces through which to affirm nationalistic discourses in El Tiempo. These tendencies
are then contrasted to El Espectador’s coverage, which reveals the newspaper’s comparatively
diverse and cautious representation of militarization and sovereignty crises at the border.
The first chapter draws heavily from the psychological variant of CDA developed by Teun A.
van Dijk in Discourse and Knowledge, marked by his observations of the socio-cognitive
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processes that underpin the construction of real-world events through language, a domain which
he characterizes as necessarily influenced by ideologies and power relations. Specifically,
Chapter 1’s examination of social media commentary––reader’s reactions to imagery that insists
upon Venezuelan aggression––demonstrates the manner in which the events and communicative
situations described by newspaper articles demands a level of congruity with readers’ preexisting beliefs. In this case, the “common ground” of El Tiempo’s readership is not only
reproduced by the coverage, but readers understand the discourse put forth insofar as it confirms,
or activates, their pre-existing assumptions about a specific situation or event––assumptions from
which leading imagery, headlines, and the editorial line do not strongly diverge.21
Drawing from Althusser’s discussion of interpellation in Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses (1970), Chapter 1 also examines the imposition of leading images to sustain
narratives of Venezuelan aggression upon El Tiempo’s readership. The chapter demonstrates the
ways in which these impositions both correspond to the internalized assumptions of Venezuelan
hostility held by the newspaper’s audience––affirmed early on by the character of the social
media commentary––and imply the validity of these assumptions through photographic evidence,
although this “evidence” does not depict the actual events in question, rather it functions to
sustain dominant narratives of Venezuelan hostility. By conditioning the audience response in
this way, leading images interpellate individuals as national subjects according to a conception
of the Colombian nation that neglects the transnational character of border life and redefines the
border as a site of hostility and the Venezuelan state as permanent threat to Colombian citizens. 22
Ahmed’s theories concerning multiculturalism, victimhood, and nationhood in Strange
Encounters (2000) and The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004) have also been influential to this
study, which examines the construction of ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ victims in the context of
mounting diplomatic tensions between Colombia and Venezuela, in addition to the Venezuelan
Migration Crisis.
The transformations of vocabulary to emphasize conflict and the placement of value upon the
emotions of Colombian and Venezuelan citizens, suffering at the hands of the Venezuelan state–
–to emphasize its illegitimacy––is a tendency observed throughout this study, in both El
Espectador and El Tiempo’s coverage of border relations and migration. This study’s
examination of the various configurations and mobilizations of victimhood within each
newspaper affirms Ahmed’s claim that certain narratives of victimhood have greater value in a
global market of pain.
Chapter 1, in particular, examines the ways in which the pain of border subjects provides a
platform upon which Colombian identity may be superimposed; this pain may be appropriated as
a collective “loss” and mobilized to affirm nationalist discourses.23 In Chapter 3, El Tiempo’s
centralization of Venezuelan victimhood––over that of Colombian border communities––
functions to a similar effect.
Van Dijk, Discourse and Knowledge, 62, 66.
Louis Althusser, On The Reproduction Of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (London;New
York: Verso, 2014), 174-175.
23 Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York: Routledge, 2004), 32.
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Moreover, the proliferation of appeals calling for migrant inclusion, which originate from the
Colombian state, are echoed by both El Espectador and El Tiempo. The affirmation Venezuelan
migrants and Colombian border citizens as victims functions––in both newspapers––to appeal to
divergent conceptions of national identity marked, nevertheless, by the marginalization of other
groups––notably, the Colombian working class by El Espectador, an issue undertaken in Chapter
2, and Colombian border citizens by El Tiempo, examined in Chapter 3. In sum, victimhood
operates to affirm state narratives and displace discussions of economic inequality, which affirms
Ahmed’s insight that:
[the] commodification of suffering does not mean that all narratives have value or even
equal value...some forms of suffering more than others will be repeated, as they can more
easily be appropriated as ‘our loss’. The differentiation between forms of pain and
suffering in stories that are told, and between those that are told and those that are not, is
a crucial mechanism for the distribution of power 24
This framework informs the examination of repeated images, actors, and stories that
make up the bulk of the following chapters.
In Chapter 1, the presence of vulnerable Colombians––women and children, members of
indigenous communities––within leading images and videos functions to construct the would-be
victims of Venezuelan aggression: isolated, vulnerable Colombians who require the protection of
the Colombian state. The possible pain of these vulnerable subjects, presumably at the hands of
the Venezuelan military, may therefore be “viewed” or “imagined” by the reader. 25 This pain,
constructed by the images, represents a transgressive force that allows the border and, in turn, the
nation to be felt––only when something is felt “against” them. This transgression––against the
Colombian subject––confirms Colombian subjectivity and nationality as distinct from
Venezuelan counterpoints.26 Thus, the repetition of certain forms of suffering functions to
consolidate exclusive notions of national identity.
Moreover, the character of the readership response, observed within El Tiempo, affirms Ahmed’s
insight that “it is necessary to look towards social landscapes for the origins and production of
feelings.”27 Throughout El Tiempo’s coverage of actual and alleged violations of national
sovereignty by Venezuelan forces at the border, the repetition of forms, signs, objects, and
images works to invest subjects in structures––in this case, the Colombian nation. 28 Emotions,
Ahmed argues, accumulate through such repetition; the “sticking” of signs, such as “hateful,”
onto others––in this case, the Venezuelan state––depends upon “past histories of association,”
manifested in the repetition of imagery throughout El Tiempo’s coverage of ColomboVenezuelan border relations. 29 This repetition represents a “past [history] of contact, unavailable
in the present, which allows the [situation in the current article] to be apprehended as
Ahmed, 32.
Ahmed, 20-21
26 Ahmed, 26-27
27 Ahmed, 11
28 Ahmed, 12
29 Ahmed, 13
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fearsome.”30 Thus, the emotional response elicited by the readership is necessarily a “social and
cultural practice,” rather than simply a “psychological state.” 31
Chapter 2 situates the migration crisis in the context of mounting tensions between Colombian
citizens and their state, reflected by the intersection of the Colombian armed conflict and the
official articulation of Colombia as a multicultural nation. This discussion provides background
relevant to the project of nation-building to which the driving narratives that characterize El
Espectador’s coverage of the Venezuelan migration crisis contribute. El Espectador’s coverage
of the Venezuelan migration crisis constructs an alternative nationalist discourse, which appeals
to a conception of the Colombian nation grounded in a commitment to the concepts of
multiculturalism and liberal democratic ideals. This appeal functions through the affirmation of
Colombia as a democratic nation, distinct from its Latin American neighbors, and an emphasis
upon the economic benefits of migration. Nevertheless, this appeal is burdened ultimately by the
fundamental tensions inherent to contemporary Colombian society: rising economic inequality
and the legacy of the Colombian conflict, significant factors behind popular opposition to the
migrant presence. Thus, the aspirational constructions of the Colombian nation and state within
El Espectador conflict with the reality of a fragmented nation, in which ongoing state violence
and political exclusion have engendered distrust between many Colombian citizens and their
state. While El Espectador invokes a conception of the Colombian nation as democratic and
inclusive, a portion of the Colombian citizenry is not compelled by this discourse.
El Espectador’s affirmation of Venezuelan migrants as victims occurs also through the
“sticking” of emotions––suffering, sadness, and fear––unto Venezuelan migrants to Colombia,
as well as neighboring countries, which functions through the repetition of imagery that
emphasizes the pain and poverty experienced by migrants at the hands of the Venezuelan state,
as well as neighboring states and their citizenry. Although the attachment of these signs and
emotions unto migrants accords also with “past histories of association”––the construction of
Venezuelan migrants as victims throughout El Espectador’s coverage, which extends beyond the
period under study––this attachment enters into conflict with the comparative lack of emphasis
upon Colombian citizens as victims of their own state, in the aftermath of the Colombian conflict
and the context of economic insecurity aggravated by migration.
Ahmed’s notion that “the stranger appears...as a way of containing that which the nation is not,
and hence as a way of allowing the nation to be,” reflects the manner in which the coverage of
Venezuelan migration functions, in part, to construct an alternative nationalist discourse in El
Espectador’s coverage of migration. The Colombian nation is configured in a narrow fashion;
communities in Colombia’s exterior provinces and, more broadly, neighboring nations, are also
cast in a critical light. These reconstructions of the nation in terms of “who or what does not
belong” forestall inevitable demarcations of assimilable and unassimilable migrant figures,
whose eligibility within the nation is not presented––initially––as a point of contention.32 Indeed,
not all migrants are “stuck” with similar signs or emotions; not all “belong” equally. The
newspaper’s coverage indicates a prioritization of “professional” migrants, a racialized term that
Ahmed, 7
Ahmed, 9
32 Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality (London;New York: Routledge, 2000),
99.
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indicates a preference for migrants of higher social status. This appeals to a conception of
national identity rooted not only in technocratic proficiency and economic prosperity, but also in
whiteness. In this way, the subject––the Colombian nation––is constituted, or comes into
existence through its “encounter” with the other: the arrival of the migrant figure, whose
“existence cannot be separated from the others who are encountered.” 33 Nevertheless,
assimilable migrants include also the most vulnerable Venezuelans: women, children, and the
elderly––while men willing to enter the labor force are implicated in this group. Certain
migrants, however, are characterized inevitably as unassimilable: drug dealers and violent
criminals, who are established nonetheless as a minority group within El Espectador’s coverage.
Chapter 3 centers upon divergent constructions of the humanitarian aid efforts at the border in
February 2019, within the coverage of both El Tiempo and El Espectador. The chapter situates
the events of February 2019 in the historical context of mounting tensions between Colombia
and Venezuela, and the legacy of Plan Colombia, manifested by the growing proximity between
the Duque administration, the United States, and the Venezuelan Opposition. In their coverage of
the February 2019 humanitarian efforts, each newspaper reaffirms the commitments to
conceptions of national identity presented in earlier chapters, for which the chapter registers new
discursive constructions of victimhood within each newspaper. While El Tiempo affirms the
benefits of Colombia’s relationship to the United States, invoking a national conception rooted in
militarism, El Espectador centers the victimhood of Colombian border communities as a result
of the humanitarian efforts and casts doubts upon the US-Colombia partnership.
In Chapter 3, Ahmed’s thesis is manifested more explicitly: Venezuelan citizens, fleeing their
state, ask El Tiempo’s viewers to “tune in to El Tiempo’s internet...YouTube channel...Instagram
and Facebook pages”34 to watch its coverage of the humanitarian concert and relevant events.
Considering the growing dependence of media platforms upon internet traffic and social media
platforms, such mobilizations of narratives of victimhood affirm Ahmed’s claim that “collective
suffering is a core component of the global political economy. There is a market for suffering:
victimhood is commodified.”35
In these ways, both El Espectador and El Tiempo construct divergent “truths,” with respect to
similar events. Both newspapers articulate different nationalistic discourses and engage in broad
criticism of the Venezuelan state; in El Tiempo, the Venezuelan state is presented as an enemy,
which appeals to a national conception rooted in militarism and legitimates Colombia’s
alignment with the United States; in El Espectador, criticism of the Venezuelan state functions
within an appeal to a moralistic, inclusive conception of national identity rooted in commitments
to multiculturalism and liberal-democratic ideals. However, for each newspaper to sustain its
respective appeal, it must ultimately engage in exclusive constructions of victimhood; neither
newspaper resolves these tensions successfully. While El Tiempo highlights the concerns of
Colombian border communities to legitimate conflict with Venezuela, these communities are
marginalized in its coverage of humanitarian aid efforts; conversely, while El Espectador
highlights the concerns of Colombian border citizens, to criticize Colombia’s alignment with the
Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters, 7.
34 “Venezolanos invitan al concierto Venezuela Aid Live,” YouTube video, 03:25, posted by “El Tiempo,” February
22, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SdnRinMnT-M.
35 Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters, 7.
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United States and denounce militarism, the concerns of Colombian citizens become secondary to
those of Venezuelan migrants during its coverage of migration. Within both newspapers, the use
of discursive techniques that function to affirm the victimhood of different actors––Venezuelan
citizens, the Colombian state, Colombian citizens, and border communities on both sides––
facilitates the formulation of appeals coherent with the ideological affinities and conceptions of
national identity held by their respective audiences. These observations affirm not only the
consequences of market pressures upon the media under neoliberal economic structures, but also
demonstrate the political and social value held by newspapers in the Colombian context.
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CHAPTER 1: EL TIEMPO AND THE COLOMBIAN STATE AS A PROTECTOR
This chapter analyzes key trends in the representation of military and sovereignty crises at the
Colombo-Venezuelan border by El Tiempo. First, a review of the significant historical
antecedents to the ongoing border crisis situates the analysis of articles within the chosen time
frame. Subsequently, the analyses of a series of key articles demonstrate the use of imagery to
further national hostility, the transformation of vocabulary to emphasize conflict, and the
functions of paratextual elements such as tweets, videos, and web links as spaces through which
to affirm nationalistic discourses in El Tiempo. These tendencies are then contrasted with an
overview of the coverage regarding alleged incursions at the border from El Espectador, to
highlight its comparatively diverse and cautious representation concerning issues of
militarization and sovereignty at the border.
In 1999, Colombian President Andrés Pastrana and United States President Bill Clinton signed a
strategic military and economic agreement, Plan Colombia, to combat Colombian drug cartels
and left-wing insurgent groups. The agreement presents a key historical antecedent to the
contemporary construction and characterization of the US-Colombia relationship, observed in
the media coverage. Initially, the US government sought to support Plan Colombia in order to
facilitate the training of military and paramilitary organizations, primarily to combat the FARC
organization and end the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics. 36 While
Colombia has sought to strengthen its relationship with the United States, in the aftermath of
Plan Colombia––under the pretext of fighting drug cartels and left-wing guerillas––this
relationship has compromised its relationship to neighboring countries. Indeed, in 2008,
President Álvaro Uribe sanctioned the presence of US troops on Colombian soil––to combat
terrorism and narcotrafficking activities. This functioned to aggravate hostilities and anxieties
over sovereignty between Ecuador and Venezuela, as the arrival of US troops took place after
Colombia’s incursion into Ecuador to assassinate Raul Reyes, the leader of the FARC. 37
The Colombian military’s incursion into Ecuador and assassination of Raúl Reyes, the FARC’s
second-in-command, inaugurated many of the themes and discourses that characterize El
Tiempo’s current representation of Colombo-Venezuelan relations, through the lens of the border
region: Venezuela as an “offensive” actor, the connections between the Venezuelan state and the
FARC, and the introduction of Venezuelan militarization as a discursive theme. The 2008 crisis
was also marked by the proliferation of sensational headlines, implying the possibility of
conflict, and discursive structures that legitimated the narratives of the Colombian state. These
remain characteristic to the current discursive constructions of border issues within El Tiempo.
Colombia’s incursion into Ecuador escalated military tensions with Venezuela, led by Hugo
Chávez, who sought to defend against similar actions at the Colombo-Venezuelan border. The
crisis introduced the connection between the FARC and the Chávez regime, which persists in the
national press coverage today and functions to justify Colombian militarization and de-legitimize
the Venezuelan state.
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Plan Colombia Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security
Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008.
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0971.pdf.
37 Morales, Mario and Maryluz Vallejo, Las bases de la discordia: el acuerdo militar de Colombia con Estados
Unidos en la prensa nacional (Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2011), 11.
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In the aftermath of this moment of tension, a local media observatory study, Las bases de la
discordia: el acuerdo militar de Colombia con Estados Unidos en la prensa nacional, noted that
the character of the media coverage in El Tiempo, El Espectador, and Semana centralized Bogotá
as the informative epicenter of news articles and privileged official sources such as presidents,
ministers, media platforms and experts, and official communications (over civilian actors,
NGOs, and labor unions). The study found that 83% of the narration within articles originated
from the Colombian state (in contrast to 63% distributed between the governments of Ecuador,
Venezuela, Brazil, and the US). Consequently, 50% of all articles presented the Colombian state
as a protagonist, while 39% of all articles aligned with neighboring countries; in turn, the latter
were framed primarily as the antagonists of the narrated events.38
These tendencies appear consistent with the media coverage today, specifically in relation to the
discourse on the Colombo-Venezuelan border, wherein the Colombian press coverage has been
essential to the shaping and public perception of border relations. Since the advent of Chavismo,
in particular, the Colombian media has exaggerated diplomatic tensions at the border, which
functions to legitimate state policies of exclusion, militarization, and violence. 39 Contemporary
media scholarship insists that the national press has had a decisive role in Colombia's foreign
policy, reflecting the impact of media ownership that has become concentrated in the hands of
elite families, national conglomerates, and dominant political parties.40
In addition to the 2008 Andean Diplomatic Crisis, the 2015 Venezuela-Colombia Migrant Crisis
presents another key example of the interplay between state and elite interests, media coverage,
and the everyday predicaments of border communities. In 2015, due to the killing of three
Venezuelan soldiers in the border region, the Venezuelan government closed sections of the
border and deported thousands of Colombians. These actions became the focus of the Colombian
national press, in which the transnational character of border life was negated through an
emphasis on two communities, not one. El Tiempo’s coverage legitimized Colombian
militarization and echoed hawkish rhetoric, predominantly from the Colombian interior.
The 2008 and 2015 cases both present important antecedents to the ongoing crises at the border
and the phenomenon of Venezuelan migration to Colombia, which have gained international
attention since the February 2019 attempt to introduce US humanitarian aid to Venezuela
through the Colombian and Brazilian border, leading to the subsequent closure of the border and
suspension of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela.
On July 22, 2010, Venezuela froze diplomatic ties with Colombia following President Álvaro
Uribe’s accusation before the Organization of American States that Venezuela was harboring
leftist guerillas across the Colombian border––an accusation that compounded outstanding
tensions over President Uribe’s decision to grant the United States access to seven Colombian
military bases under the pretext of countering terrorism and narco-trafficking. Following the
Mario Morales and Maryluz Vallejo, 32.
Carlos Manuel Jiménez Aguilar, “La frontera Colombo-venezolana: una sola region en una encrucijada entre dos
estados,” Reflexión Política 10, no. 20 (2008): 258-272.
40 Julie Billorou, “La inclusión de la diplomacia en la palestra mediática: el caso colombo
venezolano,” Desafíos 12, no. 20 (2005): 283-325.
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inauguration of President Juan Manuel Santos, however, the fractured relationship between
Colombia and Venezuela was temporarily resolved, as President Santos and President Hugo
Chavez renewed diplomatic relations. 41
By President Santos’ second term, however, Colombo-Venezuelan relations deteriorated further
when Chávez’s successor, President Nicolas Maduro, provoked Colombia by heightening
militarization at the border and violated Colombian national sovereignty through numerous
incursions by the Venezuelan military into Colombian territory. Nevertheless, President Santos’
response was––by contrast to President Uribe––restrained, defined by a focus on dialogue and
peaceful negotiations. In March of 2017, when a group of 60 Venezuelan soldiers set up camp on
the Colombian side of the border––according to the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Relations,
due to the altered course of [the] Arauca River shifting the physical location of the border––
President Santos urged a diplomatic resolution, a position which led President Maduro to order
the troops’ prompt return to Venezuela and their payment of reparations to Colombians affected
by the incident.42 Even in the aftermath of this incident, and considering the increasingly
aggressive, authoritarian character of the Venezuelan regime, President Santos affirmed that “the
possibility of a military intervention shouldn't even be considered" to affect regime change in
Venezuela, stating that "America is a continent of peace. It is the land of peace."43 Thus, the
inauguration of President Juan Manuel Santos, initiated a temporary détente in the mounting
hostility that defined relations between Colombia and Venezuela under President Uribe––
renewed subsequently under Santos’ successor, President Iván Duque.
Colombo-Venezuelan relations shifted dramatically during the Duque presidency; his close ties
to ex-President Uribe were reflected in the renewal of a confrontational attitude towards the
Venezuelan state. On the topic of Venezuelan regime change, President Duque’s ambassador to
the United States, Francisco “Pacho” Santos stated in 2018, “there is talk of unilateral military
operations...all options should be considered.” 44 In February 2019, President Duque met with
President Trump in Washington, where President Duque did not protest against Trump's
statement that “all options,” even a military intervention, were “on the table” to facilitate regimechange in Venezuela. 45 Rather, during his Washington visit, President Duque stated, “it is our
moral duty to end the dictatorship in Venezuela,” and he declined to comment on––or reject––
US National Security Advisor John Bolton’s note suggesting that 5000 American troops might
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be deployed in Colombia against Venezuela. 46 Further, President Duque consistently paired his
commitment to a diplomatic blockade against Venezuela with calls for the Venezuelan military
to “turn”––that is, to carry out a military coup––against the Maduro government, “for the
liberation of the Venezuelan people.”47
This foreign policy shift frames the coverage of Colombo-Venezuelan border relations during the
period of interest for this study, in which the representation of the border in the Colombian
national press––particularly El Tiempo––became newly politicized to serve the interests of the
Colombian right-wing. The interpersonal links between political leadership and El Tiempo––
notably, Francisco Santos Calderon’s wife, Adriana María Santos Calderón’s relationship to
Roberto Pombo, the newspaper’s editor-in-chief––help to contextualize the alignment between
state narratives and the editorial line observed within the coverage of the Colombo-Venezuelan
border put forth by El Tiempo. These family relationships are significant; El Tiempo’s coverage,
which sensationalizes conflict at the border, not only constructs a nationalist discourse in which
Colombia and Venezuela are presented as two distinct––and opposed––communities, but also it
serves the interests and foreign policy goals of political leadership, particularly the strengthening
of bilateral relations with the United States, which depends in part upon the perpetuation of
conflict with the Venezuelan state.
The Construction of an Enemy: Venezuela in El Tiempo’s Coverage of the Border
The following articles in El Tiempo, concerning actual and alleged Venezuelan incursions into
Colombia during the period of August 2017-2019, reflect the various ways in which the
newspaper constructs and works to sustain the narrative that Colombia’s sovereignty is at risk as
a consequence of aggression by the Venezuelan state, examples of which are highlighted in its
coverage of the border. These narratives constructed––and sustained––through a dependence
upon sources from within the Colombian state, a tendency which facilitates an empathetic
representation of the state and its priorities. In particular, Colombian militarization is cast in a
favorable light, legitimated by Venezuelan aggression. Furthermore, the inclusion of border
communities as sources functions to imbue the coverage with the perception of events through
dramatic and emotional representations, which often highlight the Venezuelan state as a hostile
actor. Yet, border subjects also mobilize dominant state narratives regarding Venezuela for their
own material and political goals; they are not passive recipients of discourse, but rather
discursive actors.
In El Tiempo, the Colombian military is more often presented as a “defensive” actor, while
military escalation by the Venezuelan state is depicted as evidence of “aggression.” Within El
Tiempo’s representation of border relations with Venezuela, the systematic repetition of similar
events––possible invasions, clashes with Colombian civilians, military escalation––conditions
“Duque aboga por el cerco diplomático a Venezuela,” YouTube video, 01:43, posted by “Voice of America,”
February 14, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRBWgXzgtSY.
47 “Duque no descarta acoger tropas de EE.UU. ante crisis venezolana,” YouTube video, 15:56, posted by “Voice of
America,” February 16, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O0UQiITlmQU.
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and legitimates “generic” knowledge of Venezuela, which functions as a foundation for readers
to understand the discourse of Colombo-Venezuelan relations at the border. 48 This process of
conditionalization is accomplished, in particular, through a dependence upon sources from
within the Colombian state to construct articles that pertain to the Colombo-Venezuelan border:
ministers, state functionaries, officials, army personnel, and the President––not to mention
official state communications, press-releases, and direct quotes, which occupy the
disproportionate space within El Tiempo’s coverage.
Image Repetition and the Construction of National Difference
The repeated utilization of photographs that depict the Venezuelan state as an aggressive actor
appeals to the reader's memories of past instances of Venezuelan hostility. Leading images of
this kind, and their accompanying headlines, are accompanied by narratives that do not always
reflect the content of actual articles; such images assert “facts” that may not be true. 49
Specifically, the narratives of Venezuelan aggression that they sustain overpower the actual
content of the articles under study. Consequently, El Tiempo’s coverage facilitates the
construction of national differences and justifications for hostility between Colombia and
Venezuela. Furthermore, its broad focus upon violence produces effects of feeling that
accentuate and justify the exercise of violence by the Colombian state, which gets considered
legitimate. Within El Tiempo’s coverage, other kinds of violence are also justified, such as the
marginalization and making-secondary of border residents or Venezuelan citizens; exclusive
conceptions of national identity are constructed.
The article, Governor denounces incursion of Venezuelan guard in Colombia50 (26 August,
2017), introduces a photograph that later becomes central to El Tiempo’s coverage of military
escalation and issues of sovereignty at the border. The photograph becomes the leading image
not only for the subsequent articles under analysis in this chapter but also for numerous articles
in El Tiempo’s coverage of binational tensions at the border. This frequent repetition functions to
constantly re-appeal to past incidents of Venezuelan aggression throughout the border coverage;
the constant imposition of such imagery allows readers to “attach” new, even unrelated articles
and events to the dominant narrative of Venezuela as a national enemy.

Van Dijk, Discourse and Knowledge, 473
Ibid.
50 Efe, “Gobernador Denuncia Incursión De Guardia Venezolana En Colombia,” El Tiempo, August 26, 2017,
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/gobernador-denuncia-que-guardia-venezolana-estuvo-encolombia-124114.
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Figure 1.1
The photograph included above depicts two members of the Venezuelan military, armed and
presumably facing towards Colombia. Their positionality confirms the narrative set up by the
article’s headline and leading image: that Venezuela is incurring upon or violating Colombian
sovereignty––or at least is prepared to do so. However, the main source cited by the article––a
local governor––fails to sustain the narrative imposed by the leading image; the article excludes
direct evidence of the Venezuelan “incursion” alleged by the title. Furthermore, the article then
shifts course and begins to recount a wholly unrelated event: a skirmish between a right-wing
paramilitary group, Los Rastrojos, and the Venezuelan military that took place in Venezuelan
territory: effectively, a Colombian incursion into Venezuela. In this manner, leading images and
headlines function to sustain narratives that do not always reflect the content of actual articles––
to “assert ‘facts’ that may not be true.”51
Indeed, an observation of the article’s social media comments demonstrates that readers
respond not to the actual content of the article, but rather to the narrative of Venezuelan
aggression imposed by the leading image. The article links to the governor’s tweet regarding the
alleged incursion by Venezuelan forces, and the most popular comment states “the governor
[does nothing], takes no action against those venecos who come fuck over here,” followed by a
critique of local (border) government’s failure to respond to the alleged incursion––reflecting the
internalization of Venezuelan hostility set up by the leading photograph. Furthermore, the critical
use of venecos––referring to the inhabitants of the Colombo-Venezuelan border––construes the
transnational identity characteristic of border communities as a threat. Subsequent comments
continue this trend: “Let’s see if we can kill some [Venezuelan soldiers]...and see what the fuck
MADURO would say,” followed by “The Colombian army, which supposedly protects our
sovereignty, is where?” and “it does not surprise me, those armed monkeys.” Such comments
criticize the absence of an armed response by the Colombian government and racialize national
difference between the Venezuelan and Colombian people.

51
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Timeline of image repetition:

Figure 1.2
The decision to repeat the image above––an expanded version of the photo that appeared
originally in the 2017 article––may not necessarily be a conscious editorial choice; nevertheless,
its implications delimit the possible understandings that readers may have, before any factual
confirmation of the facts specific to the case in question are presented. The repetition of this
photograph suggests––again––that, irrespective of the facts to the contrary that emerge, this
incident presents another violation of Colombian sovereignty by the Venezuelan military––
although the current articles present allegations to that effect which are never confirmed.
Figure 1.3
Governor denounces incursion of Venezuelan guard in Colombia52 (27 August, 2017)

Figure 1.4
Venezuelan incursion in Colombian territory, denounced53 (01 December, 2017)

Efe, “Gobernador Denuncia Incursión De Guardia Venezolana En Colombia,” El Tiempo, August 26, 2017,
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/gobernador-denuncia-que-guardia-venezolana-estuvo-encolombia-124114.
53 Justicia and Bucaramanga, “Denuncian nueva incursión venezolana en territorio colombiano,” El Tiempo,
December 01, 2017, https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/denuncian-reporte-de-incursion-de-militaresvenezolanos-en-arauca-157718.
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Figure 1.5
New incursion by Venezuelan Guard denounced in Arauca54 (01 December, 2017)

Figure 1.6
Venezuelan Military would have stripped elderly in Colombia55 (23 August, 2018)

Figure 1.7
Ministry confirms new incursion of Venezuelan troops in Colombia56 (07 November, 2018)

Figure 1.8
Ministry confirms Venezuelan military incursion in Cúcuta57 (May 08, 2019)

Figure 1.9
Incursion by Venezuelan soldiers in outskirts of Cúcuta, denounced 58 (8 May, 2019)
Justicia, “Denuncian en Arauca nueva incursión de la Guardia venezolana,” El Tiempo, December 01, 2017,
https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/se-investiga-nueva-incursion-de-la-guardia-venezolana-en-lafrontera-157490.
55 Bucaramanga, “Militares venezolanos habrían desnudado a ancianos en Colombia,” El Tiempo, August 23, 2018,
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/denuncian-incursion-de-guardias-venezolanos-en-territoriocolombiano-258442.
56 Política, “Cancillería confirmó nueva incursión de tropas venezolanas en Colombia,” El Tiempo, November 07,
2018, https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/cancilleria-confirmo-nueva-incursion-de-tropas-venezolanas-encolombia-290742.
57 Cúcuta, “Cancillería confirmó incursión militar de Venezuela en Cúcuta,” El Tiempo, May 08, 2019,
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/confirman-incursion-militar-de-venezuela-en-cucuta-358790.
58 Cúcuta, “Denuncian incursión de soldados venezolanos en las afueras de Cúcuta,” El Tiempo, May 08, 2019,
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/denuncian-incursion-militar-de-venezuela-en-norte-desantander-358530.
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Figure 1.10
Navy warns of possible incursion by the Venezuelan guard in Guainía59 (25 June, 2019)

Figure 1.11
Crash between Colombians and Venezuelan guards in a river60 (25 June, 2019)

Figure 1.12
Alleged incursion by Venezuelan guard in Cúcuta investigated 61 (03 August, 2019)

Peripheral Citizens and the Nation
On June 23rd, 2019, a group of Colombians traveling from Cocui, Brazil, on the Rio Negro river,
intercepted a boat carrying members of the Venezuelan military. Significantly, this encounter
took place in the Lower Guainía and Rio Negro region, the autonomous territory of the
Kurripako indigenous people, situated between Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. Members of
the Colombian crew denounced the presence of the Venezuelan boat, yelling “you’re in
Colombia!” and ramming into the Venezuelan boat. Later, the Colombian crew made the
Eltiempo.com, “Armada advierte posible incursión de Guardia venezolana en Guainía,” El Tiempo, June 25, 2019,
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/armada-advierte-posible-incursion-de-guardia-venezolana-enguainia-380182.
60 Eltiempo.com, “Video: El choque entre colombianos y guardias venezolanos en un río,” El Tiempo, June 26,
2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/habitantes-de-frontera-denuncian-intimidacion-demilitares-venezolanos-380774.
61 Cúcuta, “Investigan presunta incursión de guardia venezolana en Cúcuta,” El Tiempo, August 03, 2019,
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/investigan-presunta-incursion-de-venezuela-en-cucuta-396828.
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accusation that the Venezuelan “soldiers shot into the air and sought to forcibly detain them.” In
the aftermath of this incident, El Tiempo published two articles: Navy warns of possible
incursion by the Venezuelan guard in Guanía (25 June, 2019) and Crash between Colombians
and Venezuelan guards in a river (26 June, 2019). These articles affirm the ways in which the
dominant representations of the Venezuelan state by El Tiempo not only function to legitimate
the priorities and foreign policy goals of the Colombian state, but also function as a discursive
platform for peripheral border-citizens to negotiate their own material and political interests.
Moreover, just as Colombian media consumers are more than passive receptors of the ideology,
or particular worldviews and assumptions legitimated through repetition, framing, and sourcing
by newspapers like El Tiempo, so too are border subjects conscious, agentive participants who
recognize the dominant narratives regarding Colombo-Venezuelan relations, which they in turn
assimilate into their own articulations of demands. Peripheral citizens at the border recognize and
appeal to nationalist discourses regarding Venezuela to mediate their relationship to the
Colombian State and facilitate local priorities of material extraction, territorial integration,
security, and development. These concerns are presented through the frame of ColomboVenezuelan relations, a discourse which provides the platform for local subjects to formulate
appeals to the Colombian state and nation. These observations affirm that discourses in the press
are no longer only constructed by journalists; rather, the press also becomes the recipient of
discourses––from the State and popular opinion––set by others.
The original article recounting the altercation between the Colombian crew members and the
Venezuelan military boat, Navy warns of possible incursion by the Venezuelan Guard in
Guanía (25 June, 2019) includes, again, the leading image introduced in the first article:

Figure 1.13
Here, the image functions to a similar effect, affirming the idea of violated sovereignty––even
though the article subtitle, “The incident would have taken place this Sunday,” suggests that the
allegation of Venezuelan hostility affirmed by the leading image is, in this case, still under
investigation.
The article cites a source from the Colombian Navy who paraphrases the crew members’ claim
that the “National Bolivarian Guard, carrying weapons...intimidated them with shots in the air,
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forcing them to stop.” As such, the article depends upon these subjects' perception of the events
in question––yet, without factual confirmation of their claims. The article also includes a tweet
by Javier Zapata, governor of Guainía, in which he states having “solicited the presence of
military forces at the [border] from president Iván Duque.” The combination of the leading
image and this paratextual link sustains the narrative of a hostile the Venezuelan state, which
legitimates militarization at the border by the Colombian state and heightens perceptions of
national difference between Colombia and Venezuela: “the [Colombian] crew...made [the
Venezuelans] respect national territory,” states the Navy source.
Ongoing coverage, such as Crash Between Colombians and Venezuelan guards in a river (26
June, 2019), reaffirms how El Tiempo’s discursive construction depends upon the perceptions of
events by people in contentious border zones, to a similar effect. The video included in this
article, titled Intimidation of the Bolivarian Guard against Colombian citizens62 (26 June,
2019), begins from the point of view of the Colombian crew, taken on a cellphone as they motor
towards a small boat carrying Venezuelan soldiers. The first text of the video states, “the
(Colombian) Navy ratified a new incursion of the National Bolivarian Army into Colombian
territory. The event presented itself in the sector of La Guadalupe, Guainía.” Here, the use of
“new” implies that there have been “old” incursions; this functions to imply persistent violations
of Colombian sovereignty by the Venezuelan state.
Subsequently, the video introduces a member of the Colombian crew, an inhabitant of the Rio
Negro region, titled a “Colombian citizen,” to comment on the situation. The crew member
himself appears to be of indigenous heritage. Indigenous paintings and paraphernalia occupy the
background of the frame; the peripheral citizen is Colombian first and indigenous second.
The statements included by the crew member reveal how the discourse of VenezuelanColombian relations provides a broader platform for border residents to appeal to the Colombian
state and military to increase its regional presence and control; local residents mobilize these
narratives to acquire material assistance and political recognition. Thus, the man states,
“I want to make a call to the Ministry, to the Ministry of Defense...We have a [defensive]
presence in this area [a] public force in the border area but...each time these controversies
happen between the centers of power we the citizens who live in the border region,
especially those who are in the river communities, like our indigenous communities and
local villages, also non-indigenous communities [are affected]...we call for attention and
support...to find a solution because this is worsening...in the regional assembly we have
even had multiple reunions...and we don’t see the results. Please, before worse things
happen.”
These statements highlight regional divisions between indigenous and non-indigenous people; he
appears to associate himself with the latter and casts doubt upon the capability of the local
assembly when he asks the Colombian government to step in. The secondary inclusion of “nonindigenous” communities emphasizes that this group is also important, or sometimes sidelined; it
must also be considered. This characterization of non-indigenous communities appeals to the
“Intimidación de Guardia Bolivariana a ciudadanos colombianos,” YouTube video, 1:52, posted by "El Tiempo,"
June 26, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pUoookUwWBg.
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empathy of El Tiempo’s readership; thus, their approval of Colombian military intervention in
the region may be framed as in the service of vulnerable border subjects––while understating the
historical marginalization of indigenous communities by the Colombian State, as indigenous
people are framed as a dominant group, while non-indigenous people are framed as victims who
require State support and political recognition.
The Mobilization of Local Sources to Dramatize Conflict
In August 2019, a Colombian miner named Jorge Iván was detained and his excavator was
impounded by the Venezuelan military near the Colombo-Venezuelan border zone, after having
been already implicated in a previous investigation regarding illegal mining activity at the
border, formulated by the district attorney’s office for San Antonio del Táchira, Venezuela,
across the border from the Colombian town of Cúcuta. After days of detention, Jorge Iván was
charged with illegal mining in a Venezuelan court and released from detention, with an
injunction for his appearance in the Venezuelan court every 30 days. Ultimately, the Venezuelan
court ruled that members of the Venezuelan military had not violated Colombian sovereignty in
the process of Jorge Iván’s detention.
The following articles, which concern this alleged incursion into Colombian territory by the
Venezuelan military, exhibit the tendency of El Tiempo’s coverage to cling to the notion of
Venezuela as an aggressive actor. Again, the repetition of charged imagery functions to appeal to
reader’s collective memory of past incidents of Venezuelan aggression; the leading imagery for
the initial article, Alleged incursion by Venezuelan guard in Cucuta is investigated (3 August,
2019) utilizes the same image as the first article analyzed in this chapter, regarding another
alleged incursion into Colombian territory, which implies the status of Venezuelan state as a
danger to Colombian citizens.
In its coverage of the border during the observed period, El Tiempo demonstrates a significant
interest in the case of Jorge Iván, which is covered in a total of five articles: 1. Alleged incursion
by Venezuelan guard in Cucuta is investigated (3 August, 2019), 2. The moment when
Venezuela would have captured a conational in Colombia63 (4 August, 2019), 3. The drama
lived by the family of Colombian detained in Venezuela64 (5 August, 2019), 4. Uncertainty over
situation for Colombian detained in Venezuela 65 (6 August, 2019), and finally 5. Colombian
detained in Venezuela liberated 66 (8 August, 2019). These articles evidence a mobilization of
local sources––family members and border citizens proximate to Jorge Iván––to affirm the
Cúcuta, “El momento cuando Venezuela habría incursionado en Colombia,” El Tiempo, August 04, 2019,
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/venezuela-habria-capturado-a-un-connacional-en-colombia397092.
64 Cúcuta, “El drama que vive la familia de colombiano retenido en Venezuela,” El Tiempo, August 05, 2019,
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/colombiano-es-retenido-en-venezuela-tras-violacion-desoberania-397134.
65 Cúcuta, “Incertidumbre por situación del colombiano retenido en Venezuela,” El Tiempo, August 06, 2019,
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/audiencia-de-jorge-cetina-colombiano-retenido-en-venezuela397914.
66 Cúcuta, “Colombiano retenido en Venezuela fue dejado en libertad,” El Tiempo, August 08, 2019,
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/colombiano-retenido-en-venezuela-fue-liberado-en-cucuta398436.
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implications of Venezuelan aggression established by the leading article in the series. Moreover,
the citation of these local sources––a prioritization of the language they use to describe the
situation, particularly from family members––functions to dramatize and emphasize the
perception of Venezuelan hostility, contrary to the facts that emerge.
Through these articles, the transformation of vocabulary to emphasize conflict––the action shifts
from detain to capture to kidnap, the final turn dependent upon a family source close to the
individual––sustains the dominant narrative of Venezuelan aggression affirmed throughout El
Tiempo’s broader coverage. Article 1 paraphrases local community members, “neighbors [who
assure] that a group of ten [members of the Venezuelan military] would have crossed the
dividing line” to decommission an excavator and capture its Colombian driver––implying that
the Venezuelan military did, in fact, violate Colombian national sovereignty, a claim that has not
otherwise been confirmed (emphasis added). Furthermore, while the first article describes the
Colombian driver’s “apprehension” and “detention” by the Venezuelan authorities, the third
article includes language from the driver’s family members––who claim that, “[Jorge Iván] was
kidnapped by those military members always pointing their weapons at him.” The bolding of
this section further dramatizes the situation and highlights a claim based on emotions, without
factual confirmation, and contrary to the implications of earlier descriptions of the same actions.
Thus, the citation of local sources close to the miner shifts the description of the action taken by
the Venezuelan military from detention––which implies the possibility of wrongdoing on the
miner’s part––to kidnapping.
Yet, while the Article 3 leads in this way, with emotionally charged allegations of violent
kidnapping and a possible “new military incursion staged by Venezuela”––it ends by
clarifying that the miner had been cited by Venezuela for “illegal mining activity” and that “the
Colombian Ministry of Foreign Relations continues...to corroborate whether or not
[Venezuela] violated national sovereignty”; the article clings to the dominant narrative of
Venezuelan hostility. Article 4 recounts the detention of Jorge Iván in a Venezuelan court, yet
excludes the fact––noted in Article 3––that he has been cited for illegal mining activity; rather,
the article only includes language from Jorge Iván’s legal defense, alluding to “image and video”
proof that the Venezuelan military “committed an irregularity”––although the content of this
evidence is never detailed––while quoting Jorge Iván’s brother, who claims “we are
awaiting...all information and documentation necessary to corroborate that he [was on the
Colombian side] and did not commit any crime.” Similarly, Article 5 reiterates the existence of
“photos and mediums [that] prove [the] incident occurred in [Colombian territory]”––when in
fact the outcome of the earlier court decision had established this was not the case; yet, the
allusion to this unspecified evidence, in conjunction with the title––Colombian detained in
Venezuela liberated––functions to imply that Jorge Iván’s detention and the seizure of his
excavator were still, somehow unwarranted––that the Venezuelan military did, in fact, violate
Colombian sovereignty.
Diverse Sourcing and De-escalation in El Espectador:
Within El Tiempo’s “Venezuelan Border” section, nearly half––five out of eleven articles, during
the first two weeks of August 2019––report on the apprehension of Jorge Iván by the Venezuelan
military for illegal mining activity. Conversely, El Espectador does not insist upon, nor
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sensationalize, the Jorge Iván incident. El Espectador only publishes two articles regarding the
incident: Army and Ministry investigate alleged incursion by the Venezuelan guard to North
Santander67 (3 August, 2019) and Ministry calls for the liberation of Colombian captured by
Venezuelan military at the border 68 (4 August, 2019). Moreover, El Espectador’s coverage is
comparably diverse during the same timeframe, with articles devoted to the disappearance of
civilians at the hands of guerilla and paramilitary forces, the hunger faced by Venezuelan
migrants at the border, the internal state of Venezuela, and multiple pieces reporting on US
sanctions against Venezuela.
El Espectador’s commitment to diverse sourcing practices challenges the construction of a
binary between Colombia and Venezuela as two distinct national identities and peoples––
countering the nationalist discourse sustained by El Tiempo’s coverage. Furthermore, El
Espectador’s coverage of Venezuelan militarization at the border does not utilize imagery
repetition to sustain a discourse that highlights Venezuelan aggression. The newspaper constructs
similar events in a less sensationalistic manner; its coverage does not depend upon local sources
in a manner that highlights the emotional perception of events.
Thus, the leading image for Article 1 depicts unarmed Colombian and Venezuelan border
guards; this functions to suggest that violent incursions are more accidental than intentional.
Furthermore, both articles emphasize the “confusing” character of the situation; they do not
attribute blame to one party or another. Both articles even go so far as to construct the subject of
culpability as the situation itself: “a confusing situation that left an excavator immobilized and its
operator detained” (emphasis added). All the while, both articles clarify that the incident took
place in a “neutral” space––not necessarily within Colombian territory, as the El Tiempo
coverage consistently implies, nor in Venezuelan territory.

Figure 1.14
Efe, “Ejército y Cancillería investigan presunta incursión de la guardia venezolana a Norte de Santander,” El
Espectador, August 03, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/ejercito-y-cancilleria-investiganpresunta-incursion-de-la-guardia-venezolana-norte-de-santander-articulo-874319.
68 Redacción Internacional, “Cancillería pide liberar colombiano capturado por militares venezolanos en frontera,”
El Espectador, August 04, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/cancilleria-pide-liberarcolombiano-capturado-por-militares-venezolanos-en-frontera-articulo-874452.
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Articles in El Espectador also more consistently and explicitly denounce calls for the Colombian
state to respond with violence against Venezuela’s provocations at the border. This is
accomplished, in particular, through the citation of Colombian Opposition party members and
official representatives from border communities as sources.
Diverse sourcing practiced by El Espectador resists the essentialization of Colombia and
Venezuela as two distinct and mutually hostile nations. Rather, by comparison to El Tiempo, the
coverage in El Espectador affirms the transnational character of border communities, for whom
an armed conflict between Colombia and Venezuela would have the most negative impact. Thus,
El Espectador publishes an interview with the Governor of the State of Arauca, in which he
denounces ex-president Uribe’s call to invade Venezuelan territory to capture guerilla members,
emphasizing the transnational character of border communities: “Us Araucans share last names,
families. Many of us have our brothers, cousins and other family members on the other side of
the border.”
The article, Incursion in Venezuela: risks and implications69 (13 September, 2019), reflects
these discursive themes, observed through El Espectador’s coverage concerning crises of
sovereignty and militarization at the border from August 2018-November 2019. The article
explicitly denounces the declarations of ex-president and current senator Álvaro Uribe––which
do not appear in the El Tiempo coverage of the same timeframe––and senator Paloma Valencia
of the Centro Democrático party suggesting that the Colombian military should enter Venezuelan
territory to capture the leadership of the FARC dissidence. Notably, the article cites members of
opposition parties who critique the Duque government’s response to Venezuela’s provocations.
Senator Luis Fernando Velasco of the Liberal Party argues that “Colombia cannot lend itself to a
global geopolitical game...for economic reasons by ‘oil investors’ who long for Venezuela...we
cannot offer Colombian blood so that others can do business,” and Senator Roy Barreras of the
Social Party of National Unity affirms that a confrontation with Venezuela would “remake
Colombia into a theater of war, in which the people will die.” Similarly, Antonio Sanguino of the
Green Alliance denounces an armed conflict while senator Rodrigo Lara of the Radical Change
Party concurs that “it is irresponsible to propose military actions against another country.” Later,
Barreras cautions against President Duque heeding Uribe’s calls for aggression, noting the
importance of “diplomacy and multilateralism, over weapons.” Further, the article cites a
political scientist who affirms that for the Colombian government to play into Maduro’s
provocations would only function to legitimate Venezuelan state’s criticism of the United States’
role in Latin America––implying that a confrontation between Venezuela and Colombia would
necessarily involve the United States on Colombia’s behalf. Another political scientist states,
“what Uribe is really looking for is to gauge the reaction of public opinion.” The coverage in El
Espectador with respect to militarization at the border during this period is also balanced by the
prominent inclusion of sources from the Venezuelan state who assert their actions as defensive––
as warranted by Colombian aggression and attempts to infiltrate the Venezuelan military and
intelligence forces. President Maduro is quoted insisting that “Colombia conspires to [attack
Venezuela’s] public services [and] civil and military objectives...that in the last three months 42

Redacción Política, “Incursión en Venezuela: riesgos e implicaciones,” El Espectador, September 13, 2019,
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actions ‘to attack Venezuela’ were detected, by Venezuelan civilians and soldiers paid by the
Colombian government.”70
Similarly, in articles such as Maduro orders military exercises at the border with Colombia (3
September, 2019), the inclusion of President Maduro’s statement “lamenting the rearmament of
the FARC…[that] Venezuela has always sought the pacification of the conflict [in] Colombia”
functions to construct a more ambiguous representation of the relationship between the
Venezuelan state and guerilla groups at the border. This contrasts with El Tiempo’s coverage,
which insists upon––or implies––the links between the Venezuelan state and Colombian guerilla
and narcotrafficking organizations. Moreover, the article includes a link to another article that
presents the Venezuelan government’s position that “the rearmament of the FARC is Duque’s
responsibility.”71
The character of El Espectador’s construction of tensions at the border as such reflects the
newspaper’s broader rejection of Colombian militarism and its affirmation of border
communities as victims of binational tensions––supported by nationalistic discourses on both
sides of the border and exacerbated by Colombia’s deepening relationship to the United States,
issues discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, the newspaper’s criticism of Colombian militarism and
binational confrontation reflects its attachment to a national conception rooted in
multiculturalism and liberal-democratic ideals. This national conception forms the basis of
numerous appeals for inclusion––grounded also in economic terms––that characterize the
newspaper’s coverage of migration, in which Venezuelan migrants are constructed as victims.
This discussion is undertaken in the following chapter.

Jorge Mantilla, “El conflicto creciente entre Colombia y Venezuela,” El Espectador, September 30, 2019,
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/el-conflicto-creciente-entre-colombia-y-venezuela-articulo-883714.
71 Redacción Internacional, “Maduro ordena ejercicios militares en frontera con Colombia,” El Espectador,
September 03, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/maduro-ordena-ejercicios-militares-enfrontera-con-colombia-articulo-879367.
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CHAPTER 2: EL ESPECTADOR AND THE INCLUSIVE, DEMOCRATIC NATION
This chapter situates the migration crisis in the context of mounting tensions between Colombian
citizens and their state, reflected by the intersection of the Colombian armed conflict and the
official articulation of Colombia as a multicultural nation. This discussion provides background
relevant to the project of nation-building to which the driving narratives that characterize El
Espectador’s coverage of the Venezuelan migration crisis contribute. While El Tiempo’s
coverage concerning border activity invokes a strong state grounded in military supremacy, El
Espectador’s coverage of the Venezuelan migration crisis constructs an alternative nationalist
discourse, which appeals to a conception of the Colombian nation grounded in a commitment to
the concepts of multiculturalism and liberal democratic ideals––and burdened by the
fundamental tensions which these concepts and ideals engender, in practice, in contemporary
Colombian society.
The Venezuelan migration crisis occurs in the context of a Colombian nation grappling with the
open wounds of a conflict that left 9 million displaced people and established a relationship of
distrust between many Colombian citizens and their state. During the Colombian conflict,
distrust in the Colombian state and its institutions was aggravated by the fact that security forces
failed to confront paramilitary forces, while the Colombian military and police also committed
violations of human rights. In 2000, Human Rights Watch detailed links between “half of
Colombia’s eighteen brigade-level army units...to paramilitary activity,” which reflect the broad,
national scope of official collaboration between state and paramilitary forces. While Plan
Colombia was established by the United States and Colombia to support counterterrorism and
anti-drug trafficking efforts, US funds were utilized to support the operations of paramilitary
groups; military units receiving US military aid provided weapons, logistical support, shared
intelligence, and carried out joint operations with paramilitary groups.72 Many of these joint
operations targeted innocent civilians, trade unionists, members of the political opposition,
journalists, and human rights workers, which affirms that US military assistance strengthened
paramilitary actors and fueled the Colombian conflict.73 These tendencies persist in the aftermath
of the Colombian conflict. Following the demobilization of the FARC––a goal of the Plan
Colombia partnership––paramilitary groups, which retain ties to the Colombian military, have
carried out assassinations of more than 3,000 members of the left-wing UP party, including two
presidential candidates.74
Under President Álvaro Uribe, the internal armed conflict in Colombia was “systematically
denied,” perhaps due to the fact that, during his administration, a majority of displaced people
were fleeing violence by paramilitary groups, which emerged out of the demobilization of the
right-wing United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).75 In 2012, the Colombian
"COLOMBIA, The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links," Human Rights Watch, accessed
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Prosecutor General reopened an investigation into Uribe’s ties to the AUC, after testimonials by
former ex-paramilitary leaders indicated that he had been a founding member and key supporter
of the group, ordering massacres and assassinations during his tenure as president. 76 Under the
presidency of Juan Manuel Santos, millions of displaced Colombians were systematically
excluded from official land restitution projects; even under more liberal leadership, the
enforceability of institutions and official constructions of victimhood were shaped demonstrably
by the economic interests of the powerful political and landowning classes.77
,

Since the year 2000, internally displaced peoples (IDPs) have not been a priority in the political
agenda.78 Reparations to victims of paramilitary violence have been slow, and official
characterizations of displacement have been largely based on “depoliticized conceptions of the
forced displacement itself.”79 Specifically, no administration thus far has recognized the
Colombian conflict as a class conflict––precipitated by an uneven distribution of resources and
power. Moreover, political leaders in Colombia have continued to articulate official
commitments to multiculturalist policies and rhetoric––in the context of deepening economic
inequality, widespread violence, and persistent racism.80
By contrast, the Colombian state response to Venezuelan migration has been swift––and deeply
politicized. In a speech before the United Nations, President Duque described Venezuelan
migrants as “brothers and sisters” with whom Colombia would always be “united by fraternity”–
–a position that serves to direct public attention towards the political and economic crisis in
Venezuela and discredit the regime of President Maduro, Duque’s political enemy. 81 Moreover,
the rapid acceleration of Venezuelan migration to Colombia did not elicit an exclusionary
response by the Colombian state––unlike neighboring governments. Rather, between 2018-2019
alone, Colombia accepted nearly 1 million Venezuelan migrants––amounting to 1.7 million by
December 2019 and expected to reach 2.4 million by the end of 2020. 82 Furthermore, as early as
,
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2017, the Colombian government began to offer free healthcare and education to Venezuelan
migrants; in 2019, the state granted citizenship to all children of Venezuela refugees, a measure
to last through 2021; in 2020, the state sought to integrate Venezuelans into the formal economy
by offering work permits to hundreds of thousands of migrants who entered the country before
November 29, 2019.83
Yet, the rhetoric of fraternity and practices of inclusion by the Colombian state, echoed by El
Espectador, have not been fully embraced by all Colombians. Throughout the country, the rapid
pace of migration has deepened pre-existing conflicts over space and resources, leading to
clashes between Colombian citizens and Venezuelan migrants––met with increased calls for
inclusion and solidarity by state institutions. 84 These tensions contextualize the discourse on
Venezuelan migration constructed within El Espectador, which supports state rhetoric of
multicultural inclusion through numerous appeals to reader’s empathy and the invocation of
economic justifications for the integration of Venezuelan migrants into Colombian society. This
chapter’s examination of the tensions between Colombian citizens and Venezuelan migrants,
which surface gradually throughout the coverage in El Espectador, is framed by the
contradictions between the official response to Venezuelan migration and the reality of
Colombian citizen’s ongoing contestation for resources and recognition from the Colombian
state.
This chapter traces the development of three key moments within El Espectador’s coverage of
Venezuelan migration, from August 2018-November 2019. In the first moment, the coverage
affirms state policies of inclusion, invoking a national conception aligned with democratic
values. Articles express consistent support for state initiatives for migrant inclusion, and a
negative characterization of the xenophobic responses to Venezuelan migration undertaken by
states and citizens in neighboring Latin American countries––particularly Brazil, Peru, and
Ecuador––functions to legitimate the response of the Colombian state, promote inclusion by
Colombian citizens, and affirm Colombia’s moral superiority. The coverage supports examples
of cooperation between Colombia and European nations to facilitate Venezuelan migration––a
dynamic which affirms preexisting national “social, economical, as well as political hierarchies
that are constructed in relation to whiteness and Europeanness.”85 El Espectador’s coverage
supports the alignment between Colombia and European nations, as well as organizations such as
the United Nations. These examples are used to further the narrative of Colombian nationhood
rooted in democratic values and reject Colombia’s alignment with countries such as the United
States.
The moralization of the Colombian state functions through the mobilization of the “good” and
“innocent” migrant figure, to appeal to readers’ empathy, and the repetition of articles
highlighting the responses to migration taken by neighboring Latin-American states and their
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Venezuelan Refugees,” The New York Times, August 5, 2019,
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citizens, which are depicted as xenophobic or insufficient; these responses are presented as
antithetical to the successful, inclusive policies of the Colombian state. Of the 154 articles
examined, 21.4% highlight xenophobia by citizens in neighboring countries and/or the failed
policies, or outright antagonism towards migrants by neighboring states. The remaining articles
support the inclusive response of the Colombian state, depicted as morally superior, and offer
moral and economic justifications for Colombian citizens to align with this official response.
Secondly, the coverage denounces isolated cases of xenophobia within Colombia, particularly by
citizens and fringe political figures. This narrative turn depends upon the citation of state
officials, who appeal to inclusion and emphasize the victimization of Venezuelan migrants. The
few cases of xenophobia against Venezuelan migrants within Colombia, which appear in the El
Espectador’s early coverage, are presented as exceptions; they do not preclude, but rather,
function to highlight the moral superiority of the Colombian state and its citizens, in contrast to
neighboring nations, where Venezuelan migration is depicted as having elicited a mass
xenophobic response from the public and anti-migrant policies at the state level. Sources from
within the Colombian state also affirm the technocratic proficiency of state institutions––their
ability to integrate Venezuelans into Colombian society and resolve tensions with Colombian
citizens during that process. Numerous articles highlight the efficient provision of humanitarian
aid and the successful facilitation of employment for migrants by the Colombian state. Not only
do these examples reflect an official commitment to democratic values, coherent with the
conception of national identity affirmed throughout El Espectador’s coverage, but also they
invalidate isolated examples of opposition within the country, which lack compelling
justifications––beyond xenophobia.
Thirdly, although the coverage continues to assert the notion of an Colombian exceptional
response––highlighting the work of the Colombian state and its institutions to welcome and
integrate migrants into Colombia––evidence of growing hostility between Colombian citizens
and Venezuelan migrants begins to destabilize the prior characterizations of the Colombian state,
citizen, and society. When the reality of mounting opposition to Colombian citizens against
Venezuelans is recognized as a significant barrier to migrant inclusion, this begins to fracture the
ideal of an inclusive Colombian society, to which the coverage has appealed thus far.
Consequently, the coverage undertakes a renewed emphasis on the economic benefits of
migration, drawing heavily from sources within the academic and business sectors for
legitimacy. Thus, El Espectador’s characterization of Venezuelan migration to Colombia
reflects––and fails to resolve––the tensions which become apparent throughout the migration
crisis.
This discursive tension initiates the demarcation of admissible migrants––victims worthy of
assistance by state institutions, whose generosity affirms the technocratic proficiency, moral
superiority, and inclusive character of the Colombian state––and inadmissible migrants who,
particularly from the perspective of citizens and law enforcement personnel, threaten public
goods, health, and security.
Yet, these demarcations also fail to resolve the tensions between citizens and the
aspirational, democratic national identity supported by political and economic elites––who
continue to assert the economic and moral justifications of inclusion. In turn, a latent narrative
throughout the coverage––the illegitimacy of the Venezuelan state––becomes the dominant
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justification for migrant inclusion. This argument for inclusion rests upon the condemnation of
the Venezuelan state––an avowedly Socialist state defined by its opposition to the United States,
a key Colombian ally. El Espectador’s coverage insists upon the fractured nature of the
Venezuelan state and economy as a condition––attributed to the project of Chavismo––that will
outlast the current Venezuelan regime––noting, by contrast, the presence of liberal-democratic
freedoms and economic prosperity in Colombia.
In sum, the discourse concerning migration within El Espectador appeals to a conception of
Colombia as a civilized, democratic nation––even in the face of popular opposition to official
appeals for inclusion, by citizens who reject the migrant presence. The discourse within El
Espectador is marked by numerous strategies and techniques that aim to interpellate Colombian
citizens as “democratic” citizens––to accept and incorporate Venezuelan migrants into the
Colombian nation––which ultimately fail to resolve the tensions fundamental to the conflict
between Colombian citizens and migrants––a conflict over resources and recognition from the
state, not a conflict of identity. El Espectador frames the rise of popular opposition––primarily
by Colombian citizens––to Venezuelan migrants as a moral crisis, rather than class conflict, as
immigration engenders and exacerbates pre-existing competition over scarce resources––and
rights––in the context of political and economic inequality. While the coverage denounces
xenophobia explicitly, there is no comparable rejection of the economic conditions that may
underpin the opposition to Venezuelan migrants by Colombian citizens––nor an attribution of
blame for these conditions, upon the Colombian state. Moreover, El Espectador’s coverage––as
it constructs an “alternative” nationalist discourse based upon commitments to multicultural
inclusion and liberal democratic ideals––reflects an unwillingness to face the root of popular
opposition to Venezuelan migrants: a monopoly over resources and power, which may be
resolved through a redistribution and restructuring of property relations.
Worthy Citizens, (Un)Worthy Nations
The technical and policy failures of neighboring states, in their reception of Venezuelan
migrants, as well as the xenophobic responses of their citizens, are narratives central to El
Espectador’s coverage of the Venezuelan migration crisis. These narratives are supported by
numerous articles that highlight the successful reception of migrants in Colombia, facilitated by
the underrepresentation of tensions between Colombian citizens and Venezuelan migrants within
Colombia.
Critiques of regional responses to migration occur frequently, through articles such as
Xenophobia mounts against migrants in Perú86 (29 September, 2019), which highlight the
xenophobic response against migrants by citizens in neighboring countries. The article begins,
with messages like ‘out with the venecos’ or ‘Maduro take out your trash,’ a group of
Peruvians marched [against] ‘foreign delinquency’ and the entry of Venezuelans to the
country. This adds to a number of grave episodes of xenophobia in Perú (emphasis
added).
Redacción Internacional, “Aumenta la xenofobia contra venezolanos en Perú,” El Espectador, September 29,
2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/aumenta-la-xenofobia-contra-venezolanos-en-peru-articulo883570.
86

39

The last sentence implies that such incidents are part of a pattern, and the subsequent
inclusion of twitter videos depicting xenophobic protests affirms immediately the climate of hate
described in the opening paragraph: one video shows an endless line of anti-migrant protesters
marching in the streets of the Peruvian capital, chanting racist epithets and shouting “Maduro,
take out your trash!” A second video, taken in a Peruvian classroom, shows children being asked
“what do Venezuelans do?”––to which they respond “they kill, steal!”
The article not only portrays Peruvian citizens as xenophobic, but also suggests that the Peruvian
state is to blame for creating the conditions behind these popular attacks through shortsighted
and discriminatory immigration policies. Thus, the article states, “the measures taken by the
Peruvian government to detain the exodus have not had an effect and in the country attacks
against [migrants] have surged” (emphasis added). The article also notes the poor policy choices
of the Peruvian state, which “would be incentivizing [the killing and enslavement of migrants by
imposing] stricter [visa] requirements for Venezuelans who seek to enter the country,” indicating
that such requirements may stimulate human trafficking (emphasis added).
Articles such Why do so many Venezuelan migrants lack a passport87 (22 August, 2018) insist
that the imposition of a visa requirement––by neighboring states––both endangers migrants and
reflects a technical ignorance of conditions in Venezuela: in a dire economic situation, many
Venezuelans have had to sell their passports on the black market. Such articles also highlight the
bureaucratic incompetency of the Venezuelan State: another significant obstacle that migrants
must overcome. The article insists that even if Venezuelan migrants wanted to acquire official
migration documents, the Venezuelan state “has made excuses [that] there is no paper to deliver
[passports].” Furthermore, the article notes that the Venezuelan state has sought to annul the
passports of government critics, such as Opposition “politicians, journalists, [and] artists.”
Therefore, the imposition of visa requirements upon Venezuelan migrants by neighboring states–
–in the case of this article, Ecuador and Perú––is not only impractical, but also harms the most
vulnerable Venezuelans, as well as those most committed to democratic ideals of free expression
and action.
Similarly, articles such as The dilemma of Roraima with Venezuelan migration88 (29 August,
2018), legitimate the response of Colombian state and its citizens to Venezuelan migration
through the negative characterization of the substandard, anti-democratic, and reactionary
response to migration taken by the Brazilian state and citizenry. Colombia is presented as a more
welcoming destination, where liberal-democratic freedoms, economic opportunity, and physical
security may be found. Thus, the first sentence states, “days before the poorest state in Brazil
would solicit the suspension of migration to avoid overpopulation, fears abound that the
Venezuelan government will retaliate” (emphasis added). The use of “poorest,” here––following
the image of suffering migrants in a makeshift shelter of cardboard and plywood––suggests that
Redacción Internacional, “¿Por qué tantos migrantes venezolanos no tienen pasaporte?,” El Espectador, August
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while migrants flee economic depression and lack of opportunity in Venezuela, Brazil presents
only similar circumstances. The violence and persecution that Venezuelan migrants are
understood to flee from is highlighted also as an obstacle present in Brazil: “hundreds of
Brazilians, singing their national anthem while they expelled thousands of Venezuelan migrants
from the border town of Pacaraima [evidenced] a crisis in Brazil." In this way, Brazil is
presented as a setting no less substandard than Venezuela––equally dangerous, too. Moreover,
while Brazilian citizens are depicted as chauvinistic––oblivious to democratic principles of
inclusion and equality––the Brazilian state response to immigration is presented as no less
violent; the Brazilian military “deployed troops to the border to contain the crisis in Roraima.”
The article highlights also the technical incompetence of the Brazilian state, which “lacks the
funds to attend the migratory crisis.” Furthermore, the article notes also that Roraima, “the
poorest state in Brazil...depends 100% upon Venezuela” for its energy consumption;
consequently, the border state is vulnerable to retaliation in the form of energy-stoppages by the
Venezuelan state. Thus, Brazilian institutions appear no less deficient than their Venezuelan
counterparts; that Brazilian border communities depend upon Venezuela for public services
further aligns both countries as substandard.
Similarly, articles such as The good and bad of regional migration89 (30 October, 2018) cast
doubt upon the ability of neighboring states to integrate and support Venezuelan migrants. The
leading image depicts migrants in Brazil pleading for food and individuals distributing small
packages in plastic bags atop a civilian vehicle; it does not appear as the humanitarian response
of the state, rather of concerned citizens responding to the migrant presence. In this article, the
actions of Brazilian citizens function to condemn the response of the Brazilian state, presented as
incapable of mounting an effective humanitarian response.

Figure 2.1
María Clara Robayo, “Las sumas y restas de la migración regional,” El Espectador, October 30, 2018,
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/las-sumas-y-restas-de-la-migracion-regional-articulo-821047.
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The Brazilian state is absent; there is no evidence of a calculated, official response to migration–
–only disorder, hunger, and uncertainty. The article even draws a parallel between the “strong
policies of migratory containment” practiced by the United States government against LatinAmerican migrants and “the grave problems lived by some Latin-American countries and their
effects on intra-regional human mobility,” implicating Brazil in this latter group. In this way, the
article notes: “strong tensions are replicated...in Ecuador, Perú, Chile and even [Brazil]...other
governments''––ostensibly not Colombia––“center their attention more on the costs, rather than
the opportunities of human mobility” (emphasis added). Subsequently, the article supports a
commitment to inclusion by the Colombian state and its citizenry. The article notes,
the acceleration of migration [to Colombia] in just three years for a country
inexperienced with migration management...implies large economic, operational and
legal challenges in terms of humanitarian assistance, social integration, providing
employment and access to health and education.
At this early stage in the migration crisis––when Colombia is only receiving 40% of the
Venezuelan diaspora––the article makes an appeal to the Colombian state and its citizens to
welcome Venezuelan migrants. This appeal indicates an implicit assumption that––unlike
neighboring countries––both the Colombian state and its citizens are committed to inclusion.
This appeal for inclusion is supported by the recurrent assertion that migration brings economic
benefits to Colombia, affirmed already within the first sentence of the article: “from 2000 to
2017 more than $1B have entered by concept of Venezuelan direct investment.” Later, the article
also notes, “[migration] has contributed to the growth of the GDP...migrants are a valuable labor
force, who nurture...consumption.” These claims are confirmed by a credible source, the director
of the Colombo-Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce, Germán Umaña, who states, “migration
creates economies of scale and may complement [various] productive sectors.” In turn, the
article declares that migration presents “a grand opportunity that, without proper management,
could lose its potential––a risk Colombia cannot run.” In due course, the article concludes that
the Colombian state must “dialogue with its neighbors in favor of Latin-American social
integration,” implying again that these neighbors cannot be trusted to pursue inclusive migration
policies without pressure from leading states such as Colombia, presented as the forwardthinking, democratic actor in regional politics.
This notion––that neighboring countries are “not doing their part”––is affirmed through the
citation of state sources, such as President Iván Duque, who assert the exceptional nature of
Colombia’s response to Venezuelan migration. Thus, the article Duque asks that response to
Venezuelan exodus not be “only from Colombia”90 (2 September, 2018) highlights the
Colombian state’s commitment to democratic values and inclusion––vis-a-vis neighboring
countries which, it is implied, are not doing their part to embrace Venezuelan migrants––unlike
Colombia. The bolded statement, “Iván Duque called upon other Latin-American countries
to embrace Venezuelan migrants, as, he affirms, Colombia has done” supports this assertion
Redacción Política, “Duque pide que respuesta ante éxodo venezolano no sea ‘solo de Colombia’,” El Espectador,
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from the first paragraph. Similarly, quoting President Duque, the article notes: “the President
assured that ‘Colombians have reacted with grandeur and fraternity, never blocking access to
our brothers who flee the terrible night of a dictatorship and an economy in ruins.” The
subsequent inclusion of another quote by President Duque, “this effort cannot be only
Colombia’s,” serves to further construct a distinction between Colombia’s effort to embrace
migrants, supported by the article, and neighboring Latin-American countries’ comparative
failure to do so. The inclusion of President Duque’s tweet, with the hashtags, “#Building the
Country” and “#ReliefBuilds,” further legitimates the Colombian state’s handling of the migrant
crisis. The article not only moralizes the Colombian state through an emphasis upon its inclusive
response to migration, but also aligns the Colombian state with European nations––Spain, in this
case––and the United Nations, who are presented as partners with whom the Colombian state
will work to direct the Latin American migration response. The article supports these efforts,
which reflect the alignment of Colombia with European nations and international bodies. The
emphasis placed upon this cooperation appeals to the notion of the Colombian nation as distinct
to its Latin American counterparts, by virtue of its moral superiority and commitment to
inclusion.

Figure 2.2
In Duque’s tweet, the words “Building the Country” also reflect the function of the discourse
constructed within El Espectador: its coverage of Venezuelan migration appeals to, and therefore
contributes to the construction of, a conception of the Colombian state and citizen that contrasts
both the xenophobia and policy failures characteristic to neighboring nations, but also the
repressive, illegitimate Venezuelan government––from which migrants flee.

43

However, as the coverage progresses, it becomes clear that the presence of migrants in Colombia
does not elicit an entirely inclusive response from Colombian citizens. This growing tension––
between Colombian citizens and their state––deepens as migration surges within Colombia,
particularly in urban centers like Bogotá. Therefore, a competing discourse emerges with respect
to Venezuelan migration, beyond the discourse of inclusion supported and constructed by El
Espectador. The second, emergent discourse, which originates primarily from Colombian
citizens, reflects a rejection of Venezuelan migrants, whose presence exacerbates pre-existing
conflicts over resources and attention from the Colombian state.
As evidence of Colombian citizen’s opposition to Venezuelan migration grows, El Espectador’s
coverage continues to affirm the moral imperative of inclusion and begins to assert, increasingly,
the economic justifications for welcoming migrants into Colombian society. This justification is
supported by a frequent emphasis upon the technical proficiency of Colombian institutions,
whose ability to integrate migrants into Colombian society––particularly, as productive workers–
–the coverage insists upon.
Articles such as Each Venezuelan adds 91 (30 April, 2018) support the claim that migration
facilitates economic growth––and assert that state institutions are prepared to facilitate
Venezuelan migrant’s transition into the Colombian workforce. The article begins: “the positive
effects of migration for the economy will be visible in the short and long run, as xenophobic
flares diminish, professionals are taken in without glancing at their passport, and errors in
migration policy are corrected” (emphasis added). Thus, the article appeals to the economic
benefits of migration as justifications for the integration of Venezuelans into Colombian society.

Figure 2.3
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However, the notion that the process of migration should be facilitated for “professionals”
suggests that not all migrants are equally worthy of inclusion, or of equal economic benefit to
Colombian society. The article presents statistics about Venezuelan companies investing almost
$1B in Colombia in the last decade: evidence of Venezuelan wealth fueling the Colombian
economy. Subsequently, the article notes that Venezuelan migrants foment “the generation of
employment, entrepreneurship, new productive unities, sectoral competency, diversification of
the market, and pay taxes,” citing an academic source––Alexandra Castro, member of the
Migration Observatory of Externado University––who notes that these benefits “demonstrate that
not all Venezuelans are a burden for the state...qualified professionals stand out, given that for
many years Venezuela had higher quality public education than Colombia...for Castro, every
Venezuelan contributes” (emphasis added). Despite the final claim that “every Venezuelan
contributes,” Castro has noted that certain, qualified migrants are the most valuable; thus, her
final claim obscures the underlying assumption throughout the article, affirmed in the first line,
that the integration of professional migrants in particular is most beneficial. Yet, not all migrants
fall into this ideal group. By failing to properly scrutinize the extent to which this ideal group
actually reflects the actual majority of migrants, the article conceals significant social differences
within a heterogenous migrant population. 92
In conclusion, the article notes that beyond the economic opportunities available to migrants in
Colombia, they also stand to benefit from:
readapting to a free world, in democracy, with constitutional order, with legitimate
institutions, and as such settle the idea of returning to their country [without] a similar
system...before Colombians fled to other nations searching for a better future, now we are
the destination of hope for millions of Venezuelans.
In this way, while the article first legitimates migration by citing its economic benefits to
Colombia, the ultimate justification for accepting certain, ideal migrants functions through an
appeal to Colombia’s political and economic superiority. Thus, the migrant is mobilized as a
discursive figure to construct an imagined Colombian nation, whose construction depends upon
the encounter with such “strange” figures.
Similarly, articles such as District presents route to employment for Venezuelan population in
Bogotá93 (18 September, 2019) suggest that the Colombian state––unlike its neighbors––
recognizes the compatibility of democratic inclusion and economic growth. In the article, state
institutions such as the Secretary of Economic Development (SDE) and municipal institutions
such as The Public Agency of Employment, “Bogotá Works,” serve as examples of Colombia’s
successful management of the migration crisis, accomplished again through a reliance upon state
sources––functionaries from the Bogotá Mayor’s office. Thus, the leading image for the article
shows a group of migrants waiting in line to seek employment. Their white-collar clothes imply
that these individuals will contribute to the most productive sectors of the Colombian economy.
In turn, the article supports the notion that migration stimulates Colombian economic
Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters, 4.
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development. That the line does not appear too long or crowded suggests, further, an easy
transition process from needy migrant to productive citizen.

Figure 2.4
Thus, the article asserts that Colombian institutions are poised to facilitate migration and
economic development, with technical efficiency. The article notes that “professionals” from the
SDE and The Public Agency of Employment assist citizens who seek to obtain “formal work,” a
goal which takes “five phases:” registration, orientation, formation, intermediation, and
bonding. The use of such bureaucratic language both affirms the new role of Venezuelan
migrants––as members of the professional workforce––and highlights the technical proficiency
of the Colombian state agencies engaged in assisting naturalized migrants––new citizens––who
are in the process of “strengthening their labor profile,” becoming even more valuable and
productive workers. The article highlights that state agencies will assist migrants with
courses in personal preparation for work interviews...receive formation in specific
areas...be selected as precandidates for employment vacancies [and candidates will] be
directed by the Secretary to businesses which solicit their profiles to concrete the labor
bond.
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The notion that the Colombian state is prepared to integrate migrants into Colombian society, in
a manner that benefits the economy, is supported by the inclusion of the following image:

Figure 2.5
The modern graphic design evidences the technical proficiency of the Department of
Labor and, by extension, the Colombian state. In these ways, the article functions to mitigate any
concerns, on the part of El Espectador’s readership, not only with the economic impact of
migration, but also with the ability of the Colombian state to handle the migration crisis. Thus,
beyond the fact that migrants flee the illegitimate, repressive Venezuelan state, and xenophobia
throughout Latin America, migrants are presented as worthy of inclusion insofar as they enhance
the productivity of the Colombian economy. However, the coverage does not yet resolve the
tension within this thesis: while most migrants flee economic hardship and political repression,
not all are professional, highly productive workers; the presence of millions of migrants in
Colombia not only increases strains upon local resources, but also intensifies competition––with
the poorest Colombians––within the informal labor sector.
The Conflict of Co-habitancy
Throughout the coverage thus far, El Espectador has made consistent appeals to the notion of an
exceptional, inclusive, and democratic Colombian nation, for which examples of xenophobia
against migrants in neighboring countries, whose governments have failed to adequately address
the migration crisis, serve as a point of contrast. The coverage of Venezuelan migration within El
Espectador thus supports and serves as a platform for official discourses from the Colombian
state that call for regional and national solidarity with migrants. At the same time, the coverage
depends upon the citation of academic sources and economic experts, who offer evidence for the
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economic benefits of migration: an additional rationale for inclusion, beyond moral
justifications. These discursive tendencies are intensified when evidence of Colombian
opposition to the Venezuelan migrant presence, primarily from citizens and fringe political
figures, begins to occupy greater space in the coverage. While early examples of internal
opposition to inclusion are presented as marginal, or exceptional, as these incidents become more
frequent, El Espectador sustains its appeal to an inclusive conception of the Colombian nation
and reaffirms the ability of Colombian institutions to integrate and support migrants.
This discursive turn is reflected by articles such as Mayor of Bucaramanga affirms that
Venezuelan [women] are ‘factories to make poor little children’94 (8 February, 2019), which
denounce a case of xenophobia by a Colombian politician, whose actions are also presented as
marginal––unrepresentative of the general Colombian response to migration.

Figure 2.6

Redacción Nacional, “Alcalde de Bucaramanga afirmó que venezolanas son "fábricas de hacer chinitos pobres",”
El Espectador, February 8, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/alcalde-de-bucaramanga-afirmoque-venezolanas-son-fabricas-de-hacer-chinitos-pobres-articulo-838724.
94
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Referring to xenophobic comments made by Rodolfo Hernández, the mayor of
Bucaramanga, the article notes “this would not be the first time that [he] makes these types of
comments,” followed by “he is again in the eye of the storm” and, again, in the article’s
conclusion, “It is fitting to remember this would not be the first time Hernández makes
these types of comments.” The repetition of these points implies that the mayor, Hernández, has
a history of racist remarks. This functions as resistance to the interpretation of his remarks as
indicative of a general response to current migration; rather, his response is presented as that of a
singular, reactionary politician––whose racism precludes the current migration crisis.
Consequently, the possibility of a general xenophobic response by the Colombian people is
displaced.
Subsequently, the article highlights the official rejection of xenophobia by citing a tweet from
the attorney general, Fernando Carrillo, which appears in the article as the following bolded
statement:
machismo, xenophobia and aporophobia are bad judgements by public officials who
should set the example. These are coarse attacks against women, against
Venezuelans who are victims of dictatorship and against children.
The legitimacy of the attorney general’s statements is reinforced further by the inclusion
of a retweet by the journalist Daniel Samper. As a columnist for the center-left publication,
Semana, his affirmation of the attorney general’s position suggests that, facing the migrant crisis,
there exists a shared moral commitment to inclusion––at least between Colombia’s political and
cultural elite––that transcends partisan divides.

Figure 2.7
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The citation of opposition journalists like Samper, who in this case show support for the
state response to migration, serves to further legitimate the Colombian state––differentiated from
that of fringe, reactionary politicians in the exterior provinces. This implication supports a
centralist notion of Colombian nationhood––wherein not all Colombians are equally admissible.
As such, the article concludes: “What to do in Bucaramanga? We cannot kill nor shoot at
[migrants], we must take them in, just as Venezuela took in more than four million Colombians
[when] there were no job opportunities” (emphasis added). The “we,” here is in fact a they: the
Colombians at the fringes of the country, to whom the appeal for inclusion is directed––and, by
extension, upon whom blame for xenophobic sentiment is placed. This representation of
xenophobia against migrants as a marginal, or exceptional phenomenon functions to affirm the
moral superiority of the Colombian state and interior, which in turn contributes to a notion of
Colombian identity as one within which not only certain strange––or unproductive––newcomers,
but also certain citizens may not belong. The displacement of the migrant figure, here,
demonstrates the ways in which the presence of new “strangers” facilitates the construction of
the nation, in terms of those who “belong” and those who do not. However, this (re)construction
forestalls the inevitable demarcation of assimilable and unassimilable migrant figures, whose
eligibility within the nation is, broadly, not yet presented as a point of contention. 95
Eventually, the conflict generated by the presence of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia becomes
more difficult to deny, and the original dominant narrative within El Espectador––of solidarity,
inclusion, and empathy with migrants on the part of the Colombian state and its citizenry––
becomes increasingly untenable. At this point in the discourse, attempts to distinguish between
assimilable and unassimilable migrant figures become much more apparent, and the
representation of Colombian citizen’s opposition to the presence of migrants begins to occupy
greater space; yet, such opposition is still presented as marginal, and in a critical light. This shift
is followed by increased discursive work to legitimate Colombian institutions––evident in a
series of articles which, building upon earlier themes, insist upon the alignment between the
Colombian state and international humanitarian efforts and highlight the technical proficiency of
Colombian humanitarian organizations––and such organization’s commitment democratic values
of inclusion and equality.
In November 2018, public outcry against an improvised migrant encampment in Bogotá, near the
transport terminal “del Salitre,” reflects the emergent conflict between the Colombian state and
its citizenry, who appear to diverge on the issue of migration. This incident introduces key
tensions to El Espectador’s discursive construction of the Colombian response to migration. The
article, Images: how the move of Venezuelans to a new site in Bogotá took place96 (13
November, 2018), indicates these tensions between state, citizen, and migrant through its leading
image, the first in a slideshow of individual images that follow. Ultimately, the structure of these
images––which end with a smiling migrant mother and child––suggests that in Colombia, unlike
in neighboring countries, the state has the capacity to resolve mounting tensions between citizens
and migrants. Furthermore, within the article, Colombian citizen’s opposition to the migrant
Sarah Ahmed, Strange Encounters, 99.
Bogotá, “Imágenes: así fue el traslado de venezolanos a un nuevo albergue en Bogotá,” El Espectador, November
13, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/imagenes-asi-fue-el-traslado-de-venezolanos-un-nuevoalbergue-en-bogota-galeria-823440.
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presence is characterized as measured and moderate––rather than explicitly xenophobic, as in
neighboring countries.

Figure 2.8
The first, top-left square, demonstrates the occupation of public lands by Venezuelan migrants:
improvised tents, arranged in a disorderly fashion, surrounded by scattered trash, firewood, and
even a stray gasoline canister demonstrate dangerous, unhygienic and disorderly conditions––
which pose a threat to migrants and neighboring residents alike. In turn, the top-right image
presents a group of migrants standing together and holding a Venezuelan flag. Here, the seven
stars on the flag are politically significant; as the traditional flag of Venezuela, before it was
changed to contain eight stars under Chávez, the reader is reminded that these migrants flee
economic and political crisis in Venezuela––attributed throughout the coverage to the country’s
political and economic transformation under Chavismo. This association functions to give
justification for migrants’ presence in Colombia––where the coverage affirms that they will find
political and economic freedoms unavailable in Venezuela.
Yet, the opposition to migrants in Colombia––depicted by the bottom-left image in which two
women hold a sign in protest against a new migrant encampment established by Colombian
authorities––demonstrates a point at which El Espectador is unable to fully sustain the narrative
of general Colombian “solidarity” with migrants, nor the alternative explanation of opposition to
Venezuelan migrants as “isolated” expressions of xenophobia; citizen’s growing discontent with
migration becomes evident. Nevertheless, the depiction of citizen’s opposition to migrants is,
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again, downplayed; these Colombians are shown criticizing the location of the migrant camp,
which contrasts the numerous depictions of mass xenophobia in neighboring countries––a focus
in much of the early coverage.
Finally, the final, bottom-right image represents the institutional response to migration, which
functions ultimately to mitigate public opposition to and fear of migrants. This image, which
depicts a migrant woman and child sitting in front of a new, clean yellow tent furnished by the
Colombian state, reflects the discursive turn taken by El Espectador, in the context of growing
evidence of opposition to Venezuelan migrants by Colombian citizens. Articles begin to insist
upon the efficient and effective response of the Colombian state and its humanitarian
institutions––whose commitment to assisting migrants functions to affirm the country’s
inclusive, democratic character. The indicated recipients of institutional assistance––women,
children, and the elderly––function to appeal to readers’ empathy through an emphasis on the
inclusion of migrants who can only be understood as victims. As such, the first image in the
subsequent slideshow depicts an old woman, without visible support:

Figure 2.9
The next image depicts children sitting on a sidewalk, cold and in tears. Since this image
precedes the image of the disorderly, dirty camp (shown in the leading image), an emphasis is
placed on migrants as victims who require assistance––rather than a danger that must be driven
out:
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Figure 2.10
Similarly, a following image highlights children––worthy victims:

Figure 2.11
The background of this image offers evidence that the Colombian state is committed to the
assistance of these vulnerable migrants––uniformed humanitarian workers consult with migrants,
apparently inquiring into their needs and concerns––and appeals to reader’s empathy, affirming
the moral imperative of inclusion.
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In turn, the following image illustrates the efficacy, scale, and professional nature of the official
humanitarian response taken by the Colombian state. Uniformed workers, large sacks of food,
and safety precautions such as gloves and masks highlight an official commitment to the health
and safety of migrants––and neighboring citizens.

Figure 2.12
Yet, subsequent images also highlight possible tensions between migrants and state security
forces.

Figure 2.13
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Figure 2.14
The caption for the image on the right notes,
but the group of neighbors also demonstrated xenophobic reasons for impeding the arrival of the
foreigners. They also said that Venezuelans bring problems of health and insecurity,

which reflects earlier attempts to formulate popular opposition to migration as motivated
by xenophobia––rather than conflicts over resources.
Indeed, another photograph, in which the article notes that citizens are concerned with health and
safety, depicts citizens holding a sign that indicates they reject the migrant presence upon local
land; this affirms that popular opposition to migrants is motivated by conflicts over physical
space, rather than xenophobia.

Figure 2.15
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Subsequently, the final two images emphasize the successful provision of humanitarian
assistance by state institutions, which functions to resolve these tensions and legitimate the
official response to migration:

Figure 2.16
Here, the state response to the migration crisis reflects efficiency, security, and cleanliness. The
emphasis placed upon efforts by the state to pursue this inclusive and humanitarian response
functions to affirm its democratic character and moral commitment––and mitigate concerns by
citizens.
The notion that, facing the migrant crisis, Colombian institutions are committed to inclusion,
public health and safety, and human rights is echoed throughout the coverage following this
period. Articles such as Municipal attorney calls to reinforce attention to Venezuelan
population in Bogotá97 (5 February, 2019) legitimate the state response, which serves as
evidence to dissuade citizens from mounting opposition to migrants occupying public spaces.
Thus, after citing growing citizen concerns over migrants sleeping in neighborhood parks, the
article notes how the state successfully resolves such tensions: “officials recently announced the
possibility of offering temporary refuge.” The article concludes, “the state has determined plans
of action with UNHCR [The UN Refugee Agency], Migración Colombia and the Ministry to
attend to the most vulnerable populations,” both highlighting the bureaucratic efficiency of
Colombian institutions––working together to solve problems for the needy––and establishing a
Redacción Bogotá, “Personería pide reforzar atención a población venezolana en Bogotá,” El Espectador,
February 05, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/personeria-pide-reforzar-atencion-poblacionvenezolana-en-bogota-articulo-837961.
97
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connection between these national institutions and international human rights organizations with
global legitimacy.
Furthermore, the article downplays probable causes behind such a swift state response––
specifically, mounting opposition to Venezuelan migrants by Colombian citizens––which are
excluded from the story, focusing instead upon the efficacy of state institutions. The article
claims that state institutions have been called to “reinforce ongoing work to reduce the growing
perception of insecurity, with the end of mitigating xenophobia; reduce the risk of contagious
disease transmission, act upon growing street vendors, the invasion of public space and the use
of children for begging” (emphasis added). Within this sentence, the fragment “with the end of
mitigating xenophobia” both attributes a moral character to the actions taken by the Colombian
state and affirms its commitment to democratic ideals of inclusion, equality, and the protection of
human rights. Yet, the fragment indicates that the state seeks to mitigate xenophobia by citizens,
which implies that popular opposition to Venezuelan migrants is rooted in a rejection of their
cultural identity, over material conflicts. This allows for the legitimation of the state, while the
material factors behind growing opposition to Venezuelan migrants from Colombian citizens are
displaced.
Similarly, the article Attention for Venezuelans in Bogotá will be reinforced98 (26 March, 2019)
under-emphasizes the opposition of Colombian citizens to Venezuelan migrants, while
highlighting the democratic character of the state response. The first line notes the cooperation
between the Colombian and Dutch governments, citing the latter’s contribution of $1.4 billion
dollars to a “Center for Migrant Attention” in Bogotá. The article’s focus on the humanitarian
center, which will provide “a nursery [and] learning spaces for children [as well as] spaces for
first aid [and] legal assistance,” centers the moral character and technocratic proficiency of the
Colombian state, while excluding representations of internal opposition to migrants by
Colombian citizens. Thus, the article concludes by noting that “the plan by the District to attend
to the massive arrival of Venezuelans” has been largely successful, alluding to another center for
migrant attention in Bogotá where, similarly, “600 people received medical attention, migration
orientation and employment assistance.”
In a similar manner, a previous article on an earlier migrant center, “Another camp will not be
repeated:” manager for Venezuelans in Bogotá99 (14 January, 2019), affirms the Colombian
state response to migration as rights-focused, forward-thinking, and ultimately successful. The
article notes, “The Secretary for Social Integration [and] the Mayorship, have deployed all their
efforts [and] all of the services [the city] has provided have had positive results.” The
technocratic proficiency of the state is also invoked: “all measures have been taken in
advance...the District has already contemplated measures of a permanent and long-term
measure” (emphasis added). Structured as an interview with María Angélica Trujillo––a lawyer
tasked to head the “Management of Venezuelans in Bogotá” program––the article quotes heavily
from this official, who emphasizes the “total tranquility,” “gradual manner,” and, especially, the
Redacción Bogotá, “Reforzarán atención para venezolanos en Bogotá,” El Espectador, March 26, 2019,
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/reforzaran-atencion-para-venezolanos-en-bogota-articulo-846959.
99 Redacción Bogotá, “‘No se repetirá otro campamento’: gerente para venezolanos de Bogotá,” El Espectador,
January 14, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/no-se-repetira-otro-campamento-gerente-paravenezolanos-de-bogota-articulo-834016.
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“humanitarian character” of the successful delivery of assistance to and integration of migrants
squatting on public land. Trujillo states, “we want to guarantee the absolute compliance of all our
obligations and the total respect of the rights of the whole migrant population” and notes the
“sensibilization of the population” accomplished by the state institutions involved. While this
latter fragment reveals the growing impatience of Colombian citizens with their state, the official
affirms that citizens have “understood that the encampment is part of a transitional process.”
Thus, the growing opposition to migration by Colombian citizens is displaced; the dominant
narrative of Colombia’s commitment to democratic practices of inclusion––both by the state and
its citizens––persists.
While the preceding articles depend highly upon sources from humanitarian institutions, state
migration programs, and municipal governments, numerous concurrent and following articles,
perhaps due to a greater reliance on security and police officials as sources by some, in turn
characterize migrant’s presence in public spaces as an “invasion,” or a general threat to public
security. Thus, in Transfer of Venezuelans, in between contrasts100 (13 November, 2018), the
second paragraph notes, “with the aim of imposing order and preventing the invasion of
Venezuelans in a nearby lot...the District advanced the relocation of 38 families (emphasis
added). Similarly, the image description in Venezuelans who live in the outskirts of the Cali
transport terminal will be relocated 101 (14 January, 2020) states, “The evacuation of migrants
for the invasion of the public space is a tendency in almost all the cities in the country”
(emphasis added). In, 400 Venezuelans who invade territories near the terminal will be evicted
in Cali102 (10 January, 2019), the term “invasion” is also used frequently. Nevertheless, the
content of these articles affirms the driving narrative of the democratic character of the
Colombian state and, broadly, its citizenry.
In articles such as The last day of the Venezuelan camp103 (14 January, 2019), for example, the
description of migrants as “invaders,” or threats to public security, is presented as a concern
emanating from citizens, rather than security officials, which reflects a point of tension within
the discourse surrounding the migration crisis in Colombia. The article notes, “the neighbors in
the sector hope that the process will be peaceful and that new invasions of public space will be
controlled” (emphasis added). Here, Colombian citizens are presented as fearful of migrant
“transfers to neighboring properties or potential clashes with authorities.” Such presentation of
select cases of Colombian citizen’s opposition to and state repression of migrants contrasts
earlier examples that evidence the moral, democratic, and inclusive response of the Colombian
state––and repeated appeals calling upon citizens to act accordingly, or characterizations of

Mónica Rivera Rueda, “Traslado de venezolanos, en medio de contrastes,” El Espectador, November 13, 2018,
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/traslado-de-venezolanos-en-medio-de-contrastes-articulo-823415.
101 Redacción Nacional, “Reubicarán a venezolanos que viven en los alrededores de la terminal de transporte de
Cali,” El Espectador, January 14, 2020, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/valle/reubicaranvenezolanos-que-viven-en-los-alrededores-de-la-terminal-de-transporte-de-cali-articulo-899776.
102 Redacción Nacional and Efe, “Desalojarán en Cali a 400 venezolanos que invaden terrenos cercanos a la
terminal,” El Espectador, January 10, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/valle/desalojaran-encali-400-venezolanos-que-invaden-terrenos-cercanos-la-terminal-articulo-833221.
103 Mónica Rivera Rueda, “El último día del campamento de venezolanos,” El Espectador, January 14, 2019,
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/el-ultimo-dia-del-campamento-de-venezolanos-articulo-833975.
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popular opposition to migrants as isolated examples of xenophobic sentiment. The article insists
upon the technocratic proficiency of Colombian institutions to resolve these tensions:
functionaries of the mayor’s office advanced the dismantling of the [migrant] camp
where initially 460 Venezuelans were established...to facilitate their exit from the
camp...the Secretary of Social Integration [emphasized] that...they sponsored [assistance]
for Venezuelans to legalize their condition, find work and even a new place to live.
Thus, the article suggests that Colombian institutions are able to moderate tensions that
may emerge between migrants and Colombian citizens.
Articles such as Shelter for Venezuelans: out of control?104 (19 November, 2018) reflect similar
tensions within El Espectador’s coverage: not all migrants are configured as victims to be
welcomed, or tolerated. Allegations of violence and criminal activity reconfigure certain
migrants as dangerous threats to the public; in turn, the legitimacy of Colombia’s response to
migration rests not only upon the moral superiority of Colombian society and state institutions,
but also on a commitment to law and order upheld by state security forces. The article makes an
effort to legitimate the official application of force by establishing distinctions between
assimilable and unassimilable migrants. Thus, the article begins: “clashes between
migrants...provoked the intervention of riot police within the area...weapons and drugs were
confiscated. The District assured it would reinforce security.” As such, certain, dangerous
migrants are presented as the cause of instability and crime, while the repressive actions of the
state are presented as a legitimate response against a troublesome minority:
The unconformity of some Venezuelans...triggered a dispute which ended with the
intervention of the riot police...the outrage began with the unconformity of the
Venezuelans and a fight between a few of them...The situation got out of control, at which
point a group took the camp, destroyed District tents, and stole various supplies found
there (emphasis added).
The use of “some” indicates that not all migrants are included within this inadmissible
group; most remain categorized as victims. Furthermore, the repression of certain migrants––
those “who do not comply with the rules of co-habitancy”––remains consistent with the notion of
a morally superior Colombian state, which protects the rights of the vulnerable and upholds the
law. Indeed, when the violent outbreak––perpetrated by the problematic minority––leaves “one
[migrant] in the camp [injured]...the secretary of Security, Jairo García, announced that a legal
response would follow against those who failed to comply with the rules of the camp” (emphasis
added). Nevertheless, this selective application of repressive force by the Colombian state––
dependent upon the drawing of moral distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable
migrants––still contrasts what has been presented as a general reaction against migrants by
governments––and citizens––in neighboring countries like Ecuador and Perú; here, cases of mass

Monica Rivera Rueda and Felipe García Altamar, “Albergue para venezolanos: ¿fuera de control?,” El
Espectador, November 19, 2018, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/albergue-para-venezolanos-fuerade-control-articulo-824491.
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xenophobia and repressive official policies that harm the migrant population, as a whole, occupy
greater space in the coverage.
Similarly, the article presents the negative response of Colombian citizens towards migrants as a
specific concern with the conditions of the particular location in question, rather than an
indication of growing opposition to migrants within the country motivated by conflicts over
resources and attention from the state:
the inhabitants of the...neighborhood insist that the Venezuelans should be relocated
immediately, now that the place where the migrants find themselves lacks sufficient
health and security standards so that neighbors are not at risk (emphasis added).
This rearticulation of Colombian citizens’ response to migration suggests that, unlike
citizens in neighboring countries who are prejudiced against migrants due to a general sense of
xenophobia, the opposition of Colombian citizens to migrants––presented already as an isolated
case––stems from specific concerns over “health and safety.” The representation of citizens’
opposition to migrants is not framed as a conflict over physical space when, in fact, the
Colombian citizens cited have called upon the state to “relocate the Venezuelans immediately”
from a neighborhood plot of land, a valuable commodity in the urban environment of Bogotá.
Parallel articles continue to displace the root cause of mounting opposition to the migrant
presence: conflicts over material resources. Furthermore, the appeal made to the Colombian
citizenry––to accept the migrants in their midst––persists and continues to rest upon the notion
that state institutions have the technocratic proficiency to assist the migrant population, which
functions to invalidate popular concerns over inclusion. Thus, the article, The last day for the
Venezuelan camp (14 January, 2019), which depicts growing popular outcry against migrants in
Colombia, formulates an appeal to citizens––asking them to entrust the Colombian state to
resolve the tensions presented by the Venezuelan migrants. This appeal rests upon the
assumption that the state is able to fulfill the needs of both citizens and migrants, thus it not only
affirms the moral superiority and technocratic proficiency of the state, but also invalidates fears
behind xenophobia––for if the state is capable of managing the crisis, why should citizens be
concerned?
While this article notes that Colombian citizens have grown concerned with the migrant
population in the country––particularly in the urban center of Bogotá––the article then asks
citizens to support the humanitarian efforts of the state. First, characterizing citizens’ opposition
to the migrant presence, the article notes:
various neighbors fear that disorder will take place during the dismantling of the camp,
just as when the migrants arrived. Some inhabitants of the sector...advise that the
dismantling may provoke the invasion of nearby land.” (emphasis added).
In response, the article concludes,
the District [will] take all the precautions to avoid the taking of land in the zone,
guaranteeing an orderly exit [to migrants]...the District indicated it would continue its
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efforts to attend to [Venezuelans] in the capital, a task in which it is indispensable that
the citizenry cooperate with their comprehension and solidarity” (emphasis added).
The final sentence affirms, firstly, the technocratic proficiency of the state and, secondly,
its moral superiority––modeling the solidarity, rather than opposition, that Colombian citizens
should undertake. Although the conflict over resources and physical space that the migrant
presence engenders and exacerbates is noted, this conflict is not presented as systemic––
characteristic to a society marked by unequal access to resources; rather, the conflict is presented
as a new, isolated phenomenon: a direct consequence of recent migration.
In these ways, the affirmation of Colombian exceptionalism depends upon the construction of
distinctions between worthy (victims) and unworthy migrants (threats)––the former functioning
as the object of appeals to empathy through which to assert the commitment of the Colombian
state to democratic values and affirm the technical proficiency of its institutions, the latter
functioning to affirm its commitment to law and order.
Venezuela, The Unworthy State
Growing evidence of opposition to the migrant presence by Colombian citizens makes it difficult
for El Espectador to sustain the narrative of broad Colombian solidarity with Venezuelan
migrants. In turn, the coverage invokes a latent narrative: the illegitimacy of the Venezuelan state
and Venezuela’s economic collapse, which place a responsibility upon Colombian citizens to
welcome migrants––an appeal that rests upon the assumption of Colombia as, comparatively, a
democratic and economic success. Moreover, later coverage insists upon the inevitability of
Colombia’s position as the primary recipient of Venezuelan migration––presented as a
phenomenon that will only escalate, irrespective of regime change––which represents the final
appeal to the reader, the citizen. This appeal functions through the frequent citation of experts,
academics, and members of the business sector. Even at this point, however, the fundamental
tension between migrants and Colombian citizens––the exacerbation of pre-existing conflicts
over scarce material resources and growing competition for attention from the Colombian state
by marginalized groups––remains uncited and unresolved; rather, the coverage continues to
insist upon the need for Colombian citizens to accept migrants into their society, affirming the
moral imperative and economic benefits of inclusion.
Thus, the article 400 Venezuelans who invade territories near the terminal will be evicted in
Cali (10 January, 2019) first presents certain, inadmissible migrants as a danger to Colombian
citizens––according to a security official, the migrants carry “illicit drugs, ready for sale, and
also knives and machetes, in addition to other weapons.” Yet, in turn, the article appeals to
readers’ empathy, noting the difficulties faced by many migrants who Colombian institutions and
society are under a moral imperative to assist––more worthy victims, such as mothers, children,
and the elderly––and/or are eager to contribute to the legitimate Colombian economy––those
migrants who, in turn, are deemed worthy of inclusion by merit of their productive capacity. In
this way, immediately after noting the danger that migrants pose to Colombian people, the article
profiles two migrants who counteract the notion that all migrants present similar threats: a
pregnant 21-year old Venezuelan woman with “no money to buy diapers for the girl…[who has
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nothing], not even little clothes” and a 28-year old migrant man, who states “we are saving every
penny and hoping to rent...it is difficult [for a Venezuelan] to find such money.”
Such attempts to appeal to readers’ empathy, however––to demand the inclusion of migrants into
Colombian society––particularly in light of evidence that certain migrants may pose a danger to
that society, initiates a second appeal to Colombia’s moral superiority and democratic character.
This final appeal functions through the delegitimation of the Venezuelan state––from which the
migrants flee––and serves to attribute victimhood to migrants, in general. The delegitimation of
the Venezuelan state and society contextualizes the migrant presence and justifies their entry into
Colombia, represented as the democratic and prosperous society: Venezuela’s antithesis.
In this way, following the earlier passages concerning the threats to public safety that some
migrants may pose, the article takes an abrupt thematic turn and notes,
The Venezuelan president, Nicolas Maduro, will take possession this Thursday, January
10th, of a new mandate not recognized by the Opposition or the international community.
(Read also: The political panorama facing the ‘illegitimacy’ of Maduro)
Subsequently, the article re-quotes the 28-year old migrant man, who states “they should
remove [Maduro]...we have had to leave our homes, our lands, because there is no food, no
nothing, because of that man.” In turn, the article ends by noting that the Lima Group has not
recognized the new Maduro government and has “called upon Maduro to [transfer], in a
provisional fashion, Executive Power until new democratic presidential elections are realized.”
This unexpected thematic jump––a new focus upon the illegitimate and undemocratic nature of
the Venezuelan regime––functions as the ultimate justification of Venezuelan migrant’s presence
within Colombia. Migrants, in their own words, note that their presence in Colombia is not their
fault; thus, the article implies that Colombians have a responsibility, which presupposes the
legitimate and democratic nature of their state and society, to accept migrants––that is, to accept
those migrants who are not deemed a threat.
This ultimate justification for accepting migrants within Colombia within El Espectador’s
coverage––the illegitimacy of the Venezuelan regime and the country’s economic collapse––
depends upon the assumptions that regime change in Venezuela is not only immoral, but also
beside the point given that dire economic conditions will outlast changes in political leadership.
This assertion, which functions to stress the necessity of inclusion––while at the same time
affirming Colombia’s commitment to democratic ideals––sets up the final appeal to the
Colombian citizen, put forth in articles such as What will happen to Venezuelan migrants in
Colombia? This is what some experts say105 (23 May, 2019). This appeal affirms the moral––
and practical––imperative of inclusion. Academics and business leaders are key to the
affirmation of this message; they reject the notion that regime change in Venezuela will resolve
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the migration crisis and, in turn, assert the inevitable nature of Venezuelan migration––which
can only, in turn, be met with an inclusive response. Thus, the first paragraph states,
according to professors and experts it is difficult that Venezuelans return in the case of a
possible fall of Nicolás Maduro, in part due to the difficult economic condition
experienced by the country.
The second paragraph notes, “experts at a panel of Latin American business leaders
affirm” that the majority of the 3.7 million Venezuelans fleeing the country’s political and
economic crisis will not return to Venezuela––even if Maduro leaves power (emphasis added).
Subsequently, the article notes that a group of Colombian academics, at the “Business Future of
the Americas” conference, confirm that few migrants––especially the most underprivileged
migrants––will return to home, irrespective of changes in Venezuela’s political leadership.
Following the perspectives of these academic and business sources, the article then cites
Colombian President Iván Duque, who describes Colombian migration policy as “fraternal and
orderly.” Yet, in contrast to the panel, Duque affirms the need for Maduro’s “dictatorship...to
fall.” The utilization of President Duque as a source, here––following the assertions of academics
and business leaders––makes the perspective of the Colombian state secondary; the state appears
unable to grasp the more complex vision of the crisis articulated by “experts.” By comparison to
business leaders, who present economic solutions to the Venezuelan problem––namely, the
stimulation of free enterprise within Venezuela––and academics, who highlight the inevitable
character of migration––thus, the irrelevance of regime change to significant social and
economic progress in Venezuela––the citation of President Duque’s hawkish focus on the ouster
President Maduro presents him as ignorant of the complexity of the situation.
The critique of militarism, here, and the affirmation of Colombia’s democratic and economic
successes represent the broader themes, ideological commitments, and conceptions of the
Colombian nation articulated within El Espectador’s coverage. These factors culminate in an
appeal best summarized by the following article, Analysis: Venezuelan migration is a
Colombian problem106 (10 December, 2019), which asserts Colombia’s democratic
qualifications while emphasizing the broken nature of the Venezuelan state and society––
antithetical to Colombia, characterized by democratic freedoms and economic prosperity.
Although the article is a news piece, it is written solely from the perspective of an academic,
Ronal Rodríguez; it is not deemed “opinion.” With such legitimacy, Rodriguez proceeds to indict
the Venezuela state, affirm Colombia’s duty to democratic inclusion, and note the inevitable
nature of migration as reason enough to accept the integration of migrants into Colombian
society. Rodríguez argues, “the complex and prolonged humanitarian emergency, into which
Chavismo dragged Venezuela, will not be resolved through the toppling of Nicolás Maduro”
(emphasis added). If a military intervention in Venezuela will not resolve the political and
economic crisis in Venezuela, the Colombian state––and its citizens––can only accept migrants;
no other course of action is justified, nor practical.
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Unlike previous coverage––which insisted upon Colombia’s ability to resolve the migrant crisis
and suggested a broad commitment to inclusion, in light of the capability of the state to integrate
migrants into Colombian society––Rodriguez does not offer a clear solution; rather, he highlights
the numerous barriers to migrant’s inclusion within Colombian society. Rodríguez notes that
sectors of the Colombian working class may oppose migration, as an influx of cheap labor that
may further informalize the economy and introduce job competition; that members of the
Colombian upper class may speak out against Venezuelan migration as part of “the strategy of
castrochavismo to destabilize Colombia and the region.” In sum, he states, “there is no lack of
voices who urge the immediate expulsion [of migrants] from the country, or...the closure of the
frontier [to prevent] the entry of any more Venezuelans,” a statement which fractures the
previously dominant narrative of an exceptional Colombian response to migration––or a broad
commitment to inclusion from both the state and its citizens (emphasis added). Furthermore,
Rodríguez notes that migrants will be victimized either for their identity as Venezuelans or for
their poverty––destabilizing the assumption, found in earlier appeals to the reader, that
Colombians may be able to overcome their aversion to the migrants in their midst.
Nevertheless, Rodríguez ultimately affirms that inclusion is the only way forward. He continues
to emphasize that border closures are ineffective, military interventions are immoral and,
crucially, that Venezuelan migration will persist for years to come––at an unstoppable scale.
Also, he notes, given that 3.4 million Colombian citizens live in Venezuela, a repressive
response by the Colombian state may influence a similar, likely harsher response from dictators
like Maduro; thus, Colombians should––and practically must––take the moral “high ground” and
“prepare [themselves] to receive the many millions of people who will become part of the
Colombian citizenry,” one way or another.
Thus, even the lack of a clear solution to the migrant crisis and the open admission of the barriers
rendering the total acceptance of migrants into Colombian society unlikely, the assumption
persists that Colombian institutions––the humanitarian arms of the state and the business sector,
in particular––will be able to temper any strains that migrants may pose, and that citizens must,
in turn, accept the inevitable integration of migrants into their Colombian society. In this way,
the assumption that Colombia is somehow exceptional, or more committed to democratic
principles––by comparison to neighbors such as Venezuela or other Latin American countries
whose failed handling of the migration crisis has occupied great space in the coverage––persists,
even when the character of Colombia’s response, both from citizens and the office of the
President, is called into question.
At this moment, El Espectador again attempts to appeal to the best of the Colombian nation,
supporting the inclusion of Venezuelans into Colombian society––while forestalling the
inevitable discussion of the consequences this may have upon the Colombian working class, who
now face greater competition for jobs and for resources from the state in the context of increased
migration. Thus, the construction of the Colombian nation and state within El Espectador reveals
the unresolved relationship between Colombian citizens and their own state. While El
Espectador aims to construct a conception of the Colombian nation as democratic and inclusive,
evidently a portion of the Colombian citizenry is not compelled by this discourse. By pleading
with citizens to embrace inclusion, El Espectador reveals the fractured nature of Colombian
society; those Colombians in conflict over resources with Venezuelans are not predisposed to
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respond to the conception of an inclusive, democratic Colombian nation imagined by elites––
perhaps because the lived experiences of lower class Colombians have been characterized by
exclusion and discrimination. Further, in the context of the Colombian conflict, the nation itself
has been divided into groups who view the battles of the Left as illegitimate or legitimate; the
latter stance conflicts with the negative characterization of the Venezuelan state upon which El
Espectador’s appeals often depend, marked by an implicit rejection of the political and economic
goals characteristic to the Colombian Left. In this way, the dominant narrative of Colombia’s
democratic and economic success––upon which appeals for migrant inclusion depend through El
Espectador’s coverage––clashes with the lived realities and ideologies of many Colombians who
feel that the Colombian economy does not work for them. Indeed, the class conflict inherent in
working class Colombians’ opposition to inclusion is articulated in the final article, when
Rodriguez notes,
“out with the venecos,” “the strike is for Colombians”, “the Venezuelans aren’t brothers”
are some of the signs and graffitis which have appeared along with social demands during
the days of the national strike, including in the social unrest lived by the country that
rejects the Venezuelan population in Colombia.
Rodriguez notes that sectors of the Colombian working class may view Venezuelans,
who could exacerbate conflicts over resources in a context of already steep inequality––and
mounting labor organization––as a tool in the state’s plan to fracture working class solidarity
and, in the ensuing chaos, “justify the use of force.” Yet, Rodriguez does not pursue a deeper
examination of these concerns and, thus, the economic roots of mounting popular opposition to
migrants; rather, the narrative that Colombians have a duty to accept Venezuelans persists:
Rather than demand the expulsion of Venezuelans or the closure of the border, it should
be demanded of the Colombian state, as much as the government, but also the Opposition
and civil society to resolve the problem.
This final line suggests that the state, civil society, and the Colombian Opposition must resolve
their differences and work together in the face of the migration crisis. In this way, the dominant
narrative of inclusion conflicts with––and thus reveals––the fractured character of Colombian
society. Indeed, the recent influx of Venezuelan migrants has aggravated mounting anxieties
concerning questions of identity and belonging. Throughout the migration crisis, national
campaigns led by indigenous groups, Afro-Colombians, peasants, women, students, and workers
seeking to counter economic inequality, extractivism, sexism, and racism have been largely met
with state resistance––by the very same political leaders who have made consistent calls for
solidarity with Venezuelan migrants. Throughout El Espectador’s coverage, however, calls for
the inclusion of migrants largely fail to consider the magnitude of these contradictions, nor
suggest––or examine––the conditions of social and economic inequality at the root of popular
discomfort with migration.
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CHAPTER 3: THE BORDER, A GLOBAL SPECTACLE
This chapter traces a series of events that took place at the end of January and February of 2019,
framed by the consolidation of mounting efforts to affect regime change in Venezuela, led by the
Venezuelan Opposition, with the support of Colombia and the United States. Following a failed
military coup attempt against Maduro’s government on January 21st, on January 23rd, Juan
Guaidó, the leader of the Venezuelan National Assembly declared himself acting president of
Venezuela urging the establishment of a transitional government until free elections could be
held. During this time, US president Donald Trump made public statements in support of a
military overthrow of President Maduro’s government, echoed by officials within the
Venezuelan Opposition and the Colombian state under President Duque. The consolidation of
the alignment between the Colombian state, the Venezuelan Opposition, and the United states
culminated in an joint attempt to introduce humanitarian aid, largely of US origin, into
Venezuela, across the Colombo-Venezuelan border on February 23rd. The attempt to introduce
aid into Venezuela was also preceded by a concert, “Venezuela Aid Live,” organized by British
billionaire Richard Branson to support the humanitarian efforts, which garnered a global
audience. These events reflect a moment in which the crises and tensions at the ColomboVenezuelan border became globalized––the focus of this chapter, which traces the news
coverage up to and following these events in the Colombian newspapers of El Espectador and El
Tiempo. Within each newspaper, the chapter analyzes representative articles that affirm previous
trends observed in El Tiempo and El Espectador’s coverage of recent border crises. While El
Tiempo’s coverage legitimates the narratives of the Colombian state, the Venezuelan Opposition,
and the United States, highlights the benefits of a strong US-Colombia relationship, and
expresses confidence in a military solution to Venezuela’s economic and political crisis, El
Espectador’s coverage casts doubt upon the humanitarian motivations cited to justify the United
States’ interference in regional affairs, expresses a lack of confidence in the benefits of a strong
US-Colombia partnership, and rejects a military solution to regime change in Venezuela.
Furthermore, El Espectador’s construction of events at the border differs significantly due to the
emphasis placed within its coverage upon the victimhood of Colombian border communities at
the hands of the Colombian state and its allies, contrasting El Tiempo’s coverage, which
emphasizes the victimhood of Venezuelan citizens at the hands of the Venezuelan state.
The intersection of the Duque and Trump presidencies ignited a regional political climate
marked already by uncertainty, tension, and fear. Exactly one month after Iván Duque assumed
the Colombian presidency, the Trump administration stoked fears of a military intervention in
Venezuela by meeting with rebellious Venezuelan military officers in order to “bring positive
change to a country that has suffered so much under Maduro,” according to a statement given by
US officials to The New York Times. 107 While the clandestine conversations stalled, they
nevertheless galvanized supporters of President Maduro––who had, for years, accused the United
States of plotting violent regime change efforts. Later that year––ahead of a meeting with
Colombian President Iván Duque––Trump indicated support for a military overthrow of the
Maduro government: “It’s a regime that frankly could be toppled very quickly by the military if
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the military decides to do that,” Trump said. 108 In 2019, fears of US support for violent regime
change were invoked by the Maduro government to justify its opposition to Guaidó’s claims to
the presidency. Moreover, from the outset, the Venezuelan Opposition’s commitment to
democratic, constitutional change was compromised by a military coup attempt against Maduro’s
government on January 21st, met with public statements from Opposition lawmakers calling for
military support to facilitate regime change, such as Guaidó’s claim that growing defections
amongst low-ranking military personnel reflected a “generalized feeling” within the armed
forces.109 Following Guaidó’s self-proclamation as acting president, invoking constitutional
authority, fears mounted of a military coup in Venezuela, as US National Security Advisor John
Bolton tweeted that the US would consider lifting sanctions “for any Venezuelan military officer
that...recognizes the constitutional government of Juan Guaidó.” 110 Guaidó, in turn, offered
amnesty to military officials who abandoned Maduro and pledged allegiance to his
government.111
Following these events, in February 2019, calls for the entry of humanitarian aid, largely of US
origin––and delivered by the US air force––were met with criticism from the Maduro
government, who argued that the entry of food and medical supplies constituted a trojan horse
for a military coup or intervention to topple his government. Guaidó’s calls for the Venezuelan
military to disobey Maduro’s orders to block the entry of humanitarian aid only exacerbated
these concerns on the part of the Venezuelan state. In this climate of tension, the United Nations
called for the “depoliticization” of aid, while the Red Cross and Caritas refused to participate in
the aid campaign, as the US’ attempt to deliver aid in violation of Venezuelan national
sovereignty took on the character of interventionism and violated humanitarian principles of
political neutrality.
The Colombian state played a significant role in the aid campaign, providing the logistical
facilities for the storage and transportation of humanitarian assistance. President Duque not only
voiced support for the introduction of aid into Venezuela, but also recognized Juan Guaidó as the
legitimate president of Venezuela following Guaidó’s self-proclamation.112 Indeed, Colombia
became the launching point for the attempt of humanitarian aid into Venezuela; on February
22nd, Colombia hosted the “Venezuela Aid Live” concert organized by British billionaire
Richard Branson, which called upon Maduro’s government to allow for the entry of aid. That
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day, President Duque would embrace Juan Guaidó, alongside numerous high-profile
conservative Colombian politicians, to rally support for the humanitarian caravan. 113
The attempt to introduce US aid into Venezuela and the “Venezuela Aid Live” concert became
global spectacles. Colombian border communities received visitors from around the world––
members of international governments, humanitarian organizations, and media outlets,
volunteers and concerned citizens, concertgoers, and individuals seeking to watch the drama
unfold. In turn, the suffering of Venezuelan citizens at the hands of the Venezuelan state gained a
global audience. Global news coverage of the mega-concert, framed as an initiative to collect
funds for Venezuelans, in solidarity with the efforts to introduce humanitarian aid into
Venezuela, proliferated narratives of Venezuelan victimhood throughout the world; global media
even functioned as platforms to solicit donations for the concert and the humanitarian efforts. On
a national level, however, not all media constructions of these events in Colombia aligned with
these narratives. In the weeks prior to and following the “Venezuela Aid Live” concert and the
attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela, a discursive analysis of El Tiempo and El
Espectador’s coverage indicates divergent constructions of the same moment.
As my analysis of the articles included in this chapter will demonstrate, El Tiempo’s coverage
aligns largely with the perspectives of the Colombian state, and the priorities of the United States
and the Venezuelan Opposition. El Tiempo’s early narration of the events emphasizes the USColombia relationship, temporarily displacing the Venezuelan crisis as the subject of primary
importance. This early emphasis shares a prioritization, held also by the Duque administration, to
strengthen US-Colombia relations; El Tiempo stresses the positive implications of this
diplomatic position. These shared goals reflect the rejection of President Santos’ break with
conceptions of national identity rooted in military strength, as his administration prioritized
diplomacy with the Venezuelan state to facilitate the Colombian Peace Process. President
Duque’s hawkish foreign policy towards Venezuela––from the suspension of bilateral diplomatic
relations, to open calls for regime change in Caracas––also affirm the centrality of the United
States within the current priorities of the Colombian state. Therefore, El Tiempo’s stigmatization
of the Venezuelan state legitimates the political and economic goals of the Colombian state,
which, presently, views economic prosperity as conditional upon a strong US-Colombia
relationship. Moreover, these narratives function to further the ongoing (re)construction of the
US-Colombia partnership in a manner consistent with the priorities of the Colombian right-wing,
which rejects both the Venezuelan state––used to streamline criticism of the Colombian Left––
and the Colombian Peace Process initiated by President Santos, given that ongoing US economic
and military support depends upon Colombia’s commitment to an aggressive war against drug
cartels and left-wing insurgents.
To stress the illegitimacy of the Venezuelan state, affirm the benefits of strong US-Colombia
relations, and fuel confidence in the fragility of Maduro’s hold on power, El Tiempo draws
largely from sources within the Colombian state, the United States, and the Venezuelan
Opposition. The views of officials are further legitimated through sourcing practices that
emphasize the perspectives of Venezuelan citizens, who appear as the “worthy victims” in El
Tiempo’s coverage. The mobilization of Venezuelan citizen’s victimhood functions to further
"El momento en el que Juan Guaidó cruzó la frontera para ir al Venezuela Aid Live," YouTube video, 00:45,
posted by "El Espectador," February 22, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aP85KELk8Is.
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delegitimize the Venezuelan state and, in turn, legitimate Colombia’s relationship to the United
States, whose commitment to humanitarian assistance for the Venezuelan people facilitates
ongoing support for the US-Colombia alliance within El Tiempo’s coverage.
By contrast, El Espectador’s coverage of these events constructs alternative conceptions of
victimhood that emphasize the perspectives and concerns of Colombian border communities.
These are built upon broader sourcing practices that include the perspectives of citizens and
political representatives from the Colombian side of the border. El Espectador’s coverage
delegitimizes the “Venezuela Aid Live” concert and the subsequent attempt to introduce
humanitarian aid into Venezuela as not only politically motivated, but also harmful to the
transnational dynamics that underpin the social and economic life of border communities.
Furthermore, El Espectador casts doubt upon the legitimacy of regime change in Venezuela.
This point reflects both the newspaper’s alignment with democratic values––prioritizing regional
political transitions affected without external pressure from actors with disproportionate military
and economic power, such as the United States. El Espectador’s coverage casts doubts upon the
mega-concert and humanitarian efforts, both supported by the United States, which are presented
as illegitimate and ineffective measures to affect regime change in Venezuela, demonstrated by
the newspaper’s emphasis on the practical unfeasibility of such efforts; in particular, the
newspaper emphasizes the consolidation of power by the Maduro regime, which the coverage
asserts holds broad support from military leadership. 114 These discursive themes are grounded
upon sourcing practices that also include the perspectives of Colombian policymakers outside the
Duque administration, members of the Venezuelan state, and analysts from various American
and Latin-American think-tanks and universities. Furthermore, El Espectador’s coverage
reaffirms a conception of Colombian nationhood rooted in liberal democratic ideals, which
rejects Colombia’s deepening relationship with the United States, understood as a regional actor
that supports non-democratic practices; rather, a more global-facing conception of the
Colombian nation is affirmed, through the positive characterization of alliances with regional
states that take more moderate positions towards Venezuela, and with the European Union and
the United Nations, also cast in a more favorable light.
To evidence the contrasts between El Espectador and El Tiempo’s discursive constructions of
similar events, this chapter examines three key moments in their coverage: the meeting between
US President Donald Trump and Colombian President Duque in Washington, DC, held on
February 12, 2019, which reflects divergent constructions of the US-Colombia relationship
within both newspapers; the arrival of international aid to Cúcuta, followed by the “Venezuela
Aid Live” and “Hands Off Venezuela” concerts, which reflects both newspaper’s
characterizations of humanitarian assistance and begins to demonstrate significant contrasts in
their respective constructions of “worthy victims”; finally, the attempts to introduce
humanitarian aid into Venezuela, led by Venezuelan protesters at the urging of Opposition
leaders, and the ensuing narration of these events in both newspapers, which affirm divergent
constructions of victimhood, attributions of blame, and constructions of Colombian national
identity.
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February 12, 2019: Duque and Trump meet in Washington, DC
Prior to the attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela, on February 23rd, 2019, the
contrast between El Espectador and El Tiempo’s coverage of President Iván Duque’s visit to
Washington, DC, which took place on February 16th, 2019, reflects broader differences in the
perception and construction of the US-Colombia relationship within both newspapers.
El Tiempo’s characterization of President Duque’s visit to Washington emphasizes the benefits
of strengthening the US-Colombia partnership. While El Espectador emphasizes the significance
of Venezuela as a key factor in US outreach to Colombia, El Tiempo detaches US opposition to
Venezuela from its characterization of strengthening Colombian relations with the United States,
which are instead attributed to President Duque’s leadership, as he aims to strengthen
Colombia’s regional status.
Thus, the first line in Relations between the United States and Colombia strengthen following
shift by Duque115 (16 February, 2019) notes:
Notwithstanding the emphasis on the issue of Venezuela, the first official visit of
President Iván Duque to Washington served to consolidate the strategic relation with
the United States and as a platform to position Colombia as a regional leader at the
first level.
In this way, the article frames President Duque’s visit to the United States as motivated
by an eagerness to strengthen US-Colombia relations; the subject of regime-change in Venezuela
is, from the start, displaced. Moreover, in contrast to El Espectador’s framing of the event, in El
Tiempo, President Duque and President Trump are presented as equals; the article notes, “Duque
acquired the compromise, as much of the [Colombian] Congress as the Trump
administration, to deepen cooperation” with the United States. President Duque is presented as
holding significant influence over both Colombian affairs and US foreign policy decisions.
The article also establishes a key theme in El Tiempo’s characterization of the US-Colombia
relationship: the economic benefits of positive relations with the United States. Thus, early in the
article––before humanitarian aid to Venezuela or US support for anti-narcotrafficking are
mentioned––it is noted that, while in Washington, President Duque sought to promote
“commercial opportunities...to expand cooperation in diverse areas of the bilateral relationship.”
This thesis persists throughout El Tiempo’s characterization of US-Colombia relations. For
example, the article provides links to two articles, Promoting investments, Duque’s objective on
his second day in the United States 116 (February 14, 2019) and ‘Colombia is open for business’:
Sergio Gómez Maseri, “Relaciones entre Colombia y EE. UU. Se fortalecen tras gira de Duque,” El Tiempo,
February 16, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/eeuu-y-canada/balance-de-la-visita-de-ivan-duque-a-estadosunidos-327810.
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Duque to business leaders in the United States117 (February 14, 2019)––only then followed by
The keys to Trump and Duque’s alliance to ‘liberate’ Venezuela 118 (February 14, 2019). The
order of these links reflects another observed discursive pattern within El Tiempo’s coverage
preceding the events of February 22-23: the representation of Venezuela as a secondary, or
tangential issue to President Duque’s attempt to strengthen relations with the United States.
Indeed, the article, Relations between the United States and Colombia strengthen following
shift by Duque, displaces the subject of Venezuela and implies that the United States are
reluctant to interfere in Latin American affairs. Yet, this follows the article’s own affirmation of
President Duque’s successful negotiation of a new bilateral agreement, to replace “Plan
Colombia and Paz Colombia,” presented as “Colombia-20-23, which will guarantee the support
of the United States for four more years”––which both presents evidence of the Trump
administration's willingness to expand its influence in Latin America, contrary to claims of US
neutrality, and alludes to a previous military and economic partnership, Plan Colombia, through
which Colombia has received over $6 billion in US aid since the year 2000. Nevertheless, the
article presents this new agreement as “not a small feat facing an administration like
Trump’s, which has been reducing its foreign expenditures and avoids expanding its
footprint in other latitudes.” These bolded statements function to displace concerns about US
military intervention in Venezuela. Only much later––in the 13th paragraph––does the article
note the centrality of Venezuela to Duque and Trump’s discussion:
The most relevant role played by Duque was on the topic of Venezuela…[Duque]
helped to coordinate a massive push by the international community against the regime of
Nicolas Maduro that will launch this week on multiple fronts.
Subsequently, the character of this “massive push” is clarified as strictly humanitarian:
“led by the director of USAID [and] US officials led by Senator Marco Rubio.” However, this
characterization fails to note the presence of the US military, who accompany the delegation––a
key factor in rising tensions with the Venezuelan state and growing concerns of military
intervention against Venezuela.

Figure 3.1119
Política, “‘Colombia está abierta para negocios’: Duque a empresarios de EE. UU.,” El Tiempo, February 14,
2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/presidente-duque-hablo-en-la-camara-de-comercio-de-estadosunidos-326796.
118 Sergio Gómez Maseri, “Las claves de la alianza de Trump y Duque para ‘liberar’ a Venezuela,” El Tiempo,
February 14, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/eeuu-y-canada/trump-y-duque-sellan-alianza-para-liberar-avenezuela-326618.
119 The first article, included as a link in the article under analysis, is titled, The second of three military planes with
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In this manner, El Tiempo’s coverage preceding the events of February 22-23 displaces the issue
of Venezuela and, instead, centers the benefits of strengthening Colombia’s relationship to the
United States, which emerges as the dominant narrative in its coverage. This neglects the
interrogation of Venezuela as a key factor in the United States’ willingness to extend financial
support and strengthen diplomatic ties with Colombia, or Colombia’s foreign policy shift against
Venezuela as part of its own strategy to retain US economic and military support. All the while,
the coverage decenters the subject of a possible US military intervention in Venezuela––in fact, a
key concern that arose out of the Washington meeting between Duque and Trump. This contrasts
El Espectador’s coverage, which insists upon the subject of possibly violent regime change in
Venezuela, led by the United States and supported by Colombia, and implies that Colombia’s
eagerness to support regime change in Venezuela may be part of a strategy to sustain a fragile
US-Colombia relationship, which may give the United States greater leverage and, in turn, allow
it to utilize Colombian territory at will.
Earlier coverage from El Espectador not only denounces calls for a military coup or intervention
in Venezuela, but also casts doubt upon such methods as effective ways to bring about regime
change in Venezuela. As such, an early article, The true face of power in Venezuela 120 (26
January, 2019) emphasizes the power held by Maduro over the armed forces, whose leadership
remains unconditionally loyal to the “anti-imperialist and socialist principles of Hugo Chávez”
and, furthermore, exercise control over core industries and public services: enterprises related to
agriculture, communications, transportation, digital television, investment, construction, and
mineral water production, totaling eleven of thirty-two Venezuelan ministries, in addition to a
key financial institution, the Bank of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces. The article
concludes that even if Maduro were ousted from power by force, the military––who have already
rejected an alliance with the Venezuelan Opposition––would be positioned to take control in
Venezuela. Thus, early coverage in El Espectador frames the violent regime change as
impractical and casts doubt upon the viability of Juan Guaidó’s presidential ambitions.
Such characterizations of the balance of power in Venezuela contextualize El Espectador’s
subsequent coverage of President Duque’s visit to Washington, which places a critical emphasis
upon the possibility of violent conflict that may result from the deepening US-Colombia
relationship under the Duque administration. Contrary to El Tiempo’s coverage, El Espectador
frames Colombia’s relationship to the United States as a liability, given a frequent editorial
focus––highly dependent upon the citation of sources from Washington think tanks and
academia––on the possibility of US military intervention in Venezuela, in which Colombia may
play either a cooperative or active role. Moreover, the coverage of President Duque’s visit to
Washington constructs a notion of the Colombian state as subordinate to the interests of the
United States––presented as a dynamic that may undermine Colombia’s relationship with
neighboring countries and contradict official commitments to liberal-democratic values.

Redacción Internacional, “El verdadero rostro del poder en Venezuela,” El Espectador, January 26, 2019,
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Thus, an article written before the Washington meeting, titled What will Duque find in the
United States?121 (12 February, 2019) establishes the possibility of Colombia’s support for US
military action against Venezuela as a key concern, echoed throughout the ensuing coverage:
In Washington, [Duque] receives a recurring question: “President, at what point does the
United States count with your government before a military intervention in Venezuela to
topple Nicolás Maduro?
In turn, the article establishes the narrative that Duque’s opposition to the Maduro regime is part
of a strategy to gain the attention of the United States, whose relationship with Colombia may be
in jeopardy following the gradual reduction in intensity of anti-narcotrafficking operations by the
Colombian state. This narrative is legitimated through the citation of an international relations
analyst at the University of Florida, who states:
The drug war is an important theme, but Duque knows that he has no results to show. So
from [the] United States there exists interest in knowing how far Duque is willing to go in
finding a final solution to Venezuela. Would he be willing, for example, to lend the
territory of his country so that, from there, the United States could launch a military
offensive? (emphasis added).
This final question implies that, in order to strengthen the US-Colombia partnership,
Duque may have to allow the expansion of the US military presence on Colombian territory, or
perhaps play an active role in a future US military intervention in Venezuela. Subsequently, the
article condemns Duque’s alignment with the United States, voicing support for regional
alliances, instead, to reduce the risk of violent conflict with Venezuela:
For the analyst, Duque has managed to connect very well with the warmongering faction
of the Trump administration...which could lead to problems with [US Democrats]...and
other Latin-American governments who, while they hope Maduro will leave, reject the
possibility of a military intervention.
Although the article then cites the Colombian ambassador to the United States, Francisco
Santos, who claims, “our emphasis is on humanitarian aid. We haven’t spoken a word of military
intervention,” the placement of this claim after the earlier assertion of Colombia’s willingness to
acquiesce to the priorities of the United States––which has demonstrated an eagerness to depose
the Maduro government by any means––casts doubt upon the ambassador’s claim. Moreover, the
placement of the analyst’s interpretation before the Santos’ statements reaffirms a prioritization–
–characteristic to El Espectador––of “experts” and academics, before Colombian state actors.
Indeed, to further erode trust in Santos’ claim that humanitarian aid––not regime change––is the
central focus of Colombia’s meeting with the United States, the article cites another academic
source, an analyst from the US think tank, Inter-American Dialogue, who notes that in the event
of a serious provocation by Maduro, the Lima Group would likely prefer that Colombia and
Brazil––not the United States––take military action against Venezuela. Nevertheless, the
César A. Sabogal, “¿Qué va a conseguir Duque en EE. UU.?,” El Espectador, February 12, 2019,
https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/que-va-conseguir-duque-en-ee-uu-articulo-839307.
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addition of this interpretation functions to re-center the possibilities of military intervention or
violent conflict with Venezuela as central concerns surrounding Duque’s visit to Washington.
In conclusion, the article frames Duque’s demonstrated willingness to cooperate with the Trump
administration––and, in turn, the heightened possibility of violent conflict with Venezuela––as
part of a strategy to improve Duque’s image with the Colombian public: a member of the interim
Venezuelan government, based in Washington, states “Duque comes to [pressure]
Maduro...which will help improve the negative image he has in [Colombia], according to the
polls.” This concluding statement casts further doubt upon the notion that the provision of
humanitarian assistance to Venezuelan citizens is the true motive of Duque’s visit to
Washington.
The same day, El Espectador publishes another article, Asking Duque to not make territory
available for military operations against Venezuela122 (12 February, 2019), which highlights the
voices of government critics concerned that President Duque’s visit to Washington may
prefigure military conflict with Venezuela:
22 [Colombian] congress members from different parties in Congress and hundreds of
people and social organizations [expressed] their rejection of any action that may
implicate the participation of Colombia in an armed conflict with Venezuela
[including] the possibility that US military forces may utilize our ground, sea or
airspace, as a theater for belligerent operations against our brother country.
Thus, El Espectador frames Duque’s upcoming Washington in the context of local, bipartisan opposition to “the permissive attitude of the [Colombian] Government” with respect
to US interests and priorities, which––suggested by the concerns presented by these government
critics––may include military intervention in Venezuela.
In turn, articles such as What Trump said about Venezuela in his meeting with Iván Duque123
(13 February, 2019) and What follows the meeting Duque-Trump124 (13 February, 2019)
characterize the United States as the actor with greater leverage in the US-Colombia relationship;
Colombia appears subordinate to US interests, as President Duque aims to secure US support by
demonstrating a stronger stance against Venezuela. Thus, the former article begins, “Trump
[said]...that all options are on the table on the topic of Venezuela” (emphasis added). Similarly,
the latter article states, “[Trump] insisted that all options surrounding Venezuela are on the table,
including a military intervention” (emphasis added). These discursive patterns suggest that the
United States is the protagonist of what should be bilateral conversations.

Redacción Política, Piden a Duque no disponer del territorio para operaciones militares contra Venezuela,” El
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Trump speaks, Duque listens:

Figure 3.2
El Tiempo and El Espectador’s contrasting discursive constructions of the same events result in
significant part from each newspaper’s choice of sources that hold ideological affinity with each
newspaper’s editorial leadership and intended audience. While El Tiempo regularly cites highlevel Colombian diplomats––such as Ambassador to the US, Francisco Santos––President
Duque, President Trump, and members of the United States Congress, El Espectador also
includes the perspectives of academics, members of various international think-tanks, American
and Colombian academics, leaders of Colombian social organizations, and opposition members
of the Colombian Congress. In turn, the discursive construction of events by each newspaper is
necessarily divergent. However, key omissions, even from trusted sources, function to a similar
effect. In the case of El Tiempo’s coverage of the Washington meeting, exemplified in the
Relations between the United States and Colombia strengthen following shift by Duque (16
February, 2019) article, Trump’s statements indicating that “all options surrounding Venezuela
are on the table, including a military intervention,” are noticeably absent; yet, these are included
in El Espectador’s coverage. When the issue of Venezuela––specifically, the provision of
humanitarian aid into Venezuela, a key subject of discussion at the meeting between the two
presidents––is finally noted, El Tiempo’s article implies that the aid will be delivered to
Venezuelans already within Colombia, when in fact the humanitarian aid was to be introduced
into Venezuela against the wishes of the Venezuelan state, heightening concerns over national
sovereignty on its part:
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President [Duque] helped to materialize additional [aid] shipments with a value of up to
150 million dollars to assist the delicate situation which has provoked the entry [into
Colombia] of 1.3 million Venezuelans in the last year (emphasis added).
The arrival of international aid to Cúcuta and the dueling concerts
As each newspaper traces the events following President Duque’s visit to Washington––the
“Venezuela Aid Live” and “Hands Off Venezuela” concerts at the Colombo-Venezuelan border,
on February 22nd, and the attempt by the United States, the Venezuelan Opposition, and the
Colombian state to introduce international humanitarian aid into Venezuela, on February 23rd––
the key themes established in the early coverage not only persist, but also are deepened. While El
Tiempo’s coverage legitimates the “humanitarian” character of the food and medical assistance
that the Venezuelan Opposition, the United States, and the Colombian state seek to introduce
into Venezuela, displacing concerns about a US military intervention, El Espectador’s coverage
raises skepticism about these claims, foregrounding instead the material needs of Colombian
border communities, drawing from sources within the Venezuelan state, government
representatives from Colombian border towns, and Colombian border citizens to emphasize the
marginalization of Colombian citizens relative to Venezuelan citizens, whose victimhood
becomes the central justification for the introduction of humanitarian into Venezuela.
In El Tiempo, articles such as, Second of 3rd planes with help for Venezuela arrive in Cúcuta 125
(16 February, 2019) construct a narrative of friendship between the United States and Colombia,
a relationship which contributes to the national conception rooted in militarism, supported within
El Tiempo’s coverage. In turn, the subject of humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans is
displaced; thus, the article begins:
The first two of three C-17 planes of the US Air Force with humanitarian assistance
for Venezuela arrived this Saturday to the border town of Cucuta, leaving from a base in
the state of Florida.
Here, the article bolds “US Air Force”––not “humanitarian assistance for Venezuela”––
centralizing the presence of the US military. Similarly, the following paragraph notes,
The first plane, which left from the air base of Homestead, south of Miami (US),
landed in the [Cucuta]...with nutritional supplements for nearly 3,500 children who
suffer malnutrition and hygiene kits for at least 25,000 more [according to] US
diplomatic sources.
Again, the article bolds the details of the US military presence in Colombia––rather than
the details of the humanitarian assistance.
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Following this centralization of US power, the article then both legitimates the humanitarian
character of US aid––irrespective of the US military presence––and affirms a notion of equality
and cooperation between US and Colombian leadership. Thus, the article includes a tweet from
Francisco Santos, Colombian Ambassador to the United States, which states, “The first plane
lands with humanitarian assistance for the Venezuelan brothers. God bless all those who made
this relief possible. @IvanDuque @realDonaldTrump @AlvaroUribeVel,” which both specifies
the recipients of the humanitarian aid––vulnerable Venezuelans––and attributes the plan to
deliver humanitarian assistance to Colombian President Ivan Duque, US President Donald
Trump, and former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe:

Figure 3.3
The characterization of Venezuelans as victims is supported by a later quote, also by Santos:
“The most important thing is to feed Venezuelans and give medicine to the sick;” here,
Venezuelan citizens are generalized as helpless and sick. This statement is followed by the
citation of a communication from the US embassy to Colombia, “Additional US military planes
will take place in the next days to deliver humanitarian assistance to help the most vulnerable
populations;” here, the presence of US military planes at the Colombo-Venezuelan border is
once again articulated as motivated strictly by humanitarian concerns.
In turn, the article continues to insist upon the illegitimate character of the Venezuelan state and
the victimhood of Venezuelan Citizens. Sources from the US embassy claim, “the US and
Colombia seek to alleviate the crisis in Venezuela caused by the mismanagement of the
illegitimate regime of Nicolás Maduro...medical emergency packets [and] pharmaceutical
products could save lives.”
Subsequently, the article includes another––of three––tweet from Santos:
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Figure 3.4
Building upon an earlier theme within El Tiempo’s coverage, this tweet places @IvanDuque and
@realDonaldTrump on the same line, which helps sustain a notion of equality between both
leaders. Indeed, a subsequent paragraph notes, “Iván Duque [has] led the diplomatic blockade
against the regime of Nicolás Maduro alongside his American peer, Donald Trump” (emphasis
added). This implication also presupposes an equal cooperation between both actors, while, at
the same time, the emphasis on US military power affirms the benefit of the bilateral relationship
to El Tiempo’s audience––with an affinity for a conception of national identity rooted in
militarism. These characterizations of US-Colombia relations are contrary to those established
through the interpretation of similar events offered by El Espectador, which suggest that
President Duque’s alignment with the United States on the issue of Venezuela results from a
declining US interest––which indicates a power imbalance between the two countries––in
maintaining financial and military support to Colombia, after a reduction in the intensity of
Colombia’s internal drug war.
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Figure 3.5
Subsequently, the article includes a photograph of President Duque, in which––rather than
President Trump, Duque appears speaking to Juan Guaidó. Here, a key function of El Tiempo’s
discourse surrounding humanitarian aid also surfaces: the legitimation of Juan Guaidó’s claims
to the Venezuelan presidency. Following the image, the article notes, “The United States and
Colombia were the first countries...in recognizing Guaidó as interim president after...the 23rd of
January.” Again, the article points to an equivalency between the United States and Colombia;
both countries act in tandem, with shared goals.
In turn, the article reflects another dominant narrative within El Tiempo’s coverage: the centrality
of Venezuelan citizens as “worthy victims” of their state. President Duque characterizes the
arrival of US air force planes as “‘not a doubtful move,’ rather a ‘clear’ gesture of goodwill to
assist with the needs of Venezuelans” (emphasis added). The inclusion of this quote stresses the
victimhood of Venezuelan citizens, at the hands of the “illegitimate regime of Nicolás Maduro,”
which is presented as having “warned [that] it will prohibit the entry of humanitarian aid”––thus,
to blame for the perpetuation of its citizen’s destitution.
Throughout El Tiempo’s coverage, articles emphasize the victimhood of Venezuelan citizens,
while the concerns of Colombian citizens are displaced. Articles such as Arrival of aid and
mega-concert augments pressure over Maduro126 (16 February, 2019) once again foreground
Colombia’s relationship with the United States and emphasize the victimhood of Venezuelan
citizens living under Maduro’s government. Its leading image not only depicts humanitarian aid,
Redacción Internacional, “Llegada de ayudas y megaconcierto aumentan la presión sobre Maduro,” El
Tiempo, February 16, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/llegada-de-ayudas-y-megaconciertoaumentan-la-presion-sobre-maduro-327816.
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but also a US Air Force plane landing in the background; the US-Colombia relationship, as a
factor that contributes to Colombia’s regional supremacy and military strength, remains central
to the coverage of humanitarian aid. Thus, the first line of the article notes, “three planes of the
US Air Force arrived carrying a new shipment of humanitarian aid,” after which the article
stresses the victimhood of Venezuelan citizens, the intended recipients of humanitarian aid:
“Pressure mounts for the regime of Nicolas Maduro, who faces the challenge of the
international community to deliver food and medicine to the most vulnerable
Venezuelans.” The claim that US humanitarian assistance to Venezuela has “international”
support, however, fails to mention mounting international opposition to the project; at this point,
both the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European
Union’s High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have
criticized the politicized character of humanitarian aid for Venezuela and called for stricter
neutrality.127 Furthermore, the Venezuelan Red Cross has stated it “could not participate in the
process of introducing aid into Venezuela, arranged by opposition leader Juan Guaidó,” as noted
in an earlier article by El Tiempo, Venezuelan Red Cross, Willing to Distribute Humanitarian
Aid128 (05 February, 2019). Indeed, the claim that “the [Red Cross] cannot participate in the
process of introducing aid into Venezuela”––presented in the second paragraph––contradicts the
implications of the article title, which fails to clarify that the Red Cross is unwilling to assist in
the distribution of aid across the Colombo-Venezuelan border, as the efforts to do so, without
approval from the Venezuelan state, violate “its principles of impartiality, neutrality, and
independence.” The organization notes its willingness to distribute aid only once already present
within Venezuela.
El Tiempo constructs a narrative of Branson’s concert as a strictly humanitarian endeavor,
accomplished largely through a reliance upon sources from the event’s organizing staff and
Venezuelan attendees. Thus, an article detailing the concert, This is how the ‘Venezuela Aid
Live’ concert will be this Friday129 (21 February, 2019) stresses its function as “to ask the
Chavista leader [Maduro] to allow the entry of humanitarian aid into his country.” The article
cites an organizer for the event, Fernán Ocampo, who notes, “This event will be realized with
the objective of saving thousands of lives”––citing no evidence to support this figure. In turn,
the article notes, “The concert will take place one day before the date chosen by the
president in charge of Venezuela, Juan Guaidó, for humanitarian aid to enter his country.”
Thus, El Tiempo’s coverage of the event also functions to legitimate Guaidó’s claims to the
Venezuelan presidency. Furthermore, the article notes that “this Thursday a plane with 8.4
tons of humanitarian aid from Chile will arrive,” again stressing the global character of this
Redacción EC, “La ONU pide que la ayuda humanitarian llegue a venezolanos que la necesitan,” El Comercio,
February 06, 2019, https://elcomercio.pe/mundo/venezuela/venezuela-onu-pide-ayuda-humanitaria-lleguevenezolanos-necesitan-noticia-605040-noticia/; Redacción Publimetro, “Unión Europea: ‘Ayuda humanitaria a
Venezuela no debe ser politizada’,” Publimetro.pe, February 07, 2019,
https://publimetro.pe/actualidad/internacional/venezuela-union-europea-ayuda-humanitaria-no-debe-politizadanndc-98148-noticia/.
128 Efe, “Cruz Roja venezolana, dispuesta a distribuir ayuda humanitaria,” El Tiempo, February 05, 2019,
https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/cruz-roja-venezolana-dispuesta-a-distribuir-ayuda-humanitaria323234.
129 Sandra Ramírez Carreño, “Así será el concierto ‘Venezuela Aid Live’ en Cúcuta, este viernes,” El Tiempo,
February 21, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/asi-sera-el-concierto-venezuela-live-aid-en-cucuta329348.
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event; yet, this bolded section, stressing Chilean support, is followed by, “some 300 tons of
supplies from the United States and Puerto Rico have arrived”; this demonstrates an attempt to
construct a notion of broad, international support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to
Venezuela, whereas the United States remains the main provider of humanitarian supplies. El
Tiempo’s characterization of Maduro’s “Hands Off Venezuela” concert, however, gives few
details of what is described as a “concert of Chavismo”; the article includes only one quote from
a Venezuelan state official who notes, “we will defend our territory.” The inclusion of such
language, in turn, implies a violent response from the Venezuelan state––to what has been
insisted upon as a strictly humanitarian event. Specifications of the pro-peace slogans which, in
fact, characterized the Venezuelan concert are omitted; in turn, the reader is left to conclude that
the Venezuelan state is prepared for violent conflict.
The article also includes a video, which evidences the sourcing practices characteristic to El
Tiempo’s broader coverage: a Venezuelan citizen, who affirms the humanitarian motivations of
the concert, is interviewed, followed by Fernán Ocampo.

Figure 3.6
The first Venezuelan interviewed notes, “Of course, we’ll be at the concert, but what
interests us the most is the entry of humanitarian aid.” In turn, Ocampo claims,
One, it’s a concert to save lives...it’s a concert of life, to pass humanitarian assistance into our
brother country, because they are dying and there are 3 million displaced people...it’s a concert of
brotherhood.

These themes are evidenced in another video posted by El Tiempo, Thousands cross border on
the eve of the concert130 (21 February, 2019), which highlights the perspectives of Venezuelan
migrants to Colombia. The first migrant interviewed describes coming to Colombia every day for
130

"Miles cruzan la frontera en víspera del concierto," YouTube video, 03:43, posted by
"El Tiempo," February 21, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_00NtlivZI&feature=emb_rel_pause.
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groceries, which he states are cheaper in Colombia. Another migrant states that “everyone is
leaving to other countries,” noting the scarcity of products in Venezuela and the inadequate
minimum wage in Venezuela. Later, the host of the video, El Tiempo’s international subeditor,
claims that “there is a lot of hope in relation to the humanitarian aid, but also a lot of fear as to
what may happen this Saturday, February 23rd, the date chosen by Juan Guaidó for aid to enter
Venezuela”; given the emphasis that has thus far been placed upon the opposition of the
Venezuelan state to the entry of humanitarian assistance, this “fear” may be interpreted as fear
that the Venezuelan state may respond with violence. Indeed, another Venezuelan citizen notes,
“we are going to support the concert, because we believe it is a global message to the murderous
regime of Nicolás Maduro that we want peace” (emphasis added). In turn, another couple of
Venezuelan citizens, volunteering to deliver aid, claim “we need to do all that Guaidó says,”
again legitimizing Guaidó’s status as the country’s leader.
On the day of the concert, another video Venezuelans extend their welcome to the Venezuelan
Aid Live concert131 (22 February, 2019) emphasizes the successful attendance of the event,
highlighting the perspectives of Venezuelan citizens. Venezuelans speak to the camera, stressing
the need for humanitarian aid to enter their country––and expressing confidence that the aid will
pass––in between shots that evidence the massive crowd at the concert. The interviewee, shown
below, states, “we invite you all to come, united for Venezuela.”

Figure 3.7
While El Tiempo finds greater value in the stories of suffering told by Venezuelan citizens, El
Espectador highlights the perspectives of Colombian border communities; through El
Espectador’s coverage, these actors emerge as legitimate victims, too––yet, as victims of the
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"Venezolanos invitan al concierto Venezuela Aid Live," YouTube video, 03:25, posted by
"El Tiempo," February 22, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SdnRinMnT-M.
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Colombian state and allies such as the United States, who are characterized as responsible for the
crises inaugurated by the attempts to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela.
February 23rd, 2019: The attempt to introduce aid into Venezuela
El Tiempo’s characterization of the attempt to introduce aid into Venezuela continues to mobilize
the narratives of Venezuelan citizens, as victims of the Venezuelan state, to legitimate the efforts
to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela on February 23rd. Furthermore, during El Tiempo’s
coverage of these events, the newspaper nurtures the hope of a military coup in Venezuela––or
perhaps a military intervention by the United States––insisting, through the repetition of articles
concerning military desertions, that a low-point in military support for Maduro draws near.
Articles such as Mother and child protest together against the regime132 (24 February, 2019)
reaffirm the clear lines between victims and victimizers that have thus far characterized the
newspaper’s coverage, which emphasizes the suffering of Venezuelan citizens at the hands of
their state. The article narrates the events of February 23rd through the perspective of a
Venezuelan border resident, a mother who supports the entry of humanitarian aid into Venezuela
on February 23rd alongside her son––who claims, “I prefer to receive harm in her place. I
prefer, a thousand times over, receiving a gunshot over her.” Moreover, the article presents
Juan Guaidó as “the president in charge of Venezuela” even though the efforts to introduce aid
into Venezuela fail. In conclusion, the article notes that “dozens of [Venezuelan] military
members ceased to be loyal to Maduro,” a point insisted upon earlier in the article, with the
paratextual link to the article, In the guard ‘they feed us like dogs’, says runaway soldier133 (26
February, 2019). By now, an emphasis on the phenomenon of army deserters in Venezuela has
already become a focus of El Tiempo’s ongoing coverage.
Indeed, reference to Venezuelan army desertions begins the video, This is how D-Day goes at
the border134 (23 February, 2019), which frames the events of February 23rd as sparked by “the
desertion of various members of the National Bolivarian Guard at the border.” The video centers
upon the humanitarian personnel aligned with Guaidó, who is depicted in a characteristically
triumphant manner: leading the caravan approaching the border with humanitarian aid.
Accompanying articles, such as Chaotic: such was the day to deliver aid into Venezuela 135 (26
February, 2019) emphasize the harm done to protesters by the Venezuelan military, centering the
perspectives of Venezuelan citizens present at the border to assist the delivery of humanitarian
aid by Guaidó who attest to violence on the part of Venezuelan state forces as “routine” and
“dream of a free Venezuela.” While the delivery of aid, at this point, has been unsuccessful, the
article nonetheless affirms the sentiments of protestors who note “no one can say we failed if
Sandra Ramírez Carreño, “Madre e hijo protestan juntos contra el régimen,” El Tiempo, February 24, 2019,
https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/madre-e-hijo-protestan-juntos-contra-el-regimen-330934.
133 Gustavo A. Castillo Arenas, “En la Guardia ‘nos alimentan como perros’, dice militar fugado,” El Tiempo,
February 26, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/testimonios-de-militares-quedesertaron-de-las-fuerzas-armadas-de-nicolas-maduro-330920.
134 "Así va el ‘Día D’ en la frontera," YouTube video, 03:18, posted by "El Tiempo," February 23, 2019,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zAi3HDsro9w.
135 Sandra Ramírez Carreño, “Caótica: así fue la jornada para ingresar ayuda a Venezuela,” El Tiempo,
February 26, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/asi-ha-sido-la-jornada-para-ingresar-ayudahumanitaria-a-venezuela-330558.
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actually there was always an intent...this is the beginning of victory...tomorrow, Venezuela
awakens differently.”
Days after the failed attempt to deliver aid, articles in El Tiempo continue to assert Guaidó’s
status as interim leader, citing his ongoing meetings between his cabinet and the Duque
administration. From these conversations, the calls for Venezuelan military desertions from both
leaders are reflected throughout the coverage, seen in headlines such as ‘I have told the military
to put themselves on the side of the people’: Guaidó 136 (26 February, 2019). While the attempt
to deliver humanitarian aid has failed, such headlines imply that regime change is still possible,
yet that declining military support––which ongoing coverage centered upon military desertions
reflects––may present the final factor in Maduro’s fall. The emphasis on military desertions
surfaces again with the inclusion of the paratextual links:

Figure 3.8
Ongoing references to military desertions, apparent throughout the coverage of the events of
February 23rd, function to imply that–– given the failed attempts at peaceful protest––regime
change in Venezuela depends upon the use of military force, either through an internal military
coup or a US military intervention, a sustained threat included throughout El Tiempo’s coverage
in the lead up to this moment. As such, the sub-headline to the article, Venezuelans wrestle with
the guard to enter their country137 (26 February, 2019), notes “four Venezuelan soldiers
defected, according to Migración Colombia,” followed by paratextual links that, once again,
direct readers to articles concerning military defections. In the aftermath of the events on
February 23rd, numerous articles continue to highlight the phenomenon of military defections,
such as The number of Venezuelan soldiers in Colombia has reached 567138 (28 February,
2019). In the article, military defections are presented as an accelerating process, influenced by
the extension of amnesty by Juan Guaidó and the lifting of sanctions by the United States for
deserting soldiers. The article also includes the perspective of an analyst who notes the
“unlikelihood of the security apparatus defending strategic areas if desertions augment,” as the
Gustavo Castillo, “‘Les he dicho a militares que se pongan del lado del pueblo’: Guaidó,” El Tiempo,
February 26, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/declaraciones-de-juan-guaido-antes-deentrega-de-ayudas-humanitarias-330402.
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article notes that “the fissures, although until now not determinant, are increasingly evident,”
citing the example of “two generals” responsible for a 2018 attack on Maduro, “hunger in the
barracks,” and “the fracturing of the fundamental pillars of the Armed Forces”––according to “an
expert in military matters.” In conclusion, the article notes,
The abandonment of soldiers from Maduro will continue, and for those who are
compromised in grave violations of human rights, they are willing to continue supporting
him…[yet] not without an exit Plan B, which all of the military high command has, since
none will sacrifice himself for him.
Thus, El Tiempo’s coverage allows its readership to cling to the hopes of a military coup––or
perhaps a military intervention by the United States, once military support for Maduro reaches
the significant low point that, according to its coverage, draws near. The reformulation of the
failed attempts to deliver humanitarian aid as a success––as the breaking point from which
military support for Maduro begins to crumble––contrasts El Espectador’s construction of the
same events and their aftermath.
Conversely, El Espectador’s coverage following the events of February 23rd characterizes the
attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela as a failure, casting doubt upon the
viability of violent regime change. Specifically, El Espectador’s coverage gives no indication of
violent regime change at the hands of the Venezuelan military––or external actors such as the
United States––as a likely, nor legitimate option to resolve the political and economic crises in
Venezuela. Rather, El Espectador’s coverage indicates that the failure to introduce humanitarian
aid into Venezuela reflects Maduro’s hold on power. Therefore, in the aftermath of the failed
attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela, and taking into account Maduro’s ongoing
hold on power, El Espectador’s coverage highlights efforts to discuss regime change in
Venezuela within organizations such as the Lima Group, which is presented as one possible
arena to facilitate political change in Venezuela through peaceful, diplomatic negotiations.
Furthermore, El Espectador’s subsequent coverage insists upon the victimhood of border
communities. Through their perspectives, El Espectador attributes blame for the chaos, violence,
and mounting insecurity at the border––understood as direct results of the humanitarian efforts––
to the Venezuelan Opposition, the Colombian state, and the United States.
El Espectador’s commitment to broader and alternative narratives of victimhood is evidenced by
articles such as, When Cúcuta was global news139 (22 February, 2019). The article, which very
title implies that Cúcuta was at the center of global news, but that this temporary attention did
not persist, centers the perspectives of Colombian border communities. First, the article notes,
“taxi drivers and those who work in the city’s hotel industry don’t ever remember Cúcuta
receiving this much attention.” In turn, another taxi driver refers to the days surrounding the
concert as “better, because there is a little more work”; similarly, a hotel receptionist states, “she
is happy with the large amount of visitors the city has received.” In turn, the sub-headline “From
the party to the hangover” introduces a new theme: the climate of uncertainty and fear
provoked by the concert and the attempt to introduce humanitarian aid, which the article
characterizes as part of “the international strategy to provoke the fall of Nicolas Maduro in
Jesús Mesa Mosquera, “Cuando Cúcuta fue noticia mundial,” El Espectador, February 22, 2019,
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Venezuela.” The article notes that border communities fear the introduction of aid into
Venezuela may “take a turn for the worst.” In conclusion, the article notes that efforts by
“volunteers loyal to Guaidó...to convince [the Venezuelan military] that there is a humanitarian
crisis in their country, which has been underestimated by Maduro...will be much more difficult
than had been thought”––contrasting the narratives of hope and optimism highlighted by El
Tiempo’s coverage. In this way, the article not only casts doubt upon the legitimacy of the
humanitarian efforts––they are presented as part of a political project to provoke the downfall of
the Maduro regime––but also upon their feasibility; irrespective of Guaidó’s hopes, US support,
and Colombia’s cooperation, the article’s conclusion that the Venezuelan military, the key factor
to Maduro’s hold on power, remains loyal, suggests that efforts to provoke regime change are illfated. Furthermore, unlike El Tiempo, the article also emphasizes the political motivations
behind the “Venezuela Aid Live” concert; Cúcuta is characterized as “the epicenter of the
international pressure led by Colombia and the United States against the government of Nicolás
Maduro,” and the concert is presented as the “climax” of this pressure campaign. In contrast to
similar coverage in El Tiempo, the article also characterizes Maduro’s counter-concert, “Hands
Off Venezuela,” in detail. The article notes that Maduro’s concert “convened thousands of
people, according to television transmitted by the official television network” and notes the antiwar and pro-peace messages of the Venezuelan concert, including images of official screens with
messages like “for war, nothing”, while noting that “attendees rallied with slogans in favor of
Peace and in rejection of foreign interference” (emphasis added).
Thus, El Espectador’s coverage of the attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela on
February 23rd, by supporters of Juan Guaidó, is prefigured by a contextualization of these
events, throughout the preceding coverage, as possible steppingstones to military intervention.
Articles such as Did Maduro cross the red line?140 (23 February, 2019) affirm, indeed, the
victimhood of Venezuelan citizens at the hand of their state, which fired “tear gas and shot
rubber bullets” at protesters urging the Venezuelan state to allow trucks with humanitarian aid to
cross the border. Yet, the article frames the repression of Venezuelan security forces and progovernment militias, upon whom the article places primary blame for the violence against antigovernment protesters on February 23rd, as “anticipated” by the Venezuelan Opposition––part of
a plan to provoke a violent reaction from the Venezuelan state in order to, in turn, justify a
military intervention, likely with support from the United States. Indeed, following the claim, by
an exiled Venezuelan, that violence against protesters by the Venezuelan state “could bring
international consequences against Maduro,” the article includes a link to the article, Trump
reaffirms that a military option is on the table141 (03 Feb, 2019); the reader is reminded that the
effort to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela is motivated, in part, by the urge to provoke
a reaction from the Venezuelan state that would provide the justification for a military
intervention in Venezuela led by the United States, acting upon longstanding claims––with vocal
backing from the Venezuelan Opposition and members of the Duque administration like
Francisco Santos––of openness to violent regime change in Venezuela.
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The article notes that the events of February 23rd have been marked by conflicting attributions of
blame; the Opposition denounced violence by the Venezuelan military as the Venezuelan state,
in turn, denounced these same claims. The article points, rather, to “Bolivarian militia forces,”
armed pro-government groups, as the “out of control” actors most likely to blame for violence
that weekend. These themes within El Espectador’s coverage resurface in articles such as Ureña
and San Antonio: setting of the chaos and repression of aid in in Venezuela142 (23 February,
2019), which reflect the chaos and uncertainty surrounding the events; the article notes that
protesters––as well as members of the Venezuelan National Guard––were harmed, “three of
them shot and the majority due to inhaling tear gas.” In conclusion, the article notes that “heavily
armed” non-state groups, perhaps on both sides, may have also fueled violence.
El Espectador’s coverage of the Lima Group summit following the events of February 23rd
affirm the newspaper’s commitment to peaceful, democratic regime change in Venezuela, and its
rejection of the humanitarian aid efforts led by the Venezuelan Opposition, the Colombian
government, and the United States. Thus, the article, Why is a peaceful and negotiated exit the
only option for Venezuela?143 (24 February, 2019) asserts that “the use of force, as suggested by
the auto-proclaimed president [Juan Guaidó] would be the worst solution for a crisis that affects
Colombia in a direct way.” Citing vocal support for military intervention from the United States,
as well as from Juan Guaidó, who stated “all options are open to achieve liberation,” the article
presents President Duque’s calls for an end to “belligerent discourses” as inattentive, given that
tensions have reached new heights. The potential for violent conflict or military intervention is
affirmed through the citation of an academic source who indicates a growing support for the use
of force to unseat Maduro, from officials in Venezuela, the United States, and Colombia.
Nevertheless, the academic notes that, within the Lima Group, there exists broad opposition to a
military option. The article also notes that many world leaders––even from countries
participating in the humanitarian efforts, such as Spain and Chile––have explicitly rejected
military intervention. Citing another academic source, also at the Del Rosario University, the
article notes that “a peaceful exit and dialogue are the only options.” Furthermore, the article
condemns the attempt to introduce aid into Venezuela as ineffective, given Maduro’s clear hold
on power; this analysis, by implication, insists upon regime change as the motivation for the
humanitarian aid campaign by the Venezuelan Opposition and its allies.
In the immediate aftermath of February 23rd, El Espectador begins to characterize the attempt to
introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela as a failure, noting that protestors felt “abandoned” by
the Opposition and the politicians who called for the weekend’s events. On February 23rd, live
coverage144 included a tweet that already established this key theme:
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Figure 3.9
The tweet states, “#23Feb The people on bridges ask themselves where are the politicians
who convoked them. ‘We are putting everything on the line and they are hiding, like always.”
This claim, a direct quote from a Venezuelan citizen, facilitates the construction of the day’s
events in stark contrast to El Tiempo’s coverage, where Juan Guaidó, in particular, is depicted in
a leadership role––alongside the humanitarian caravan, driving as the head of supporters towards
the border with Venezuela.
Similarly, the article Venezuelan migrants ask themselves where are those who convoked
them145 (24 February, 2019) highlights the perspectives of “disillusioned” Venezuelan citizens,
who crossed into Colombia to support the delivery of humanitarian aid and felt left behind by
“the politicians who convoked them.” Venezuelan citizens are noted to have been made to
believe “the thesis of the Venezuelan Opposition...that the government of Nicolás Maduro would
be history come Sunday.” In the face of well-organized, well-equipped Venezuelan security
forces, the article also indicates that protesters “can do little with a fistful of stones or bottles,”
reflecting the broader emphasis within El Espectador’s coverage upon the tight grip on power
held by Maduro and his forces. The article’s inclusion, as a paratextual, within numerous other
Jesús Mesa, “Migrantes venezolanos se preguntan dónde están quienes los convocaron,” El Espectador,
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articles relevant to the events of February 23rd affirms the centrality of these critiques to El
Espectador’s broader coverage of the attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela.
Subsequent articles establish a direct critique of the Colombian state, from the perspective of
Colombian border communities that faced mounting insecurity and economic distress following
the events of February 22-23rd, a theme that characterizes El Espectador’s construction of the
aftermath of the turbulent weekend. Thus, articles such as Cúcuta, between tension and calm146
(25 February, 2019) emphasize the fear and uncertainty felt by border communities, which are
directly attributed to the binational tensions provoked by the concert and the subsequent, failed
efforts to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela. The text accompanying the leading image
notes, “Protestors at the Colombo-Venezuelan border reject an eventual military intervention;”
the concert and attempt to deliver humanitarian aid are re-framed, from the perspectives of
Colombian border communities, as events that may prefigure an external military intervention, or
escalate tensions between the Colombian and Venezuelan states to the point of military conflict
between the two countries. Moreover, the article draws a distinction between Colombian and
Venezuelan border residents. Venezuelans appear to embrace the possibility of military
intervention in Venezuela:
“Military intervention now,” some affirm. “Mr. Donald Trump, do your thing,” yell
others, placing in the United States their trust that the crisis in their country, which has
forced nearly 3 million people to emigrate, will end.
Colombians, however, are presented as cautious:
But while [Venezuelan] migrants plead for and believe that the possibility of a military
intervention with Washington’s help will resolve their problems, the Colombians who
live at the border find themselves uneasy facing this option, which has made a lot of noise
in the streets of Cúcuta (emphasis added).
In turn, a Colombian resident of Cúcuta is interviewed, who states that since February 23rd,
when Guaidó and his delegation of supporters and volunteers attempted to introduce US
humanitarian aid into Venezuela, “we are on edge. Asking for a war from the outside is easy, but
we are the ones who have to shoulder the burden” (emphasis added). The legitimacy of these
concerns is affirmed through the subsequent citation of a Colombian border representative, who
stresses the need for “Colombia to opt for a passive attitude…[Maduro’s] exit must be
negotiated, measured, cordial, and unspirited. We cannot become warlike nor enter that tone.”
The centrality of Colombian border communities as victims of these events persists, as the article
establishes links between worsening economic conditions in Cúcuta––and the border region as a
whole––and the decline in Colombo-Venezuelan relations, which earlier coverage has already
attributed to Colombia’s eagerness to strengthen its relationship with the United States. Thus, the
article notes that “currency exchangers and businessmen [agree] that [Cúcuta] has taken a hit”
following the concert and the attempt to introduce aid into Venezuela. Similarly, the article
quotes a shoe shiner from Cúcuta who notes,
Jesús Mesa, “Cúcuta, entre la tensión y la calma,” El Espectador, February 25, 2019,
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Here we also have problems. We are waiting for President Duque to fulfill his promises,
because many of us here voted for him...we understand that things with the Venezuelans
are tough, and we support them, but he is the president of Colombia and not Venezuela.
As exhibited in earlier chapters, the construction of discourses surrounding international crises––
in this case, the diplomatic crisis between Colombia and Venezuela––offers an opportunity for
border communities to highlight their own concerns and demands; the discourse constructed
within El Espectador, in highlighting the perspectives of Colombian citizens who are
marginalized by their own state, provides a platform for these citizens, and by extension their
communities, to negotiate their relationship with the state.
Moreover, the article attributes economic precarity in the border region to the decline in
Colombo-Venezuelan relations. Specifically, the article notes that, while unemployment has
largely declined at the national level, unemployment in Cúcuta has not decreased since 2009––
precisely when Colombo-Venezuelan relations began to deteriorate––while the informal
economic sector has also grown during this period. In turn, an analyst from the Cúcuta Chamber
of Commerce notes, “the economy of [North of Santander] [depends] solely and exclusively on
the situation of [Venezuela].” Therefore, the article suggests that the transnational economies
upon which border communities depend are directly harmed by the tensions between both the
Venezuelan and Colombian states. The article’s conclusion casts doubt upon the claims of the
Colombian state that “its interest in resolving [Venezuela’s] problems has to do, precisely, with
that Colombia will improve as a result;” rather, the article notes that “residents of Cúcuta
say...this has yet to be seen.” Thus, El Espectador filters criticism towards the Colombian state
through the perspectives of border communities who present legitimate claims of marginalization
and victimhood.
Perhaps the most emphatic critique of the concert and attempt to introduce humanitarian aid
surfaces in an article published months later, For what did the mega-concert in Cúcuta
serve?147 (13 April 2019), in which the mayors of the Colombian border communities of Cúcuta,
Los Patios, and Villa del Rosario claim that “nothing has changed” following the events of
February 22nd and 23rd. Firstly, the article notes, “Between 2005 and 2016 the border between
Colombia and Venezuela was closed 14 times. Six of them were ordered by Colombia and eight
by Venezuela.” This statement is significant and reflects a broader characteristic of El
Espectador’s coverage in which border closures, so maligned by locals from both sides for their
negative economic and social consequences, are attributed to both the Colombian and
Venezuelan states––by contrast, El Tiempo’s characterization of border closures, particularly
during the weekend of February 22nd and 23rd, emphasizes the decision by Maduro to close the
border, in order to prevent the entry of humanitarian aid into Venezuela.
In turn, the article notes that the “Venezuela Aid Live” concert
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claimed to ask the president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, to allow the entry of
humanitarian aid that various countries had recollected to mitigate the crisis suffered by
Venezuelans (emphasis added).
The implication, here––that the concert did not achieve its intended purpose––is affirmed
by the article’s declaration that “The concert passed. The aid didn’t enter. The trucks were
incinerated (there is still no clarity as to who did this)...[we] continued to remain forgotten”
(emphasis added). Here, the marginalization of border communities throughout the events is
affirmed. To affirm this claim, the article cites the perspective of Juan Fernando Cristo, a native
of Cucuta and ex-Minister of the Interior,
who said on Twitter that “a month after the famous concert at the border and the
frustrated show of humanitarian aid, the situation in Cucuta is worse than ever. No one
from the Government returned to the city and no aid has been decided. Commerce fell by
60%, hotel occupancy by 45%. The social crisis grows” (emphasis added).
The inclusion of Cristo’s declaration that the concert failed to benefit Colombian border
communities––and perhaps deepened pre-existing economic crises––is later supported by more
official sources from the border, who affirm the discrepancy between the priorities of the
Colombian state and those of their communities; the article notes that the three local mayors
cited “agree that after the mega-concert nothing new happened in their regions, although the
Government promised to help” (emphasis added). One of these mayors, Diego Armando
González Toloza––who, the article stresses, is affiliated with centrist and conservative parties––
nevertheless departs from official characterizations of the humanitarian aid efforts; he criticizes
the February 22nd “Venezuela Aid Live” concert and the parallel attempt to introduce
humanitarian aid into Venezuela as factors that deepened pre-existing economic and social
crises for border communities. He notes that, following these events, insecurity and
unemployment rose, while schools, hospitals, and public services became overburdened due to
the border closure; that “for now, the government has not taken a stance. The difficult situation is
not a present reality, rather it is one of many years.”
Thus, the article centralizes the marginalization of Colombian border communities by the
Colombian state. The article notes that the mayor of Cúcuta requested significant financial
assistance from the state to alleviate the financial burdens generated by the total closure of the
Colombo-Venezuelan border––yet, claims by state representatives, indicating official plans to
“benefit and assist the region” are cast into doubt, as the article states, “the representatives of
North Santander, although without much hope, continue to await the plan” (emphasis added).
This lack of hope stresses a dominant narrative throughout El Espectador’s coverage: that the
Colombian state’s support of the “Venezuela Aid Live” concert and the introduction of
humanitarian aid into Venezuela is ultimately detrimental to border communities, who now
suffer the consequences of a total border closure, generated by these events, which are
understood as part of a pressure campaign against the Venezuelan state, supported by the Duque
government and its international allies, the United States and the Venezuelan Opposition.
The article’s conclusion reasserts a key theme of El Espectador’s broader coverage, as it casts
doubt upon the positive implications of Colombia’s relationship to the United States, presented
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as a key source of tension for Colombo-Venezuelan relations and, in turn, border communities.
Thus, while the article notes that Pompeo will meet with President Duque to “present an Impact
Plan to mitigate the effects generated by the migration crisis and the closure of the ColomboVenezuelan border,” the placement of this claim following the characterizations of official
failures to mitigate these crises and the raising of doubt, by local leaders, that further plans to do
so by the Colombian state will be successful, leads the reader to also interpret the claims of
Pompeo and the Colombian state with skepticism; thus far, the article has emphasized the ways
in which the imposition of pressure upon the Venezuelan state has only harmed border
communities. Moreover, the benefits of strengthening the relationship between Colombia and the
United States are put into question––in particular, if either party is committed to resolving
tensions at the Colombo-Venezuelan border, or willing to consider the needs and priorities of
border communities.
In contrast, El Tiempo’s characterization of the events on February 23rd in light of local sources,
reaffirms ongoing narratives that center the victimhood of Venezuelan citizens and assert the
legitimacy of the humanitarian efforts, while sidelining the concerns of border residents
regarding the consequences of these efforts upon local communities. The article, The strong
critiques of the Mayor of Cúcuta against Duque after the 23F148 (28 February, 2019), includes
the perspective of Cesar Rojas, mayor of Cúcuta––yet displaces his criticism of the Colombian
state, the United States, and the Venezuelan Opposition, emphasizing instead the victimhood of
Venezuelan citizens and the Colombian police, in contrast to the mayor’s repeated claims that
Colombian border citizens have suffered greatly from the circumstances following the megaconcert and the attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela. The leading image for the
article already establishes a main focus contrary to its title, which implies that the mayor’s
criticism of the weekend’s events is the central subject of its content; the article emphasizes
instead the illegitimacy of the Venezuelan state, presented as the victimizer of its citizens and a
barrier to the entry of humanitarian aid. The leading image excludes any reference to the mayor–
–or the Colombian border communities on whose behalf the mayor presents strong critiques of
the concert and humanitarian aid.

Figure 3.10
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Thus, from the start, the article attributes the border closure, which has had detrimental effects
upon Colombian border communities, to the Venezuelan state. The mayor is asked, “What effect
does the closure of the border generate over Cúcuta and the surrounding metropolitan
area?” This question, however, establishes the problematic event as the border closure itself,
while neglecting its context––the attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela and the
accompanying US military presence, which led the Venezuelan state to close its border; the
question does not address the source of the border closure: an impending violation of
Venezuela’s national sovereignty marked by the threat of military intervention. Nevertheless,
with respect to the consequences of the border closure, the mayor states, “it is a negative
effect...with all due respect to the president Ivan Duque...it is necessary to find a formula to open
the border.” The article does not, however, indicate that a formula may require a significant
reparation of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela––and, likely, an open
rejection of US claims that “all options are on the table” by the Colombian state, not to mention
the Venezuelan Opposition.
The article then centers its attention on the “moments of tension at the border between Colombia
and Venezuela,” on February 23rd, emphasizing the violence of the Venezuelan state.

Figure 3.11
The Venezuelan Bolivarian National Guard is depicted throwing tear gas at civilians on
the Colombian side. The presence of the Colombian and US military, however, is excluded;
therefore the attribution of blame for violence against Colombia and Venezuelan citizens falls
solely upon the Venezuelan state. By contrast to these dominant narratives––affirmed to a great
extent by the images that accompany the text––later in the article, Mayor Rojas’ critiques finally
surface. Rojas extends victimhood to the Venezuelan state forces; he clarifies that they are also
responding to aggression: the attempt to introduce aid into Venezuela––a violation of national
sovereignty––and the accompanying US military presence. Furthermore, the mayor criticizes the
permissive attitude of the Colombian state towards aggression against Venezuelan state forces,
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affirming that the tensions resulting from the collaboration between the Colombian state and the
Venezuelan Opposition, particularly during the events of the February 22-23 weekend, function
only to harm border communities. Specifically, Rojas condemns any collaboration between
Colombian defense forces and Venezuelan “resistance” members, calling upon the Colombian
state to suppress any aggression on the latter’s part against the Venezuelan National Guard,
which “only looks to alter the harmony in the environment surrounding the city of Cúcuta.”
Throughout the piece, however, large imagery, bolded questioning, and bolded sections continue
to support narratives that––contrary to the Mayor’s––are consistent with the interests of the
Colombian state, the Venezuelan Opposition, and, in turn, their ally the United States. The
discrepancy between the narratives prioritized by the article, which reflect the tendencies of its
broader coverage, and the criticism presented by Mayor Rojas is demonstrated by the
implications of the paratextuals and links that appear throughout the article. One large and
bolded paratextual states, “Note that the Colombian police have the order to stay on those
bridges without weapons, nothing. But when a Colombian police member is harmed, that
could provoke a reaction.” This statement centers the victimhood of the Colombian police; this
is not the focus of the mayor’s critique, in which he centers the victimhood of border citizens.
Similarly, subsequent images and statistics, which follow Rojas’ assertion that border
communities need “other kinds of help, such as promoting employment and resolving
informality”––not temporary humanitarian aid––center the humanitarian aid, whose intended
recipients remain Venezuelan citizens:

Figure 3.12
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Figure 3.13
While Rojas affirms the victimhood of border communities––presented as a consequence
of the humanitarian efforts, which he claims exacerbated informal economies, unemployment,
and security concerns––these large images, which occupy disproportionate space in the article,
center the victimization of Venezuelan citizens at the hands of their state, the legitimacy of
humanitarian aid, and the positive, humanitarian role played by the United states, while the
perspectives of border communities take a secondary role.
It is only in the final paragraph that the mayor’s strong critiques are presented in full:
I have never agreed with this…[these actions] harm the city of Cúcuta and don’t leave us
anything. Here we need to take into account all the difficulties presented for Cucuteños,
because those who live in the center of the country, this doesn’t affect them at all. We
know the difficulty that the Venezuelan people live, and we are in solidarity with that, but
for that reason we need to find other mechanisms. They (Nicolás Maduro and Juan
Guaidó) must resolve their differences between the two governments, but involving us is
difficult. As [mayor] I find myself affected by the lack of security and the lack of clear
policies towards the difficulties of Cúcuta and its borders.
At this point, Rojas affirms that the priorities of the Colombian state, allied with Juan
Guaidó and the United States, have marginalized the needs of border communities. Moreover,
Rojas notes that the introduction of humanitarian aid into Venezuela has generated further
difficulties and insecurity for border residents, whose interests have been sidelined as the
Colombian state has prioritized supporting the Venezuelan Opposition––and, in turn,
strengthening its relationship with the United States.
Within El Tiempo’s coverage, attempts to deflect criticism of the Colombian state, as well as the
Venezuelan Opposition and the United States, are consistent with the coverage explored in
earlier chapters, in which the newspaper places an emphasis upon the victimhood of Colombian
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border communities only when this serves to fracture the legitimacy of the Venezuelan state––
and, in turn, affirm a conception of Colombian national identity rooted in military strength.
Moreover, the attachment to military intervention in Venezuela, presented as a legitimate option
to affect regime change throughout El Tiempo’s coverage reflects a broader commitment––
coincident with the ideological character of the newspaper’s leadership and audience––to
conceptions of national identity rooted in militarism, evidenced by the affirmations of violence
and the commitment to narratives of conflict characteristic to earlier coverage of binational
tensions.
By contrast, El Espectador’s emphasis upon the victimization of Colombian citizens–– framed as
a consequence of Colombia’s eagerness to gain US support and a commitment, by the
Colombian Right, to delegitimize the Left at any cost––reaffirms the ideological characteristics
of the newspaper, observed in earlier chapters. Throughout the coverage of the concert and the
attempt to introduce humanitarian aid, military intervention or conflict are consistently
accompanied by criticism from academics and experts, who affirm the impractical nature of
violent regime change in Venezuela, and ultimately border residents––the victims of such threats
and the accompanying response by the Venezuelan state. Moreover, El Espectador’s quick pivot,
following the weekend of February 23rd, to examples of international negotiations to resolve the
crisis in Venezuela––such as the meetings of the Lima Group that emphasize support for
peaceful negotiation of regime change––reflect its characteristic focus upon a national
conception rooted in a commitment to liberal-democratic values and global cooperation. 149
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CONCLUSION: A FRAGMENTED NATION
In this thesis, I have observed that both El Tiempo and El Espectador construct divergent
nationalist discourses, which appeal to distinct communities, ideologies, and conceptions of
national identity. I have examined the ways in which the discursive actor––and discursive
construction––of Venezuela permits the “imagining” of the Colombian nation. Furthermore, I
have suggested that the textual representation of the border and Venezuelan migration operates
to obscure the internal tensions of the Colombian nation.
In this conclusion, I want to consider the ways in which the nationalistic discourses constructed
within both newspapers converge. In both cases, the Venezuelan state functions as an antithesis
to the Colombian state––either rooted in military strength or a commitment to democratic values.
Moreover, the nationalistic discourses constructed by El Tiempo and El Espectador are coherent
insofar as they define the Colombian nation in relation to the Venezuelan state. In Chapter 1, El
Tiempo provides a platform for border communities to narrate their victimhood at the hands of
the Venezuelan state––to the extent that these narratives of victimhood are coherent with the
newspaper’s conception of the Colombian state as a protector. Similarly, in Chapter 2, El
Espectador presents the Venezuelan state as a failed state, which affirms the exceptional,
democratic character of the Colombian state––presented also as a protector of vulnerable
migrants, fleeing authoritarianism and economic distress. However, when both newspapers
define the Colombian nation in relation to Colombian citizens, their respective discourses
become incoherent.
Within El Tiempo’s discourse, Colombian citizens are only legitimate victims at the hands of the
Venezuelan state. Thus, as we can see in Chapter 3, when border communities are antagonized
by the Colombian state––which is not considered a legitimate victimizer––their narratives of
victimhood are excluded from El Tiempo’s coverage, or obscured and reformulated to the extent
that these narratives may be coherent with El Tiempo’s ideological commitments to militarism
and conflict with Venezuela. Conversely, as illustrated in Chapter 1, El Tiempo’s mobilization of
border communities’ narratives of victimhood––which supports its conception of the Colombian
state as a protector and functions to legitimate militarization in rural border zones––obscures the
legacy of state, or state-sponsored violence experienced by indigenous and peasant communities
at the hands of military and paramilitary forces––a crucial factor behind ongoing internal
displacement in Colombia.
Similarly, in Chapter 3 we observe how El Espectador highlights the victimhood of Colombian
border communities at the hands of the Colombian state and its international allies, as these
narratives of victimhood facilitate the newspaper’s appeals for an inclusive, democratic
Colombian nation; however, throughout El Espectador’s discursive construction of the arrival, or
“encounter” with Venezuelan migrants, analyzed in Chapter 2, the concerns of Colombian
citizens are excluded, marginalized, or reformulated––as they are incoherent with El
Espectador’s conception of national identity––which reveals the fragmented, broken character of
the Colombian nation.
Nevertheless, as the popular rejection of Venezuelan migrants mounts it becomes obvious that
Colombian citizens are not easily compelled by official appeals for inclusion, and that
competition for resources among other conflicts are unavoidable in the context of an unequal
97

society in which the relationship between Colombian citizens and their state is marked by
distrust, violence, and the failure of the Colombian state to follow through with the promises of
inclusion of their own “Others”––as constitutional commitments to multicultural inclusion are
fractured by violence against ethnic minorities, and vulnerable Colombians, particularly in rural
regions, continue to live under threat from paramilitaries, narcotrafficking groups, and state
military forces alike. While both El Tiempo and El Espectador construct Venezuela as an enemy,
or an anti-democratic counterpoint, both newspapers reject a broader representation of
Colombian victimhood, which would require the contextualization of popular distrust in the idea
of the Colombian state as both a protector and a democratic actor. Such a contextualization
would necessitate a discussion of the Colombian conflict. Beyond the legacy of state and statesponsored violence, it would be necessary to ask why a purportedly democratic and inclusive
nation has struggled to achieve internal peace. Failures by the state, institutions, and civil society
to grapple with these contradictions may result from the “comfortable perception of political and
economic stability,” as the Colombian Group of Historical Memory describes the indifference
and passivity to quotidian violence characteristic to a society that remains fractured by the
Colombian conflict and its roots––and suspended by “the negation of the possibility of
coexistence…the radical negation of democracy.”150 It is this perception of “political and
economic stability” to which the nationalist discourses in El Tiempo and El Espectador
contribute, through the externalization and displacement of violence, victims, and victimizers,
and both newspaper’s constructions of the Colombian nation.
The recent focus on border crises and migration within the national media, centered upon
violence, crime, and conflict, and the centrality of Venezuela as an antithesis to Colombia, may
function to shift public attention away from the human costs of a country undergoing neoliberal
reforms that will only exacerbate the structural inequality at the root of the 60-year long
Colombian conflict. Moreover, the construction of Venezuela as a national “other”––either a
failed state or a national enemy––may divert attention from internal failures, such as the
hesitation, on the part of the Colombian Right, to support the Colombian Peace Process, which
entails the demobilization and political reincorporation of the FARC guerilla. Indeed, in 2016,
50.2% of voters rejected the national referendum to end the conflict between the state and the
FARC, although the peace accord was revised and ultimately ratified by the Colombian Congress
later that year. Despite the peace accord, violence against community leaders, activists, peasants,
and indigenous communities has been on the rise, particularly in rural Colombia. Colombian
think-tank INDEPAZ reports that 138 former guerrillas have been killed since the peace accord,
largely at the hands of former or current members of right-wing paramilitary groups.151 Between
2018 and 2019, the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office registered a 47% increase in threats against
social leaders: union activists, human rights advocates, and environmental defenders.152
According to the United Nations, 107 human rights advocates were murdered in 2019, and at
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least 10 activists have reportedly been killed in the first two weeks of 2020.153 Furthermore,
during the summer of 2019, as the Duque government attributed the rise in rural violence to the
still-active ELN and the dissident FARC guerillas, Colombia entered a renewed controversy over
“false positives,” the Colombian military’s practice of identifying civilians as enemy combatants
to inflate kill counts––information that had been withheld from the public. At the same time,
Colombia was reeling from a series of protests in 2018 and in the spring of 2019: multiple
national strikes brought about by a mass mobilization of students, indigenous groups, teachers,
public workers, and organized labor that took place all over the country. In general, the national
strike was set against the implementation of President Duque’s National Development Plan, or
Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (PND). Mobilization against the PND criticized its potential
informalization of labor and reduction of labor protections, its commitment to an extractive
economy near-half dependent on mining and oil, its failure to refinance public education,
guarantee healthcare, raise stagnant public wages, and expand access to education.
While taking these events and Colombia’s current political climate into account, the redirection
of national attention towards Venezuela may also reflect an involuntary blindness on the part of
media producers. Editorial staff are members of distinct knowledge communities, whose
ideological commitments may not be consciously understood as beliefs; the communicative
situations expressed within newspapers such as El Tiempo and El Espectador affirm, necessarily,
social knowledge specific to groups and individuals with personal experiences, assumptions, and
criteria that do not necessarily reflect the Colombian nation, as a whole. The notion of the
Colombian state as a protector may be a legitimate one, for a rural landowner, yet unreasonable
for an indigenous leader protesting state-sponsored mineral extraction. Similarly, the notion of
Colombia as a democratic nation may ring hollow for those who have been excluded from
democratic processes.
Nevertheless, El Tiempo’s construction of events in a manner that so often forms implications
contrary to the text––and the clear connections between editorial and political leadership––
indicate that there may be a more conscious editorial project to conform events, and their
interpretation by readers, to adhere to the newspaper’s commitment to militarization and conflict
with Venezuela. Conversely, in the case of El Espectador, the commitment to an aspirational
conception of the Colombian nation observed within its discourse concerning Venezuela may
reflect an editorial blindness to the experiences of the Colombian working class and internally
displaced people. The newspaper’s own commitment to broader sourcing practices, which
indicates a lesser fidelity to one “truth,” itself engenders the dissonance observed within its
discourse; as the discourse progresses––and evidence against the notion of Colombia as an
inclusive, democratic nation emerges––this aspirational notion becomes contradictory in the
context of the Colombian conflict and its roots.
These observations affirm that nations are limited, fragile projects, which involve both memory
and forgetting. As Benedict Anderson noted in Imagined Communities, nations are ongoing,
flexible, and creative projects that, “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may
prevail in each,” sustain myths of “deep, horizontal comradeship.” 154 Anderson indicated that
Associated Press, “UN Says ‘Staggering’ Deaths of Rights Activists in Colombia,” January 14, 2020,
https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-01-14/un-says-staggering-deaths-of-rights-activists-in-colombia.
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153

99

newspapers represent cultural products through which individuals relate to their imagined
national communities, pointing towards a driving premise to this thesis: that nations are
constructed through discourse––another imagined realm. The construction of nationalistic
discourses within El Tiempo and El Espectador is marked by repetition, even redundancy––
necessary to sustain themes and dominant narratives of the Colombian nation. One would think
that, given the mass-produced and fleeting value of the news, both news producers and
consumers would prioritize news products that were characterized by novelty and difference.
Yet, repetition and redundancy are crucial techniques for the interpellation of national subjects;
as this thesis affirms, news products––while mass-produced and of rapidly depreciating
monetary worth––have significant social and political value; their discursive techniques make
greater sense if they are understood as such––if the news media are understood as mechanisms in
the reproduction of power relations, sites of socialization, and instruments that both reflect the
contradictions of, and yet sustain, imagined nations.
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